How the Russian factor has affected Turkiye’s normalization efforts

Russia has consistently played a significant role in Turkiye’s normalization efforts with both Armenia and Syria. Armenia is often viewed by Russia as part of its sphere of influence, while Syria holds considerable geopolitical importance for Moscow’s ambitions in the Middle East.

Historically, Turkiye’s relations with Armenia and Syria have been strained, with cordial ties existing for only a brief period with Damascus in the pre-civil war era. Ankara is now actively working to normalize its relations with both Yerevan and Damascus. Improving relations with Armenia is vital for Turkiye’s influence in the South Caucasus, while Syria is crucial for its role in the Arab regional system.

With Turkiye in an era of formulating a new foreign policy, Armenia is also reassessing its foreign policy priorities. Despite domestic and diaspora pressures, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Tuesday met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the Turkish House in New York, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. The leaders agreed to “give new impetus” to the ongoing normalization process.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Armenia found itself increasingly vulnerable and so began seeking closer ties with Turkiye and Western nations to safeguard its interests. The full-scale invasion shifted Moscow’s focus away from regional issues, including those in the South Caucasus. Additionally, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh has heightened Yerevan’s urgency to resolve its conflicts with Azerbaijan and Turkiye, as Pashinyan has benefited from the weakening of the pro-Moscow opposition at home.

Armenia’s foreign policy and geopolitical orientation are heavily influenced by its history and geography. Armenia shares borders with Azerbaijan and Turkiye but lacks a direct border with its traditional ally, Russia. Although Armenia has been the only former Soviet state where Russian influence has steadily grown since the Soviet Union’s collapse — as illustrated by the appearance of Russian border guards in 1992 and the establishment of a military base in Gyumri in 1995 — its disappointment with Moscow’s actions during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War has eroded its view of Russia as an ally or security guarantor. This disillusionment has been a key factor driving Yerevan toward Ankara.

The invasion of Ukraine shifted Moscow’s focus away from regional issues, including those in the South Caucasus

Sinem Cengiz

Dissatisfaction with Moscow has prompted Armenia to make bold moves, including providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine for the first time since the Russian invasion and requesting the withdrawal of Russian border troops from Yerevan’s international airport, signaling a further decline in Russian influence.

In regard to the Turkish-Armenian normalization process, we see a decline in the influence of the Russian factor. This is not the first instance of Russia distancing itself from Turkish-Armenian normalization efforts. In 2009, when protocols were signed between Armenia and Turkiye, Russia opted to remain uninvolved. Ultimately, the protocols were not ratified by either parliament.

Currently, two factors are keeping Russia out of the process: the ongoing war in Ukraine and the desire of both Turkiye and Armenia for a bilateral normalization process without third-party involvement. Armenia, in particular, does not see Russia as a favorable partner in this context, despite Moscow’s previous offers of assistance in 2021.

The Russian factor in Turkiye’s normalization efforts with Syria closely parallels that observed in its relations with Armenia. In 2019, developments in Syria were largely shaped by Russian and American influence, which prevented Turkish intervention, particularly their safeguarding of the Kurdish groups considered as terrorists by Ankara.

The presence of Russian military forces has repeatedly thwarted Turkish attempts to initiate military operations in Syria, with at least three planned operations being directly impacted by this dynamic. For Ankara, in certain contexts, Russia has failed to uphold its commitments in the region. Furthermore, there has been little meaningful progress within the Astana process, which involves Turkiye, Russia, Iran and the Syrian regime.

For Russia, the normalization of relations between Turkiye and the Syrian regime remains a key priority

Sinem Cengiz

For Russia, the normalization of relations between the Turkish government and the Syrian regime remains a key priority. By maintaining its presence in Syria, Russia aims to protect its interests in the region. However, geopolitical shifts, combined with the global ramifications of the war in Ukraine, have significantly influenced the dynamics on the ground in Syria. Following its invasion of Ukraine, Russia, constrained by resource limitations, withdrew a number of its troops and some weaponry, including the S-300 air defense system, from Syria. This has ushered in a new chapter of the conflict in Syria. As the conflict dragged on, it was unavoidable for Russia to give concessions to Ankara. Thus, Russian-Turkish relations within the context of the Syrian crisis evolved not only due to the Ukrainian war, but also the dynamics in the region.

As Russia’s military and political influence begins to wane, Arab states are stepping into the role of mediators between Turkiye and Syria. Both Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar Assad have expressed their openness to resuming talks over the past few months. In the late 1990s, it was Arab nations that facilitated the normalization process between Turkiye and Syria. This shift presents a potential advantage for Turkiye, much like the situation with Armenia.

In conclusion, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Turkiye seized the opportunity to engage with both Armenia and Syria, navigating diplomatic channels with a newfound assertiveness. This approach allowed Turkiye to pursue its interests without the constraints of Russian involvement, which had previously complicated relations with these states. By capitalizing on the reduced Russian presence, Turkiye has been able to make overtures to both nations without the need for concessions.

• Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz