This might be Israel’s ultimate strategic gamble
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For weeks, there has been an air of inevitability in Israel about an imminent escalation in hostilities with Hezbollah. Both sides stand on the brink of a full-scale war that could potentially engulf the entire region. Alternatively, they could agree to a last-ditch international effort to secure a ceasefire. The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was a bold, although dangerous, message by Israel that it was prepared to risk regional escalation.
Having spoken over the past two weeks to officials in Israel and some of the few residents who remain in the north of the country after a year of Hezbollah rocket, missile, and drone attacks on their towns and villages, I found a broad consensus that the current situation is intolerable, and demands that the government do something to change an equation that has handed Hezbollah, and by extension Iran, a strategic victory by displacing 60,000 residents from their homes, leaving part of the country mostly uninhabited and on the verge of economic collapse.
For more than a decade, Israeli politicians and senior military commanders argued, not without justification, that of all the theaters of conflict bordering their country, Hezbollah in Lebanon posed the most dangerous, long-term strategic threat. This is because of its massive weapons stockpiles and a military force, estimated to be 40,000 strong, that includes the elite Radwan Force, the presence of which so close to the border has required constant vigilance to prevent an incursion.
Israeli authorities have devoted considerable attention to efforts to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from Iran to Hezbollah. In pursuit of this, they acquired accurate intelligence that led to many operations beyond Israel’s borders. This was all in preparation, following the last major conflict between the two sides in 2006, for another direct confrontation.
There is a school of thought in Israel that views Iran as the head of an octopus, with its allies and proxies the tentacles. Of all those tentacles, Hezbollah is the most militarily potent and, compared with the Houthis or militant groups in Iraq, its proximity to Israel makes it a more valuable asset to Tehran. Consequently, as the massive Israeli bombardment in Lebanon and the assassination of most of the Hezbollah leadership illustrates, the aim of escalating the confrontation is not to bring the group to the negotiation table but to set it back many years in terms of the threat it poses to Israel.
Over the years, Hezbollah’s increasing military capabilities and exchanges of inflammatory rhetoric with Israeli authorities, expressing hostile intentions, have ensured that an eventual, full-blown confrontation between the two was not only a very real possibility, but one that could drag the entire region into a war, including external powers such as Iran.
In April this year, the US, UK, France, and Jordan joined forces to assist Israeli efforts to intercept hundreds of missiles and drones launched by Iran. There is no reason to think that should Tehran launch another similar or bigger attack against Israel in an attempt to ease some of the pressure on its Lebanese ally, an ad-hoc coalition led by the US would not once again come to its aid.
A common mantra over the years has been that neither Israel nor Hezbollah, despite the constant exchanges of vitriol and mutual provocations, has the appetite for a full-scale confrontation, mainly because the damage inflicted on both sides during the 2006 war left them under no illusion about the consequences of another such conflict.
At the same time, the so-called “ring of fire” of pro-Iranian militant movements that exist on Israel’s borders has remained a constant and unnerving threat to its security.
Unlike the Palestinian issue, which includes a territorial dispute and an occupation, since Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, following the ill-conceived invasion of its northern neighbor 18 years earlier, there has been no Israeli military presence there.
For more than a decade, Israeli politicians and senior military commanders argued, not without justification, that of all the theaters of conflict bordering their country, Hezbollah in Lebanon posed the most dangerous, long-term strategic threat.
Yossi Mekelberg
The prioritization by Hezbollah of enmity with Israel is a cynical means of preserving its own power and control over much of Lebanese politics and society, with the group presenting itself as the champion of the Palestinian cause.
The war in Gaza is mired in some sort of stalemate, and efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement with Hamas that would include the release of hostages and the delivery of desperately needed humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza is obviously not a priority for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
As a result, some in his government, led by Defense Minister Yoav Galant and senior military personnel, have forcefully declared that an opportunity exists to hit Hezbollah and hit it hard. The objective would be to diminish the group’s offensive capabilities by creating a military buffer zone that can ensure the security of northern Israel, and the rest of the country, with the additional aim of delivering a hammer blow to Tehran’s hegemonic aspirations.
The discovery in 2018 of Hamas-like tunnels running from Lebanon deep into northern Israel, along with Hezbollah’s plans to take over parts of that territory, sparked concerns that the fate of Israelis living close to the border might be similar to those who lived along the border with Gaza. Those concerns increased following the attacks by Hamas on Oct. 7 last year.
One of the unknowns in all this is whether the attack in Lebanon two weeks ago using thousands of exploding pagers and walkie-talkies — if we make the extremely reasonable assumption that it was carried out by Israeli authorities — is the prelude to a wider military operation than the one already taking place.
Or perhaps Israel acted out of fear that Hezbollah was about to discover the explosives planted in the devices and detonated them, following this up with a military operation that included the elimination of many senior Hezbollah commanders in an effort to translate a successful covert operation into a military, and eventually a political, achievement. While the extensive use of Israel’s air force was only to be expected, there remains the threat that this might be followed by the use of ground troops. Following the killing of Nasrallah, further escalation, perhaps beyond Lebanon, is a possibility, which only a swift response by the international community can avert.
Certainly, Israel’s military plans rely heavily on a best-case scenario that is far from guaranteed. While there is no love lost between Hezbollah and the Lebanese people, or many people across the region, if Israel is indeed intent on using force in Lebanon in the way it has been doing in Gaza, it is hardly likely to drive a wedge between the people of the country and Hezbollah.
Moreover, massive civilian casualties would certainly deepen and broaden the criticisms by the international community, including among those countries Israel would need support from most in case of a regional conflict, who are already critical of the manner in which the war on Gaza has been conducted.
There is also a danger of “mission creep,” especially if an incursion by ground troops intended to be short-term drags on and lasts for months or even years, leaving Israel to deal with damaging guerrilla warfare.
Above all, it might bring us a step closer to fulfilling Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar’s dream of a regional war. This might also suit Netanyahu’s administration, in the belief that it would drag the US and its allies into a war with Iran that might result in the destruction of Tehran’s nuclear and other military capabilities.
But these are extreme scenarios with potentially dangerous and unforeseen consequences, although after Friday night’s events we might be one step closer to them.
• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg
