GCC-Russia dialogue and the lost opportunities
Last Wednesday (Feb. 19), the third ministerial meeting for GCC-Russia strategic dialogue was held in Kuwait. The Russian side, in particular, was keen on holding this meeting after it had been postponed previously. Some thought that Russia was planning to make a new announcement or initiative, but it turned out not to be the case, except for some flexibility on the humanitarian side. As such very few tangible results could be achieved from meeting, other than to continue the dialogue and some common understanding regarding the humanitarian situation.
A few years ago, to the surprise of many, the GCC and Russia decided to start a “strategic dialogue.” The formal ministerial meeting launching the dialogue took place on Nov.1, 2011 in Abu Dhabi, but preparatory meetings took place over a few years before that date.
The Abu Dhabi meeting established, for the first time, a formal mechanism for consultations and cooperation between the GCC as a regional organization and the Russian Federation. It was agreed that the strategic dialogue would cover a wide range of subjects, including trade, investment, energy, education, scientific research, health and the environment, in addition to political coordination and consultation. A memorandum of understanding was signed to that effect in Abu Dhabi in November 2011, an event marked by broad media presence.
Based on the understanding in Abu Dhabi, preparations were started for a “joint action plan” to cover those and other topics, spread over a number of years with clear goals and programmed activities.
The GCC was looking forward to try a new path of cooperation with the Russian Federation after decades of estrangement, and not-so-benign mutual neglect. Prior to the Abu Dhabi meeting, there were only perfunctory, formalized meetings and consultations, usually at the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Starting in 2008, the two sides organized preparatory meetings, designed to prepare the way for the launch of strategic dialogue. Participants at that inaugural meeting spoke of shared determination to enhance peace, security and prosperity, as well as people-to-people contacts to revive shared culture and history.
Economic cooperation was among the key goals of dialogue, as was articulated in particular by the Russian side. Exploratory business contacts had started in earnest. For despite great potential that the GCC and Russian economies possessed, there was only limited trade and investment. In 2012, two-way merchandise trade totaled a meager $2.5 billion; Russian exports amounted for 80 percent of that total. Not much when you compare it to GCC trade with China for example, where two-trade exceeded $150 billion. Or with India, Japan, the European Union or the United States, where GCC trade exceeded $100 billion annually.
More to the point, the limited volume of GCC-Russia trade was miniscule compared to the combined size of their economies, which exceeded $3.7 trillion last year.
Flush with funds from accumulated oil and gas revenues, the GCC and Russian economies are searching for investment opportunities and there is a great potential for mutually beneficial partnerships. Energy in particular is a natural area for cooperation. Russia is a major oil and gas producers. It competes with Saudi Arabia for the top spot in oil production. As a major gas producer, it co-founded the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), based in the Qatari capital, Doha.
Russia is also interested in cooperation in the areas of industry, renewable energies, communications and agriculture.
GCC countries are interested in exploring the potential in higher education and scientific research, to provide opportunities for contact and cooperation between universities and research institutions.
In the political sphere, the two sides appeared in 2011 ready to reach an understanding. Russian Foreign Minister Serguey Lavrov appeared ready to embrace a solution to the Syrian crisis similar to the GCC initiative in Yemen.
However, that auspicious start in Abu Dhabi did not last for long, mainly due to differences over Syria. Soon after that meeting, Russia went on a singular approach that fully sided with the Syrian regime and blocked international efforts to end the crisis. There were serious attempts to bridge the differences. Several high-level meetings were held between the GCC and Russia, in New York, Riyadh and elsewhere, but to no avail.
Even as the death toll exceeded 150,000 — innocents killed by Russian-made and provided heavy weapons and airplanes — Russia ignored appeals by the United Nations Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation for intervention to stop the relentless military attacks by the Syrian regime against civilians.
Russia has advanced several arguments to justify its support for Assad, but they are largely spurious and do not stand up to scrutiny. It says, for example, that it has no interest in prolonging the reign of Bashar Assad, only that his fate should be decided by the Syrian people. Of course the Syrian people have already made their decision quite clear. Tens of thousands have paid with their lives to get rid of Assad and millions have fled the country rather than stay under his rule.
Russia also says that its terrorist groups are taking over the anti-Assad cause and that their victory would have disastrous results for the region. Russia has in mind, in particular, the possible spillover effects on Muslim-majority Russian southern regions. It says that hundreds of Russian Muslims have joined the ranks of anti-Assad groups. However, it is the prolongation of the Assad reign of terror that has made it easy for terrorist groups to find recruits. The sooner the conflict is brought to an end, the sooner those terrorist groups are going to lose their appeal to young recruits.
The main argument that Russia uses has to do with old notions of sovereignty and respect for “international law,” which it believes bars intervention even for compelling humanitarian reasons. But this is the weakest argument that Russia has made, for neither the UN Charter nor international law at large prohibit intervention. In fact, the Charter makes it a duty on the Security Council to intervene, by use of force if necessary, in a situation such as Syria that threatens international peace and security.
Thus while Russia and the GCC are interested in launching a serious strategic relationship, their efforts have not made much headway as the gulf between them over Syria has widened. On the other hand, the fact that Russia voted for the UNSC resolution on Saturday could be a sign that it may move, slowly, to join the international consensus on Syria.
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