Amid a fragile truce, has the world forgotten Gaza?

The ceasefire agreement in Gaza between Israel and Hamas last October was widely welcomed. Yet almost immediately it was met with a mixture of suspicion and fear that it would not extend beyond mere de-escalation, leaving the enclave devastated, partly occupied by Israel and partly controlled by Hamas, and far from progressing toward the subsequent phases as outlined in the Trump peace plan.
Admittedly, the worst-case scenario, the resumption of full-scale war, has not materialized. However, the second-worst outcome persists: an intolerable status quo of low-intensity conflict that continues to claim Palestinian lives, restrict humanitarian aid to this densely populated territory, and offer no meaningful political horizon for a lasting solution — one that will need to address the end of Israeli occupation, the cessation of Hamas rule, and allow the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza to begin its reconstruction work in earnest.
There remains a stark and painful discrepancy between what the people of Gaza urgently need and the slow, often hesitant timeline followed by the negotiating sides while the international community appears to be losing interest. Conditions in the enclave may have improved since the US-brokered ceasefire, but the baseline of comparison is catastrophically low. It is also difficult to meaningfully describe the current situation as a ceasefire when, during this period alone, 786 people have reportedly been killed and 2,217 injured, with the numbers continuing to rise.
A joint UN-EU report titled “Gaza Strip: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment,” published last month, highlights the scale of the catastrophe. It notes that the events during the war, and their continuing aftermath, have set back human development in the territory by an estimated 77 years as a result of around 1.9 million people being displaced, often multiple times, and more than 60 percent of the population having lost their homes. As the report underscores, in such conflicts, it is “women, children, persons with disabilities, and those with preexisting vulnerabilities (who) bear the greatest burden.” These cannot be treated merely as statistics: They represent a society struggling to survive under extraordinary pressure.
There had been an expectation that increased humanitarian aid would accompany political progress toward the second phase of the ceasefire, particularly after the relative success of the first phase, but these hopes have failed to materialize. From the outset, however, it was evident that advancing to Phase 2 would be more challenging as long as Hamas remains in control of large parts of Gaza and the population, and while Israel is governed by an extreme right-wing coalition that has promised total victory and the complete eradication of Hamas, both politically and militarily.

Every day that goes by prolongs suffering.

Yossi Mekelberg

 

One of the central stumbling blocks is the demand for the disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups, but whether and under what conditions they would agree to that remains vague and unclear. The broader objective is to reestablish a legitimate, centralized Palestinian security authority in Gaza, one that holds a monopoly over the use of force. Such an arrangement would be both logical and justified, potentially serving the interests of both Palestinians and Israelis. However, a key question remains: What would Hamas demand in return for not obstructing such a process? Any arrangement would need to be acceptable not only to Israel but also to the wider Palestinian population, instead of being externally imposed, although it would require proactive international involvement.
Adopting more neutral terminology, such as “decommissioning of arms” or “rendering weapons beyond use,” borrowed from the Northern Ireland peace process, might help facilitate dialogue. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. Negotiations between state and non-state actors are inherently complex. State actors often expect non-state groups to dissolve or transition into political entities with limited influence, while non-state actors, despite their weaker position, retain the capacity to act as disruptive spoilers. Hamas exemplifies this dynamic, as it seeks to ensure its physical survival and maintain some degree of political relevance within Palestinian society. Israel, however, categorically opposes any such outcome. Creating a pathway that allows Hamas to disengage militarily while ensuring it no longer poses a security threat is essential, but extremely difficult to achieve.
Another major obstacle lies within Israeli domestic politics. The current government is deeply affected by its failure of Oct. 7, 2023, and by criticism of its conduct during the war in Gaza. It has also entangled Israel in multiple regional wars, while maintaining the stated objective of eradicating Hamas. This has left the government with limited room for compromise. Under pressure from its most hard-line elements, it appears increasingly inclined to transform its occupation of large portions of Gaza into a permanent reality. This approach reflects a longstanding security paradigm that territorial control and buffer zones are the primary guarantees of national security. Yet this very strategy undermines the possibility of a sustainable political resolution.
As Israel moves, at least in practice, if not officially, into an election period, the likelihood of the government making any significant concessions diminishes further. Without a strong and coordinated effort by the US and other international actors, the political incentive for Israel’s leadership to pursue compromise remains minimal. At the same time, global attention, particularly in Washington, has shifted elsewhere since the ceasefire agreement. The mandate of international mediators remains unclear, and the prospects for progressing to subsequent phases of the ceasefire, including the potential establishment of an International Stabilization Force, are uncertain.
Meanwhile, the people of Gaza cannot afford these delays. They cannot afford to be forgotten. Each day without progress exacts a human cost, not only from military operations but also from the collapse of essential services. According to the UN, no hospital in Gaza is currently fully operational, and only about half are partially functioning. Primary healthcare services are severely limited. Although Israel permits a small number of medical evacuations, more than 18,000 people are reportedly waiting for authorization to leave Gaza for urgent treatment, many of them requiring lifesaving care. Food availability has improved somewhat, yet malnutrition remains a serious concern, particularly among children. Every day that goes by prolongs suffering and costs lives.
In the immediate term, the suffering of millions of civilians is morally unacceptable. In the longer term, the failure to resolve the current impasse risks reigniting widespread violence and radicalization, potentially extending beyond Gaza into the West Bank and further afield. The situation demands urgent and sustained international engagement. Without it, the fragile de-escalation that exists today may prove to be nothing more than the calm before the next storm.

• Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House.
X: @YMekelberg