Europe and a possible Trump presidency

With the US presidential race too close to call, there remains significant uncertainty over the outcome when Americans go to the polls in November. Though Kamala Harris is marginally ahead in many national polls, much of the world is nonetheless preparing for the possibility of a second Donald Trump presidency.
It is perhaps Europe, more so than any other single region, that would be at the sharp end of a second Trump term. Disagreements between the traditionally close transatlantic allies were legion between 2017 and 2021, and could be even worse between 2025 and 2029 should Trump return to the White House.
Already it is reported that, on the trade front, the EU has decided the best way to engage Trump would be to try to offer some early deals. The goal would be to reduce a trade deficit in goods that has grown from about €110 billion ($120 billion) when Trump was elected in 2016 to more than €150 billion.
If this deal-making approach fails, Brussels is said to be preparing to respond with a tough series of countermeasures to any sanctions Trump might impose on the 27-member club, including a mooted 10 percent minimum tariff that could have a significant, negative impact on EU exports to the US.
There is a precedent for this approach: In 2018, Brussels introduced tariffs totaling about €2.8 billion after Trump imposed €6.4 billion in tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum, including those from Europe.
While the EU is by no means dismissing the possibility that Harris will win in November, the discontinuity likely to arise from a Trump victory would be significantly greater. So it is no big surprise that polls, including one published by Pew Global in June, reveal that most European populaces would favor, often by huge margins, a Democratic victory.
While it is possible, then, that Harris will win in November, Europe is increasingly waking up to the possibility she will not by making advance preparations for the prospect of a second Trump term, with all the risks and opportunities this would bring. It is not a time for a “wait and see” approach.
While much of Europe is squeamish about a second Trump presidency, and with good reason, there is also growing recognition that now is the time to deepen engagement with key Republicans around him. The goal is to try to ensure as smooth a transition as possible, should Trump win, especially on issues such as trade, defense, climate action, China, and the Middle East.
Take, for example, the issue of defense spending by European nations, which has been perhaps the biggest single bone of contention for Trump. In this case his arguments have some merit, and Europe has acknowledged this through the limited progress it has made on resolving the issue in recent years, even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
During the NATO summit in Washington last month, the leaders of the 32 member states highlighted that progress, with 23 of them on course to meet the target of spending at least 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. Key exceptions remain Italy, which currently chairs the G7, and Spain, the fourth largest economy in the EU.

Now is the time for Europe to think ahead to the very difficult decisions and trade-offs that could lie ahead. 

Andrew Hammond

Welcome though the progress toward meeting this 2 percent target across NATO might be, it is not enough to ensure European defense in an increasingly geopolitically uncertain world. Despite calls for greater strategic autonomy from key figures such as French President Emmanuel Macron, the region remains heavily dependent on US security guarantees. This at a time when, given the possibility of a second Trump term, there has never been less certainty about Washington’s commitment to transatlantic security.
So now is the time for Europe to invest even more in its own security, which would in turn boost transatlantic ties by showing Washington it is not carrying the burden alone. It is already clear from the experience during 2017 and 2021 that a second Trump term would involve a more transactional US commitment to what he has sometimes described as a “delinquent” Europe, and that the future of the transatlantic alliance might rest on key EU and non-EU nations doing more.
Even if Trump fails to win a second term, Europe should pursue this agenda anyway to boost its own capabilities and self-sufficiency. The geopolitical context might grow even more challenging in the next half-decade, especially if Russia becomes increasingly emboldened.
Poland, the biggest single economy in Eastern Europe, is helping to lead the way in this by now spending about 4 percent of its GDP on defense, a proportion that is comparable to that of the US in relative terms, and Warsaw plans to increase it further. Between 2022 and 2023, the Polish defense budget grew in real terms by more than 40 percent, the largest proportional increase on the continent.
States in Western Europe, too, can send a signal that the region is serious about this agenda. In 2023, for example, the UK was the largest military spender in Europe in absolute terms. A strategic review of defense under Prime Minister Keir Starmer is expected to make the case for increasing defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP.
Therefore, as we face the prospect of what might be a return to a much more volatile period in transatlantic ties, now is the time for Europe to think ahead to the very difficult decisions and trade-offs that could lie ahead. That there will be tensions if Trump becomes president again is inevitable; the question is when rather than whether.
The stakes for Europe in the case of a second Trump term would be huge and historic. The continent must therefore aspire to a renewed partnership, from trade relations to defense cooperation, that might hopefully result in significant benefits for both sides at a time of global geopolitical turbulence.

— Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.