Turkey may be dragged further into the regional quagmire

The new power balance that is emerging in the Middle East will probably affect Turkey more than many other countries. It started with Russia’s withdrawal of part of its forces from Syria to the Donbas area of Ukraine. The exact size of the military units to be transferred was not announced, but one may presume that this will not cripple the Russian military presence in Syria.
Moscow seems to be intent on letting the Iranian-backed Hezbollah fill part of the gap, though this may not be its first choice. President Vladimir Putin may have hesitated because some of Hezbollah’s activities might be spoiling what Russia wants to do in Syria, but Tehran may have become a partner for the want of a better alternative.
Moscow cooperates with Iran in several fields. Before a June 29 meeting in the Turkmen capital Ashgabat of the leaders of the riparian countries of the Caspian Sea, Putin said: “In addition to the issues pertaining to the Caspian Sea, Russia and Iran will also discuss the security situation in Syria, because Iran is an important ally of Russia in Syria.” This is a clear indication of Russia’s will to maintain cooperation with Iran, despite the fact they are not always on the same page.
Less than 48 hours after this conversation, two Israeli F-16s carried out a missile attack in Syria. It was at Al-Hamidiyah, which is about 14 km south of the Russian naval base at Tartus and a few kilometers north of the Syrian-Lebanese border.
There was a pro forma reaction to the Israeli attack. The Syrian official news agency SANA reported: “Israeli enemy carried out an airstrike near the town of Hamidiyah. It led to the injury of two civilians.” A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson condemned the attack, saying it was “categorically unacceptable.” And Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian condemned Israel for striking Syria. Tel Aviv did not acknowledge the incident.
Before this attack, Turkey had announced that it planned to carry out a new military operation in the north of Syria. Careful observers of Middle Eastern affairs must have noticed the coincidence in the timing of Ankara’s declared intention regarding this military operation and the joint military drills carried out by Russia and Syria. One of these drills was held in an area close to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, but it can hardly be perceived as a message to Israel. Rather, it must have been directed to Turkey.

Both Russia and Iran have openly said they are opposed to a military operation by Turkey in Syrian territory.

Yasar Yakis

Furthermore, both Russia and Iran have openly said they are opposed to a military operation by Turkey in Syrian territory. The Damascus government has also said it would do its best to counter the Turkish attack. And the US has joined the choir by announcing it was also opposed to a Turkish military operation.
Amid that much opposition, the military operation may not be held at all. Or, in the present pre-election atmosphere, it may be glossed over to avoid giving the impression that the government took a step backward.
The Syrian crisis is a multilayered imbroglio. All stakeholders, irrespective of the partial Russian withdrawal, are trying to further consolidate their hold in the country. They are also looking beyond the horizon to try and figure out what type of Syria will emerge after the civil war. Even if war fatigue prevails in Russia because of the Ukrainian crisis, Moscow is going to remain the main actor in Syria. Washington’s view of Syria continues to be hazy. Iran will continue to be active despite Israel’s pestering. Ankara’s attitude will depend on the outcome of the forthcoming national elections. If Recep Tayyip Erdogan is reelected, he may try to maintain the present policy with as few adjustments as possible. Turkey’s attitude will also be affected by the war in Ukraine.
The Madrid summit declaration issued by NATO heads of state at the end of last month made two indirect references to the role that Turkey is expected to play. One is the increasing role of the Black Sea as a result of the war in Ukraine. Turkey has to be part of several equations in this connection. So far, it is fulfilling this task more or less satisfactorily.
The second is the reference in the summit declaration to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Turkey does not consider Iran’s nuclear program to be a direct threat to its own security, but Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has the possibility of sucking Ankara into a conflict it does not want to be part of.
Turkey’s increasing role as a country that maintains relations both with Russia and Ukraine has brought it to the forefront.
The shaping of the new power balance in Syria will take time. The best policy for Turkey would be to avoid further involvement in the conflicts in the region.

• Yasar Yakis is a former foreign minister of Turkey and founding member of the ruling AK Party.
Twitter: @yakis_yasar