A new understanding in Turkish-Russian relations

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was in Russia this week, holding high-level talks with his counterpart Sergey Lavrov, President Vladimir Putin and other senior officials. In light of the developments in the Caucasus, Syria, the Gulf and Europe, the visit was seen as critical. The timing also attracted attention, as Turkiye is preparing to host the next NATO Summit in Ankara in early July, which US President Donald Trump is also expected to attend.

Several commentaries have been published in leading Western media outlets arguing that Turkiye has been moving closer to the West, as Russia is losing leverage from Syria to the Caucasus. According to this view, Turkiye is preparing its own “regional playbook” that increasingly requires less coordination with Russia. It states that Turkiye’s interests largely align with those of the West, despite the ebbs and flows in their relations.

This is not a new argument. Over the past decade, Turkiye has largely remained within the Western political and security frameworks while pursuing a strategic autonomy approach, under which Russia and at times even Iran have found a place, particularly in the Syrian context.

For Turkiye, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a test of its middle-power policy. Since the start of the war, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has remained one of the few NATO leaders who continues to engage directly with Putin, with whom he has cultivated a personal relationship that has enabled him to maintain diplomatic channels despite Russia’s isolation from the West.

Erdogan has remained one of the few NATO leaders who continues to engage directly with Putin

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

For instance, while condemning the Russian invasion, Turkiye refused to join Western economic and financial sanctions on Russia. Instead, it continued trade, tourism and nuclear energy cooperation with Moscow as part of its strategic balancing act. Turkiye’s position is shaped by its energy interdependence with Russia, which explains its deliberate efforts to preserve autonomy by not fully aligning with sanctions.

At the same time, Turkiye supplied high-tech Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine, which enhanced its influence and credibility with both Ukraine and the Western alliance. Thus, Ankara leveraged the war as an opportunity to maximize its influence by maneuvering between rival powers. Turkiye’s policy also aimed to meet its expectations in terms of reaching a deal with Washington regarding sanctions imposed over its purchase of Russian S-400 systems.

During this week’s visit, Fidan warned Russia about the need to avoid any steps in the Black Sea that might ‌threaten regional security and Turkiye’s interests. The militarization of the Black Sea and disruption of trade flow through its straits is a concern for Ankara.

Meanwhile, Moscow proposed discussing the current challenges facing the two countries, noting that while some long-standing issues remained unresolved, new opportunities for cooperation had also emerged.

Aside from the Ukraine war, at least three main developments have shaped Turkish-Russian relations in recent years, either opening or limiting their room for cooperation: the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Turkiye’s normalization process with Armenia, and the current US-Iran escalation and its impact on the Gulf.

The fall of the Assad regime has reduced Turkiye’s previously held incentives for cooperation with Russia. Even before the collapse of the regime, the nature of Turkish-Russian relations in Syria was not an alignment but a temporary and tactical coordination that served their respective interests, while also allowing them to pursue their own diverging agendas. The Astana peace process of 2017 to 2024 was the framework for their coordination.

The fall of the Assad regime has reduced Turkiye’s previously held incentives for cooperation with Russia

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

However, in post-Assad Syria, Turkiye has new partners and enjoys greater room for maneuver than ever before. But because Syria remains the critical point of Ankara’s regional policy, completely sidelining Russia there is not viewed as a strategy that would serve Turkish interests in the long term.

On the Gulf front, Iran’s attacks on the region’s states have brought new actors into the equation. The Gulf states have now developed an interest in leveraging Ukraine’s wartime experience and are reportedly considering integrating low-cost Ukrainian interceptor systems into their defense capabilities, which currently rely on expensive air defense missiles to counter Iranian drones.

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s April meetings with Erdogan and Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa took place shortly after Ukraine signed security cooperation agreements with the Gulf states. Zelensky’s visits to the Gulf states, Turkiye and Syria, during which he promoted Ukraine as a new strategic partner, certainly irritated Moscow. However, Russia is in no position to criticize those countries for welcoming him.

On the Caucasus front, Russia is also no longer the indispensable third party between Armenia and Turkiye. Turkiye’s normalization process with Armenia is moving at an unprecedented pace. Following this month’s parliamentary elections in Armenia, more positive developments are expected soon.

Thanks to its steps toward normalization with Turkiye and Azerbaijan, Armenia no longer feels compelled to pursue its policies under Russia’s shadow. Turkiye, therefore, has both old and new partners in the Caucasus and greater flexibility in shaping its regional strategy. However, Ankara does not want to remove Russia from its strategic calculus in the Caucasus.

Given all these developments, a new understanding is emerging in Turkish-Russian relations. Not necessarily because Turkiye and the West have become significantly closer, nor solely because Russia has lost relative leverage in Syria and the Caucasus. Rather, their relationship is evolving into a new modus vivendi.

Turkiye will continue to compartmentalize its ties with Russia, particularly while the Russia-Ukraine war remains ongoing and Syria continues to be a space where Russia, although more limited than before, still retains influence. Looking ahead, Moscow will remain a variable in Ankara’s relations with the West, just as the West will continue to remain a key factor in Turkiye’s relations with Russia.

• Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz