The growth of Arab-China strategic ties

After decades of complete dependence on a single external power, mainly the US, the Gulf countries have concluded that strategic autonomy requires multiple credible relationships and that China, whatever its limitations, now qualifies as an important partner.
For most of the past two decades, China’s presence in the region was limited to one main transaction: oil for manufactured goods. Bilateral trade between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council now stands at about $300 billion annually and China draws 42 percent of its crude oil imports from the Middle East, including 14 percent from Saudi Arabia and 7 percent from the UAE.
But the more significant development is the depth of Chinese industrial and financial integration. Sinopec holds an equity stake in Qatar’s North Field East expansion, one of the most important energy projects of this decade. The Aramco-Sinopec joint venture in Yanbu embedded Chinese capital and expertise into Saudi downstream production years ago. In the first two months of 2026, Chinese solar panel exports to the Middle East and North Africa region reached $850 million — part of a technology transfer that Gulf states are actively seeking as they attempt to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbon dependence. Meanwhile, the relationship has acquired institutional weight alongside the trade and economic aspect.
The consistency of Chinese foreign policy is, for Gulf leaders, a practical asset. American regional strategy has oscillated sharply between administrations, from the close alignment of the first Trump administration with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to the deliberate distance of the Biden White House and back again in Trump’s second term. Gulf states have had to manage these fluctuations and, most importantly, maintain domestic reform agendas and long-term economic planning that require external partnerships to be reliable.
China does not generate this kind of uncertainty. Its noninterference posture is consistent. Its investment frameworks are not subject to congressional review or conditioned on governance benchmarks. Through initiatives such as the mBridge project, a cross-border digital currency settlement system developed with the UAE and others, Beijing is also providing Gulf states with financial instruments that reduce exposure to Western economic dependence — an increasingly valued capability in an era when sanctions have become a common instrument of American statecraft.

China’s investment frameworks are not subject to congressional review or conditioned on governance benchmarks.

Zaid M. Belbagi

However, Beijing has been very direct about not assuming military responsibilities in the Gulf and the asymmetry with Washington remains very large. The US maintains between 40,000 and 50,000 military personnel across the region, including more than 10,000 at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. It conducts joint exercises and interoperability programs with all six GCC states and the Gulf’s military infrastructure, including command systems, procurement frameworks and logistics networks, has been built around American platforms and expertise over several decades. That integration is not easily replicated elsewhere.
Between 2021 and 2025, the US accounted for 54 percent of all Middle Eastern arms imports. Chinese drones have found buyers because they carry fewer political conditions, but equipment sales are not a substitute for the kind of extended deterrence and security architecture that the American presence provides. When Gulf states assess the threat environment — which includes, among others, Iranian missile programs, Houthi strikes on shipping and infrastructure, and the vulnerability of subsea cables and energy corridors — the conclusion remains that no available partner replicates what Washington offers in this domain.
As such, the most accurate characterization of the Gulf’s China policy is that it functions primarily as a mechanism for managing the American relationship. By credibly deepening ties with Beijing through joint energy ventures, technology partnerships, financial experimentation and high-level diplomatic engagement, the Gulf states have altered the terms on which they engage Washington. They expect to be treated as strategic partners with independent interests.
This represents what analysts have begun describing as the gradual “Asianization” of the Gulf economy. The deepening of financial, industrial and technological ties with Asia, while at the same time maintaining security arrangements with Washington, is poised to be the defining feature of Gulf strategy for the foreseeable future. It represents a necessary adjustment to ensure there is no complete dependence on any single external power, which could create a major vulnerability in the case of any misalignment.
China’s global approach points to an ambitious project. Its steady accumulation of investment deals, industrial partnerships and equity stakes across the Gulf and throughout Africa reflects a long horizon of competition with the US that is not confined to any single geography. Beijing is gradually constructing an alternative economic and industrial architecture at scale.
For Arab states, this dynamic is a real opportunity. China brings industrial capacity, technology transfer, large-scale financing with fewer political conditions and a development model that is designed to endure.
At the same time, engagement with Beijing does not require disengagement from Washington. The more consequential question for regional leaderships is how to ensure that external partnerships, regardless of origin, are translated into domestic industrial projects and genuine knowledge transfer.
In the end, the region’s leverage will depend less on how many partners it balances and more on how much it is able to build at home.

• Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
X: @Moulay_Zaid