Europe finally asserting itself in transatlantic relations

There is nothing like a good crisis to focus the mind. And the question of how Western countries intend to proceed in relation to the war in Ukraine is providing such an existential crisis — one that has forced everyone to define their values and principles as well as to consider the specific task of dealing with the war itself.

From the start of the Russian invasion of February 2022 until very recently, the US and Europe had shown a united front regarding Moscow’s unprovoked aggression against its Ukrainian neighbor. Accordingly, a strict regime of sanctions was imposed on Vladimir Putin’s Russia in order to hurt its war machine, while Ukraine, led by its unlikely hero Volodymyr Zelensky, received huge amounts of military and financial support from the West in a move to ward off the naked violation of its sovereignty. But this transatlantic unity came to an abrupt halt upon Donald Trump’s return to the White House.

Nevertheless, the rift over Ukraine — just like those over the future of Gaza and free trade — is also a blessing in disguise. For too long, Europe has lived in the shadows of the military and economic prowess of the US. But it now has an opportunity to step out of the shadow of its American ally and enhance its own brand of liberal-democratic foreign policy that is distinct to that of the US, but without distancing itself completely from its long-time partner.

The profound disagreement that has surfaced over Ukraine is forcing Europe to assert itself and allocate the necessary resources to rebuilding its hard power in order to enhance its already considerable reserves of soft power. And this could eventually mean a strengthening of transatlantic relations.

There is a comforting illusion shared by the world’s liberal democracies: that, with minor differences, they are very much the same in terms of their outlook regarding both how countries should be run domestically and how they conduct their foreign policy. It is, to my mind, a mistaken view — and no more so than when we compare US-European relations, largely derived from their different histories, systems of governance, geographies and even their contrasting attitudes to the relationship between religion and politics.

On some fundamental issues that define a society, such as freedom of speech, the right to life and the welfare state, Europe and the US hold very different views. And why shouldn’t they?

On the other hand, there is enough commonality of values and principles that deserve and require a close alliance. Nevertheless, the experience of the last few weeks has emphasized the need for Europe to reduce its military and political reliance on Washington and develop its own particular foreign policy that will serve its own interests and system of beliefs.

The examples of Ukraine and Palestine could incentivize Europe to rally round and develop its own brand of foreign policy and peacemaking. For now, however, it has been a case of Europe’s voice being heard more clearly on Ukraine than on Gaza.

The disastrous meeting between Trump and Zelensky in the White House was a catalyst for Europe to take a leading role and, in the process, also accept that the security challenges it is facing require continental cooperation and increased military expenditure. Europe has, for too many years, been too slow to react to impending threats and has let reductions in military expenditure reach levels that mean it can no longer fulfill its political objectives because of popular calls to cut taxes or improve public services.

In some countries that have previously suffered from undue military influence — regimes such as we have seen in Poland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Romania — civilians have held very negative views of the military, views that still linger. In Germany, the debate over military power, especially the issue of deploying it overseas, remains one of the most sensitive issues 80 years on from the end of the Second World War. And this is a great worry in light of the current security uncertainty in Europe, because Germany’s role is essential for securing Europe’s future.

In 2018, President Emmanuel Macron of France warned that Europeans cannot be protected without a “true, European army” and he was ridiculed for that in many quarters. But he might have the last laugh as, within days of the recent ill-tempered meeting in the White House between Zelensky and Trump, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented a five-part plan to bolster Europe’s defense industry and increase its military capability to the tune of nearly €800 billion ($864 billion), much of it to provide urgent military support for Ukraine after the US suspended aid to Kyiv.

Moreover, Germany, Europe’s most powerful economy, is prepared to take a major step to boost its defense capabilities by exempting spending on the sector from the country’s constitutional fiscal restraints. The move was justified by Germany’s chancellor-in-waiting, Friedrich Merz, who declared: “In view of the threats to our freedom and peace on our continent, the rule for our defense now has to be ‘whatever it takes.’”

And the Ukraine crisis also seems to be the making of UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer on the world stage. Starmer has been convening summits to ensure that there is a united European front and is also skillfully and cautiously walking the line between being assertive about Europe’s intention to back Ukraine and avoiding a rift with the new American administration.

European leaders, like those in the Middle East, rejected outright the US administration’s idea of a so-called voluntary emigration of the people of Gaza — a euphemism for the forced transfer of a population, which is a violation of international law or, more plainly put, a war crime.

The disastrous meeting between Trump and Zelensky in the White House was a catalyst for Europe to take a leading role.

Yossi Mekelberg

Under the circumstances, the focus is on Ukraine, but the logic is that, on both issues, there is a fundamental gap between how Europe and the US see both the substance and the style of negotiating them. It is also true that, in both cases, Europe is geographically closer to these places and what happens there has a greater and more immediate impact on it than it does on America. And Europe has different historical ties and a better understanding of certain geographical locations.

All this means that Europe’s leadership must internalize the importance of developing a robust and distinguished common foreign and security policy, in which its military capabilities match its values and ambitions. Sometimes it is also forgotten that Europe — through the UK and France — holds two permanent positions on the UN Security Council, while the EU (even without former member the UK) is the world’s second-largest economy and represents a market of almost half a billion people.

None of this should mean an end to the transatlantic “special relationship.” Rather, it is an opportunity to reboot that relationship and put it on a more even keel. There is an old saying that one should “never waste a good crisis,” and it seems that Europe’s leaders are today doing their best to heed this advice.

• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg