Can Europe afford to pay for its own defense?

Many voices in Europe have recently been claiming that the continent would not be able to defend itself without the US. They have been warning that NATO without the US also could not defend Europe. Alarming as that sounds for Western democracy, one wonders if Western nations have lost their way, as well as their will to modify their nations and their economies in the interest of preserving their freedoms. Above all, they still seem too politically divided to protect their way of life, which has been so visibly under attack since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
The leaders of the three front-line states bordering Russia — Latvia, Estonia and Finland — last week urged NATO to stop “endlessly debating” how it might deal with the looming threat from Russia. They urged members of the alliance to increase defense spending to meet the level of the threat emanating from their eastern neighbor.
The election of Donald Trump — at best a skeptic regarding the mission of NATO and America’s role in defending European countries — has no doubt focused minds on the need for European states to urgently bolster the continent’s defenses. This is something that has proven elusive for decades; a problem that is easier to discuss than to act on.
But the issue may not be restricted to whether Washington will withhold its commitment to defending Europe or if simply raising their spending will achieve a self-sufficient defense. There is also the fact that Europe’s research and industrial sectors are now more than ever at the mercy of market forces and of profit, rather than securing the group of nations’ security and defense interests.
Trump’s statement in February that he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to NATO nations that do not pay their fair share no doubt rattled many countries that are still totally reliant on the alliance and its treaty’s Article 5 on collective defense. By the admission of many defense ministers of countries that are members of the transatlantic alliance, the grouping needs America in both the short and the longer term, even if they all started spending in excess of 5 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, not just the current target of 2 percent that only two-thirds of members will achieve this year.
The three front-line nations raising the alarm are among those that have been spending the highest ratio of GDP on defense.
The NATO target of 2 percent has been deemed by many as too low even for peacetime. Russia, for example, is projected to spend in excess of 6 percent of its GDP on defense in 2025. The UK, in comparison, is likely to spend 2.3 percent, while France might only just cross the 2 percent threshold in 2024, having spent only 1.94 percent in 2022. Germany spent 2 percent in 2024 but is not expected to spend more than that until 2028.
It is clear to many that European nations need to correct their defense deficits and quickly find ways to compensate for years of downgrading their military capabilities after the end of the Cold War. But this is likely to take time, especially considering the constantly changing nature of warfare in the wake of recent technological revolutions and the uncertain future impacts of cyberwarfare and the artificial intelligence realm.

European nations need to quickly find ways to compensate for years of downgrading their military capabilities.

Mohamed Chebaro

These uncertainties have wreaked havoc on planning, research, manufacturing and procurement for many armies around the world. Take the UK as an example. The government in London is about to embark on its third strategic defense review in the space of four years. And that is not just due to emerging threats, but also their multiplication and their differing nature.
What should defense be focused on: conventional or unconventional capabilities? Previous reviews guided military commanders to draw down on conventional capabilities, such as large standing armies and tank battalions, to make way for more advanced cyber supremacy that would blind the operability of enemy forces.
Should Britain reduce or increase its naval fleet and at what cost to its overall force posture and power projection? Should it renew its nuclear arsenal or reduce it? Counting the money when it comes to defense is not a fun game. In the case of the UK, the nation has been doing a little bit of everything, but less well than before, to the point that its standing army, it is said, could be “expended” after as little as six months of war.
London is not alone in this, as France and Germany are unlikely to fare any better due to budgetary, political and geostrategic adversities. Strategic reviews have always necessitated tradeoffs in a world of ever-increasing sources of insecurity and instability, both state and nonstate, as well as hybrid and asymmetric threats. That makes any spending less impactful, even the ambitious 5 percent of GDP called for by some European countries that are fearful of US priorities shifting further east.
Short of rejigging their political and military alliances, as well as their research, development and manufacturing capabilities, European nations are likely to spend their time plugging holes in an ever more demanding security landscape. It is not simply a matter of money or survivability, but also the need to come clean with voters. They need to clarify that the world is today a more dangerous place and that greater defense spending can be paid for either by cutting services or raising taxes. Only then will the future look less bleak and the enemies and friends of Europe might — but only might — take note.

• Mohamed Chebaro is a British-Lebanese journalist with more than 25 years of experience covering war, terrorism, defense, current affairs and diplomacy. He is also a media consultant and trainer.