Foreign policy reboot strengthens Turkiye’s hand

Turkish foreign policy has been marked by major geopolitical shifts in the past year. Reading Turkish foreign policy is no simple task; it requires a nuanced understanding of the country’s diplomatic maneuvers, as well as its regional and global positioning.
In 2024, Turkiye scored three important goals in its foreign policy, while also facing challenges as it heads into 2025. The overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, the normalization of relations with the Arab world, and successful mediation efforts between African nations were the three main foreign policy victories for Ankara.
The collapse of the Assad regime strengthened Ankara’s leverage in its foreign policy amid declining Russian and Iranian influence in the region. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s historic visit to Cairo, the first such visit in over a decade, not only signaled the restoration of ties with Egypt, but also was pivotal for Turkiye’s reintegration into the Arab world. Egypt, with its central role in the Arab League, helped facilitate Ankara’s renewed acceptance in the region.
At the end of 2024, Erdogan brokered a peace agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia, resolving a year-long maritime dispute over access to the Red Sea. This deal signaled Turkiye’s growing influence in Africa, with Ankara positioning itself as a neutral mediator capable of defusing tensions with diverse actors. Following the agreement, Erdogan announced plans to visit Ethiopia and Somalia in early 2025, showing his continuing commitment to deepening Turkiye’s footprint in Africa through economic investment, security cooperation, and humanitarian aid.
Ankara’s relations with the Gulf states also showed significant progress in the past year. Regional cooperation and connectivity, driven by economic imperatives, have been the defining features of Turkiye’s recent policy toward the Gulf. In 2024, Turkish-Gulf relations entered a new phase, underpinned by three key developments: Ankara and the Gulf Cooperation Council agreed to begin formal negotiations for a free trade agreement, and also to resume talks on strategic dialogue — Turkiye was designated as a strategic dialogue partner by the GCC in 2008. Meanwhile, a four-way preliminary agreement was signed for joint collaboration on a “Development Road” involving Iraq, Turkiye, Qatar, and the UAE. Turkiye’s political and defense cooperation with individual Gulf states also was strengthened through visits by their leaders, which paved the way for the signing of several key agreements.
Beside these successes, Turkiye’s relations with the West remain troubled, especially in light of Israel’s war in Gaza and Ankara’s close ties with Moscow. As the US prepares for a second Trump administration in 2025, Turkiye appears to be positioning itself for a more critical international role, while maintaining a cautious “wait-and-see” approach. Ankara is likely to shape its policies toward Donald Trump’s second administration based on Washington’s actions and priorities in the region. The future of Turkiye-US relations will likely depend on the new administration’s handling of its relations with the Kurdish YPG/PYD in Syria, which has been a long-standing point of disagreement between Ankara and Washington.

The West now looks to Turkiye for guidance on Syria’s future.

Dr. Sinem Cengiz

Turkiye’s prominent role during and in the aftermath of the downfall of Assad’s regime in Syria has dramatically increased its influence in regional geopolitics, with both Washington and regional actors now recognizing its outsized role. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has indicated that Ankara is willing to act as a mediator between the US and Syria’s future authorities. He also said that Ankara “is coordinating actions on the situation in Syria with Saudi Arabia at the highest level.”
As 2024 draws to a close, Turkiye is actively seeking regional support for its Syria policy. Turkish policymakers have visited Cairo and the Gulf capitals to discuss the future of Syria’s transitional government. They also have signaled that Turkiye’s new foreign policy in the region can achieve success only with strong regional support.
Additionally, throughout the past year, Turkiye has maintained a delicate balancing act in its approach to Russia’s war in Ukraine. While strengthening ties with Ukraine, Ankara has also continued its pragmatic relations with Moscow. There is an existing divergence between Turkiye and the West, particularly the US, in their perceptions toward the great power rivalry. Ankara views multipolarity positively, which offers Turkish policymakers flexibility when dealing with the West. Yet, in 2025, the effectiveness of Turkiye’s strategy will depend largely on the incoming Trump administration’s handling of the Ukraine war, its approach to the YPG/SDF in Syria, and its strategy in navigating relations with Ankara.
Although the region faces uncertainty related to the post-Assad Syria, Iran-Israel tensions, and the Gaza war, Turkiye is entering 2025 in a relatively strong regional position. It has normalized ties with former regional foes, and also elevated its role as a crucial Western partner, thanks to its efforts to mediate the Ukraine war. Ankara has also taken positive steps in its relations with the EU since the elections held in Turkiye in May 2024. This led to a reconfiguration of Turkish foreign policy, which was redefined by de-escalation.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s recent visit to Turkiye is a promise of a closer future between Brussels and Ankara. According to von der Leyen, “Turkiye has an essential role to play in stabilizing the Middle East.” This statement is significant, particularly as the West now looks to Turkiye for guidance on Syria’s future after Assad.
Looking ahead, Turkiye’s ability to leverage its foreign policy successes and navigate the region’s complexities in the coming year remains to be seen.

• Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz