Israel’s options in Lebanon are limited — and fraught with risk
https://arab.news/cr39c
Benjamin Netanyahu’s televised message to the Lebanese people last week sounded a bit “off,” with Israel destroying the country. “This will hurt, but it is for your own good” was the implied meaning, and the tone attempted to be like that of a friend doing you a favor, but issuing a threat at the same time. The Israeli leader advised the Lebanese — I am translating here — to launch a civil war against Hezbollah in order to save themselves from destruction by Israel. If those were not his exact words, this is how we heard them in Beirut, the twisted product of a perverse logic.
The Netanyahu doctrine revealed in that speech is not complex — it is a binary view of the world, with Israel on one side fighting an enemy that it seeks to destroy physically. Success is measured by the number of people killed and buildings destroyed. He is crudely asking us to help. On this side of the border, the battle is far more sophisticated. By fighting Israel, Hezbollah justifies maintaining its arms, its status as a resistance force and its control over the country. It can lose militarily on the local front, but the so-called axis of resistance could also gain political power even from a military defeat. By calling on the Lebanese to join him, the Israeli leader is weakening them politically by turning them into collaborators in the destruction of their own country.
If there is a lesson that Israel can conclude from its previous wars, it is that victory on the battlefield has resulted in its enemies emerging stronger. It must be doing something wrong.
Israel’s third Lebanon war has even less chance of success than the previous two. Success is not calculated by the number of deaths or the amount of destruction. A military victory can also translate into a political defeat, and history is full of heroes of glorious defeats on the battlefield. The saying in Arabic is that “the outcome at the threshing floor is not what was expected when planting the field.” It is the exact opposite of the English saying that “you reap what you sow.”
At the end of his last speech before he was killed, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah set a trap when he practically invited Israel to invade southern Lebanon, saying that “we are ready.” This allows Hezbollah to declare victory no matter what happens. What follows is a glimpse of how it can spin it.
If Israel does not invade, then Hezbollah will claim that it was deterred by the resistance and will declare victory. Even continuing bombardment without a land operation is counterproductive and will have the opposite effect of bringing the Lebanese closer together. It is absurd to think otherwise.
Here are the options:
If Israel falls into the trap and does invade, then Hezbollah will be given a lifeline legitimizing its role as a resistance force at a time it needs it most. It solves Hezbollah’s crisis of legitimacy — for almost a quarter of a century, since Israel withdrew from south Lebanon in May 2000, it has faced a challenge in that it was resisting an occupation that hardly existed. Its interventions in Syria, Iraq and Yemen were also a bit of a stretch.
Israel will have two options after it invades, and I am not sure which is worse. If it remains as an occupation, then the chances of getting rid of Hezbollah’s arms in Lebanon through a political process will be zero. Political debate in Lebanon will be back to square one, with few arguments for a now legitimate resistance to give up its arms. Hezbollah will also be the subject of a continuous supply of munitions, weapons and other resources from its allies, as it will be the front line in a global confrontation.
Israel has far more serious problems than security — those of legitimacy, sustainability and viability.
Nadim Shehadi
Worse still, if after a land operation Israel withdraws partially or completely, or if it carries out limited incursions, then Hezbollah would also declare victory, claiming that the enemy was repelled by the resistance, and the result would legitimize its arms even further.
But that is not the end of the story. Defeat on the battlefield can also give the party a boost politically, with influence that transcends the border area. Let me explain, or at least anticipate the narrative. Hezbollah is not just fighting a far superior enemy, it can also claim that it is fighting a global alliance that includes the US and NATO. This is the definition of a glorious defeat that would then attract support from all the anti-US forces in the world, including the students at Columbia and Berkeley universities.
Israel has far more serious problems than security — those of legitimacy, sustainability and viability. It cannot ensure its security by destroying the neighborhood. The Zionist dream is turning into a nightmare for both Israel and the region. It also threatens the broader region with radicals being given the upper hand over moderates. Calls for peace with Israel sound hollow while it is exhibiting so much brutality. The dehumanization of the Palestinians and Lebanese does not help it gain more friends in the Arab world and embarrasses those who already are.
There is a need for a deep and sober reevaluation of the Zionist project, since it is obvious that the current model has reached a stage of crisis. This process has already begun with the work of Israeli revisionists, or the “new historians,” who are gaining influence. Authors such as Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappe, Tom Segev and Shlomo Sand are radically leading that thought process. Their work, however critical and sometimes extreme, is not necessarily a sign of weakness. The challenge that they pose is essential and they touch on fundamental issues. The same is happening among diaspora groups, especially young Jewish groups.
While this crude Netanyahu doctrine condemns the region to eternal instability without ensuring its security, it is also strengthening its enemies over those who now seem naive if they talk of peace. The optics should be clear. Israel should distance itself from such thinking, not only to save itself but also to save the world to which its present behavior also represents a danger.
The political impact of military defeat can also be unpredictable and far more dangerous. We have seen in Europe that the rise of fascism was fueled by despair and humiliation that made people yearn for a strong leader who would lift them up from the abyss. The culture of defeat in itself transforms societies in unpredictable ways.
At the same time, the larger picture is optimistic. The dark image is that, nearly two decades after the 2006 wars in Lebanon and Gaza, Israel’s enemies look stronger. Iran and its proxies control the politics of Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and the current war empowers them and puts them in a position to blackmail the rest of the region. But on the bright side, the prospects for peace look much brighter than they did in 2006, with the Arab Peace Initiative, the Abraham Accords and the recent declaration by Jordan’s foreign minister on behalf of other Arab colleagues offering security guarantees in return for peace.
After a catastrophic war, there are lessons learned that can follow conflicting logical reasoning and lead to contradictory outcomes. The desirable conclusion is that one side will learn that war is tragic, destructive and should not be repeated, leading it to work toward peace. The conclusion to be avoided is that the other side learns that it is defeat that should not be repeated and so it starts preparing itself for the next, even more devastating, conflict.
- Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser. X: @Confusezeus
