Russia’s breakthrough and the new geopolitical rivalries in Africa

Among the external parties active in Africa, Russia is, without a doubt, the one that has increased its influence the most in recent years. This is particularly true for the Sahel region, where Moscow has replaced Paris.

However, this is worsening geopolitical rivalries in a merciless struggle over the continent’s resources and strategic importance.

Over the past decade, Moscow has succeeded, under Vladimir Putin, in extending its military, security and political influence onto the African continent, at the expense of France and other Western powers.

In its work toward erasing the impacts of the collapse of the Soviet Union, described as “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century,” the leader of the Kremlin is not satisfied with his actions in Russia’s neighborhood and is taking interest in other zones, from the Middle East to the Sahel.

In parallel with the intervention in Syria since 2015, the process of Russian actions in Africa was launched following the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the start of the intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. It built on the Soviet legacy of the Cold War, taking advantage of the French retreat and the American withdrawal. Russian strategists have carefully observed and exploited the dynamics at play in several African countries to better develop their strategy of infiltration and influence. It was in Sudan, in 2017, and later in the Central African Republic, that Moscow began to develop its African strategy.

The years 2021, 2022 and 2023 saw Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger make a significant strategic shift by allying with Russia, thus extending the consolidation of its presence in eastern Libya and its introduction into Chad.

Russian strategists have carefully observed and exploited the dynamics at play in several African countries

Khattar Abou Diab

To achieve this breakthrough, Moscow relied on two key instruments: the launch of orchestrated campaigns against the West, “awakening” the postcolonial resentment of a part of the African elite and the African public, and the deployment of the private military company Wagner, which established itself as a laboratory for Russian action. As of summer 2023, Wagner was replaced by the Africa Corps, a subordinate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The latter assigns its deputy minister to the exclusive management of the security policy in Africa. Hence, Moscow is no longer subcontracting its presence on the continent and is now acting with transparency.

These two instruments have turned out to be very well suited to the era of the digital revolution, as well as the return of the war cycle.

Unlike its Chinese ally, which is satisfied with its means of soft power, Moscow uses hard power security services to control mining and other resources. Russia has established itself as a “stabilizing force” to protect existing powers (or the products of coups d’etat), as well as maintaining the status quo.

Russia claims to be “exemplary” in the fight against terrorism, seeking to promote its expertise and experience.

On the diplomatic front, Putin has launched the Russia-Africa summits, marking Russia’s “grand return” to the African continent.

Moscow has also called on the track record of the former Soviet Union (in solidarity with liberation movements and scholarships for thousands of African students) to facilitate its access to many of Africa’s elites. The expansion of Russia’s economic commitments gives increasing importance to raw material sectors such as agriculture and hydrocarbons.

Russia is also Africa’s major arms supplier, taking control of half the market.

Lastly, Russian diplomacy presents itself as the standard-bearer of the Global South and the defender of African causes.

Nevertheless, this Russian activism is causing a stir, notably in Algeria, one of the loyal partners of the former Soviet Union and then of Russia.

Historically speaking, Algiers has always rejected any foreign interference in its neighborhood. At the moment, Russian paramilitary action near the Algerian border with Mali is provoking a “silent” and “unprecedented” crisis in the history of bilateral relations.

According to sources in Brussels, Russian authorities have openly blamed their Algerian counterparts for failing in their duty to cooperate with the Russian secret services and have suspected Algiers of neglecting the surveillance of a region close to the Mali border, which is overrun by Ukrainian groups dispatched by Kyiv to assist the rebelling forces of armed movements allied for the defense of Azawad (Tuareg rebels).

However, both Algiers and Moscow do not agree with this scenario, given that Algerian authorities exert influence over Malian armed groups. For the time being, it is not certain that Ukraine has succeeded in hindering Russian action in the Sahel. However, this Algerian “mistrust” highlights the fact that the Russian path is paved with pitfalls.

Faced with Russia’s domino strategy, the West is concerned about the loss of considerable strategic leverage in Africa, which has transformed over recent years into a field of international power competition.

This zone of Russian influence in Africa comes in the context of a war in Ukraine that is rekindling east-west and north-south divergences.

Africa has always been a geopolitically coveted continent and a Western preserve. This has always been contested by Russia. On the contrary, this continent provides Moscow with a global stage from which it can boast a geostrategic position that is greater than it seems. The African position on the war in Ukraine underlines this growing Russian interest.

As a provisional conclusion to the current phase of geopolitical confrontation, Russia has succeeded, over the last 10 years, in establishing itself on the African continent, both on the military and diplomatic levels.

While Moscow has greatly benefited from the failures of French interference and the lack of coherent strategy on the part of Paris, the downside for Moscow in the medium term is that it offers very little, if any, development aid to African civilians. Russia has also contributed little to improving the security situation and much to its deterioration. Attacks on civilians and even massacres by Russian mercenaries have been documented in the region.

Finally, the geostrategic shift in Russia’s favor is not irreversible, and makes way for the preparation of future conflicts. France’s retreat and Russia’s return to Africa with a bang have put the continent back on the American radar. However, Washington’s mission is not an easy one either, due to how challenging it is to come up with a concrete strategy in coordination with Europe and in discussion with potential African partners.

• Khattar Abou Diab is a French-Lebanese political scientist, specialist in Islam and the Middle East, and professor of international relations at the University of Paris Sud. X: @abou_diab