The usual suspects fear a Turkiye-Syria thaw

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed openness last July to talks with Syrian President Bashar Assad, but not if withdrawing Turkish troops from Syrian territory was a condition.

A year later, Erdoğan has indicated that he would invite Assad “any time” for discussions to “restore Turkiye-Syria relations to the same level as in the past,” which was a groundbreaking statement. Interestingly, there was no mention of a condition involving the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Syria. Iraq and Russia have been advocating this meeting for a while, and recent developments in Syria have been fostering the possibility.

Turkiye would have two objectives: first, to establish full control over its border with Syria, as on its border with Iraq, aimed at eliminating elements of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and the PYD. The Iraqi government, previously critical of Turkish operations, has given the green light for Turkiye’s new security policy in Iraq. Turkiye now seeks a similar understanding from Damascus to ensure that northern Syria does not pose a threat to its national security. The second objective is the safe return of Syrian refugees, a complex issue with both security and humanitarian dimensions. Turkiye has hosted over three million Syrians for more than a decade, always viewing this as a temporary measure while pushing for a political solution.

Turkiye’s policies toward Iraq and Syria have significant distinctions, but also parallels, both aimed at securing its borders with the approval of the other two governments. Turkiye signed critical deals with both countries in the 1980s and 1990s.

The 1998 Adana Agreement lays the groundwork for a possible Turkish-Syrian thaw, as it did decades ago. It was signed at a time when relations between Turkiye and Syria were strained to the brink of war.

Damascus had been allowing Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the outlawed Kurdish separatist PKK — who is now serving a life sentence on the Turkish island of Imrali — to take shelter in Syria and direct the group’s activities for years. When Turkiye threatened military action, Damascus deported Ocalan and closed PKK camps in Syria.

The Adana agreement was designed to help restore relations: some described it as a Turkish-Syrian version of the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel.

Sinem Cengiz

The Adana agreement was designed to help restore relations: some described it as a Turkish-Syrian version of the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel. Syria’s decision to expel Ocalan and negotiate with Turkiye was linked to its concern about the strength of the Turkish military compared with its own weakness. In an interview later, however, Assad said: “The deportation of Ocalan was not out of fear, but because we preferred you. We could either be friends with the Turkish people or prefer the Kurds and lose you. Because our preference was with you, we sent Ocalan out.”

Damascus now has a choice: normalize relations with Turkiye and join forces against the Kurds, or continue its policy of the past decade, allowing Turkiye to maintain its forces in the north. Significant signs suggest it may opt for normalization. Fears of a permanent Kurdish presence in northern Syria could lead to Ankara-Damascus talks, with discussions underway to launch a joint military operation against Kurdish groups who Turkiye considers terrorists. This process began with intelligence officer meetings in 2020 and progressed to meetings between defense and foreign ministers, though subsequent progress has been a challenge.  

An Erdogan-Assad meeting would be driven by the need to address mutual issues, and to solve Syrian problems cooperatively. However, as Turkiye's last ambassador to Damascus Omer Onhon has pointed out, even if they met soon the process would be complex, with intertwined issues and no quick solutions. 

Who would worried about a Turkish-Syrian thaw? Well, the usual suspects: first, the PYD and SDF. As primary opponents, they stand to lose the most. Second, the US. As the Kurds’ patron, Washington’s influence could wane in Syria at the expense of Russia. Third, the Syrian armed opposition. Dependent on Turkish support, they might feel betrayed by Turkiye’s shift toward Assad. Fourth, the Syrian refugees; those living in Turkiye and in Turkish-dominated areas in northern Syria could face uncertainty and upheaval. There have already been protests against the Turkish government in northern Syria, and attacks on Syrian migrants by Turks in parts of Turkiye. Northwest Syria, home to about five million people, including local populations and displaced opposition Syrians from areas under Assad’s control, remains volatile. Moreover, there are members of armed groups and other opposition Syrians who have been living in northern Syria within the framework of the de-escalation zone agreements signed in 2017.

How Turkiye and Syria can agree on groups they perceive as threats remains to be seen. For instance, Turkiye considers the Kurds terrorists, while Damascus views armed groups fighting against the Assad regime as terrorists. The differing perspectives, the complex humanitarian situation, and the vested interests of stakeholders all pose challenges to this process. These fundamental differences will be a significant hurdle in any potential rapprochement.

• Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz