Protests offer risks and opportunities for ethnic unity in Iran

The latest protest movement in Iran — perhaps the most significant since the 1979 revolution — began in response to the death of a young Kurdish woman who died in police custody. Many Iranians related to her as a symbol of women’s rights and all Iranians’ vulnerability to security forces that use violence with impunity. For Iran’s ethnic minorities, her death also highlighted the discrimination and abuse that minorities face in the country.
Even Mahsa Amini’s name reflects the grievances of Iran’s ethnic minorities. Her Kurdish name was Jina. However, Iranian authorities require that citizens have a name from an approved list, which excludes many non-Persian names, so her official name was Mahsa. We do not know exactly why police targeted her, but many Iranians from minority groups suspect that ethnicity played a role.
Iranians with an ethnic Persian background constitute about 60 percent of the population. However, as a large and diverse country, Iran has multiple other ethnic groups. While numbers are disputed, Azeris might make up 16 percent or more of the population. Although they live in multiple places, including Tehran, they are particularly concentrated in the northwest, especially around Tabriz. Kurds are about 10 percent of the population, largely located in the far northwest. Lurs are about 6 percent, mostly in the western mountains. Balochis make up about 2 percent, primarily in the southeast, and Arabs another 2 percent, largely in the southwest. Turkmen constitute another 1 to 2 percent, with smaller minorities making up the rest.
These ethnic minorities all face some degree of discrimination. For example, Azeris often suffer from derogatory stereotypes. Kurds, Balochis and Arabs tend to face more severe problems.
Ethnic minorities’ concentration in border areas and their connections with ethnic groups in neighboring countries is one factor behind poor relations with the government. Iran’s Azeris have close ties to Azerbaijan, Kurds to Iraq and Turkey, Arabs to Iraq, Balochis to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Turkmen to Turkmenistan. The Iranian government is suspicious of these connections. The existence of Kurdish, Balochi and Arab separatist movements further complicates relations with the government.
Religion also plays a role. Ethnic minorities that share the Shiite Muslim faith with the larger Persian community and the authorities face discrimination and efforts to suppress their identities, but tend to fare better than other minorities. For example, Azeris and Lurs are mostly Shiite. Iran’s Kurds, Balochis and Arabs are mostly Sunni Muslim and their religion adds an important additional source of hostility from the theocratic government.
It is important to remember that the Iranian government uses violence and repression against Persian and Shiite citizens, as well as ethnic and religious minorities. Minority groups in Iran also experience a range of additional layers of discrimination and repression. They face negative stereotypes and are not allowed to teach their own languages in schools. Away from the country’s center, the regions that have large populations of ethnic minorities receive less investment in infrastructure, services and economic development. Ethnic minorities often face discrimination in the job market as well. For example, Arabs in Khuzestan have complained about being shut out of jobs in the oil industry.
While the Iranian regime has proven its willingness to use violence against all Iranians, regardless of ethnicity, it has a long history of particularly targeting Kurds, Balochis and Arabs. For example, Amnesty International recently reported that minority groups, especially Balochis, face a disproportionately high level of death sentences. Regime brutality against these groups has helped to fuel separatist movements that also use violence against security forces.
Minority groups have played an important role in the protest movement that followed Amini’s death. The protests largely began in Kurdish areas after Amini’s funeral, then expanded across the country. The protesters’ motto, “woman, life, freedom” comes from Kurdish politics. The nationwide and multi-ethnic nature of the protests is one of the movement’s defining features — and is particularly threatening to the regime.
The government’s crackdown on the protest movement that began in September was especially intense in Kurdish areas and in Sistan and Balochistan Province. Kurdish towns such as Sanandaj have played a significant role in the protests and endured a harsh response from security forces. Early in the protest movement, people in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan and Balochistan, demonstrated in support of the national movement that followed Amini’s death and in anger over the alleged rape of a Balochi girl by a police commander. On Sept. 30, the regime responded with indiscriminate shooting, killing at least 66 people.

Members of all ethnicities have suffered under the government’s crackdown, creating a shared experience.

Kerry Boyd Anderson

The protest movement has quietened in the face of the brutal government response, but it is not over. Many reports from Iran note that individuals continue to find ways to express disdain for the regime, while smaller-scale protests still occur.
The government is trying to use ethnic differences to divide the opposition, both by promoting Persian nationalism and by attempting to exploit disputes between minority groups that predate the recent protests. However, the protest movement offers a valuable opportunity for unity among the government’s opponents. Some protesters chanted slogans promoting togetherness among the different ethnic groups. Members of all ethnicities have suffered under the government’s crackdown, creating a shared experience. Amini was Kurdish, but her death infuriated members of all ethnic groups, who embraced her as a symbol.
The future of the protest movement and the stability of the regime are uncertain. However, a unified opposition has a greater chance of success. If a new government comes to power in Tehran in the future, it should be prepared to offer better treatment and equality to the country’s ethnic minorities.

• Kerry Boyd Anderson is a writer and political risk consultant with more than 18 years of experience as a professional analyst of international security issues and Middle East political and business risk. Her previous positions include deputy director for advisory with Oxford Analytica. Twitter: @KBAresearch