Global shifts suggest Syria’s ‘waiting game’ could pay off

At the height of Syria’s civil war, Bente Scheller, a political scientist and former German diplomat, published “The Wisdom of Syria’s Waiting Game.” In it, she argued that Syrian foreign policy under President Bashar Assad and, before that, his father Hafez Assad had long followed a strategy of “waiting out” international difficulties and crises. Damascus would rarely change the policies that provoked ire from outsiders, but instead waited for former critics to soften their stance.
This has been Assad’s approach since the Syria conflict exploded in 2011, refusing demands to loosen his brutal grip on power, confident that, with considerable help from allies Russia and Iran, eventually it will be his enemies that bend. Thirteen years after many in the international community cut ties with Damascus and erected sanctions, the regional climate appears to be shifting, and Assad may believe that Syria’s waiting game is once again paying off.
Syria’s international rehabilitation has already begun. Even during the civil war, Damascus was never fully isolated. As well as allies Russia, Iran, and China, significant powers, notably Brazil and India, declined to sever ties. As it became clear Assad would survive, a trickle of Arab states, such as the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan, which had called for his overthrow reestablished ties. In 2023, Saudi Arabia favored Syria’s return to the Arab League after its suspension 12 years earlier.
But there is still a long way to go. While back in the Arab League and attending regional events such as the recent Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh, Assad is far from fully reintegrated. Jordan, among others, protests the flow of Captagon from Syria, allegedly overseen by the Assad regime, while trade and diplomatic relations with the Arab world remain far below pre-2011 levels. Despite low-level talks with Ankara, detente with Turkiye appears to have stalled over continued Turkish control of northern Syria. Meanwhile, relations with the EU and the US remain severed, with economic sanctions still in place.
However, three recent developments could shift the dial. First, the Lebanon war. Almost 500,000 people have sought sanctuary in Syria since October, mostly Syrians who fled war in their own country during the previous decade. This helps Assad paint a more positive international image of his war-torn state — even if many refugees are reportedly trying to move on to either Iraq or rebel-held northern Syria. It also increases Syria’s importance to the international aid community and raises the, albeit remote, possibility that Damascus might be included in Lebanese peace talks.
A further benefit is that though the decimation of its ally Hezbollah is a blow, it shifts the balance in the Hezbollah-Syria-Iran relationship more in Assad’s favor.

Even during the civil war, Damascus was never fully isolated

Christopher Phillips

Second, the continued rise of populist right-wing parties in Europe increases the chance that ties with the continent could improve. Populist governments in Hungary and Italy have already pushed for the EU to loosen sanctions in exchange for Assad taking back Syrian refugees, and Rome even reopened its Damascus embassy in September.
A key development could be the German elections in February, should this result in a far-right Alternative for Germany triumph. Germany and France have led EU opposition to Assad and pushed against those calling for improving ties. But the AFD met with Syrian officials in 2019, and has previously mooted collaborating with Assad to repatriate many of the Syrians living in Germany. Even if the AFD is frozen out of government by other parties, a strong election performance might persuade Germany’s leaders to alter their uncompromising stance on Assad.
Finally, there is the reelection of Donald Trump. On the one hand, there are signs that Trump’s return could benefit Assad. His pick for health secretary, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., recently noted how Trump wants to remove US troops from northeastern Syria. This would likely benefit Assad, who wants to recapture all this region. Kurdish forces, currently administering there under US protection, would probably be forced to reconcile with Assad in the face of the alternative: attack by Turkiye. Such an outcome could also help oil the stalled detente with Ankara. Neutralizing the Kurdish autonomous region might lessen Turkish security concerns or, alternatively, Assad might be more open to a phased Turkish withdrawal from the north, having recently captured the east.
It is also possible that Assad’s relative neutrality during the Gaza war — not joining its allies Iran and Hezbollah in fighting Israel — may be rewarded with a less hawkish approach from the Trump administration. Tulsi Gabbard, named as director of national intelligence, visited Syria and met Assad in 2017 while a Congresswoman, and her nomination supports the possibility that the new White House could be less hostile. A softer US view of Russia under Trump might also benefit Assad. While the lifting of US sanctions on Damascus appears unlikely, Assad may hope that a less aggressive White House will enforce them less vigilantly.
Yet, Trump showed during his first term how unpredictable he can be, and his approach could easily break the other way. Should Trump ramp up his hostility to Iran, as he did before, Assad is unlikely to cut ties with Tehran, which remains the cornerstone of Syria’s foreign policy. In such circumstances, Syria could once again be in Trump’s crosshairs.
However, although the geopolitical wheel appears to be turning, it is far from clear Assad will seize this opportunity. It requires considerable diplomatic skill to utilize these changing circumstances effectively. Although the Syrian leader has followed his father’s “waiting game” diplomacy, it is yet to be seen if he has inherited Hafez Assad’s ability to navigate a way back into international favor. Despite more advantageous conditions, Syria could yet remain a relative pariah.

• Christopher Phillips is professor of international relations at Queen Mary University of London and author of ‘Battleground: Ten Conflicts that Explain the New Middle East.’ X: @cjophillips