Deja vu as US prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan

US President Donald Trump last week announced on Twitter that he plans to withdraw all American troops from Afghanistan by Christmas in order to fulfill a campaign promise to end “endless wars.” Though this action might be commended by the average American, a strategist would know that leaving while the mission remains unaccomplished is not the way to end such conflicts. In fact, such behavior ensures the perpetuation of conflicts and the creation of free space for terrorist organizations and non-state actors to flourish.
The problem is that the US is engulfed in what former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, now a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, described as “strategic narcissism,” meaning that it views issues only from its own perspective and fails to see other actors’ perspectives or to preview how they might react to its actions. To add to that, there is an inconsistency in its decisions, which are, in many instances, formulated in a reactive and not a strategic manner, as they are byproducts of political calculations and reactions to popular mood swings.
The situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan are victims of America’s whims. Following the 9/11 attacks, the US went to Iraq on the pretext of its supposed weapons of mass destruction. It went with a great sense of optimism, thinking it could change the entire system and establish a Jeffersonian style of democracy. It went with ambitions and dreams but no executable plan. The US created the insurgency by disbanding the domestic army and police and making their members outlaws, which led to a huge wave of violence. This chaos created the space for Iran to operate and assert itself.
However, after a few years of chaos, the US got its act together and George W. Bush realized that Iraq needed a comprehensive plan. Under the leadership of Gen. David Petraeus, the US started its “surge” in 2007. The plan coupled national reconciliation with a crackdown on non-state actors, and Iraq was stabilized.
In 2008, a new US president was elected. Barack Obama had built his entire narrative around opposition to the Iraq war. This narrative translated into a campaign promise and later on into a policy item. Despite the fact that the surge was working, Obama withdrew in order to cater to a popular mood that was tired of seeing the coffins of American soldiers wrapped in flags on the news. By withdrawing, Obama undid the surge and squandered all the gains that had been accomplished and paid for by American blood and treasure. Needless to say, the premature and chaotic withdrawal provided impetus for a surge of extremism. After the US withdrew, the promises given to its Iraqi allies were quickly forgotten, paving the way for the revenge of the brutal and sectarian Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki. The resentment and the feelings of being betrayed by the US led to the resuscitation of the Al-Qaeda-linked groups that were subdued during the surge, and ultimately to the rise of Daesh. They also led to the empowerment of Iran and its proxies.

The US has not learned from its mistakes and is still driven by strategic narcissism.

Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib

Afghanistan was hit by the same inconsistencies and short-termism. In the 1980s, Afghanistan was at the forefront of the competition between the Soviets and the Americans. In a covert program, the US armed and trained the mujahideen. However, once the Soviet Union was defeated and withdrew from Afghanistan, the US closed the portfolio and left the country to descend into civil war and become a scene for its neighbors’ influence, leading to the Taliban’s seizure of power in 1996. The Taliban harbored Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan became the place where the Al-Qaeda leader planned the worst ever attack on US soil. Two months after 9/11, the Taliban were driven out of power by US forces.
That operation was going well, but in 2003 the US got distracted by Iraq. On May 1 that year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared the end of “major combat” in Afghanistan. The US drew down its presence and only toward the end of Bush’s term did he realize that more troops were needed. Further gains were squandered again by another drawdown, starting in 2011 under the Obama administration, leading to another escalation of violence.
Trump, like Obama, now wants to fulfill a campaign promise by withdrawing. He is leading talks with the Taliban, but they have not shown any sign of relinquishing their violence. The Afghan people and the security forces are today the main targets of terrorism and the Afghan state is still fragile, meaning it cannot maintain security on its own. However, the US has not learned from its mistakes and is still driven by strategic narcissism. The inconsistencies give observers a sense of deja vu.
With such a frame of mind, how can the US build alliances and garner its allies’ loyalty? When the US deals with its allies in such a transactional manner, directed from a self-centered perspective, how can it expect its friends’ loyalty? When policy is reset with every president and past promises made to allies simply forgotten; when policy changes with the fluctuation of public mood; when the US does not show its allies any empathy, can anyone blame those allies when they look for alternatives?
The US is the world’s superpower, but with great power comes great responsibility — and that responsibility is not only toward American taxpayers, but also toward the world, as US policy choices have repercussions internationally. The same way the US left the “sons of Iraq” to be slaughtered by the sectarian and vengeful Al-Maliki, today Washington is leaving the fragile Afghan government to deal with the Taliban alone. Though this move might please some American voters, strategists know there will be a bill for the US to pay later on.

• Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She is the co-founder of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building (RCCP), a Lebanese NGO focused on Track II. She is also an affiliated scholar with the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut.