Another scam in the making

Indian Premier Narendra Modi’s arbitrary decision to scrap the $20 billion Rafale combat-aircraft contract — touted as the “mother of all defense deals” signed by New Delhi till date — serve as a warning to this still evolving democracy of the consequences of blindly electing leaders by believing their rhetoric.
It is one thing to admire or worship such political personalities, but quite another to actually elevate them to the top slot. That leaders with authoritarian trait are fundamentally unpredictable is best reflected in Modi’s whimsical cancellation of the original Rafale deal concluded initially in 2012. According to the agreement, Indian Air Force (IAF) would have got 18 planes in flyaway condition while the rest of the 126 ordered was to be manufactured in India in collaboration with the government-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).
And this term of contract perfectly fit into Modi’s grand “Make-in-India” concept. However, to everyone’s surprise, it is the same Modi, who goes around telling the world that “India will emerge as a major global center for defense industry” has not only throttled the prospect of HAL co-producing an advanced flying-machine but also knocked the wind out of India’s premiere public-sector defense manufacturer’s sails. Was aerospace not supposed to be the fulcrum of defense manufacturing in India as successive governments sought to usher a new dawn in design and production of high-end indigenous defense hardware?
Unless his friends and admirers — with deep pockets — use their influence to manipulate the media and sweep the issue under the rug, mothballing the “2012-Rafale-contract” will prove costly for Modi. It is no less an incipient scandal of significant proportion, equivalent (in gravity) to the one concerning domestic coalfield allocations that tarnished the Teflon image of former Premier Manmohan Singh. If Singh, despite heading the coal ministry figuratively and not deriving any personal benefits, could be accused of causing financial losses to public-sector coal mining companies by giving preferential treatment to private players, Modi surely will be held culpable for shoving a disastrous decision down the country’s throat.
Not only such quick-fix solution to bridge the technology gap in military aviation has far-reaching consequences on the state exchequer, the reported presence of an Indian industrialist in Modi’s official meeting with the honchos of defense industry in Paris also raises some uncomfortable questions. Sources reveal Modi has lobbied the French manufacturer discreetly to produce Rafale in partnership with this private Indian player because the IAF desperately requires six squadrons of “medium-multi-role-combat-aircraft” to meet India’s strategic security requirements in the ever-changing geopolitical circumstances. And with 36 off-the-shelf planes, IAF cannot establish more than three Rafale Squadrons. Did the Indian premier therefore not violate the dignity of his chair by openly promoting a private corporate house despite the fact that an organization functioning under government aegis has a stake in the same sector and this particular contract?
Does Modi’s decision on Rafale not point to a conflict of interest whereby the impartiality of the prime ministerial chair is potentially undermined? Why did Modi award a single-vendor contract to the French firm once he decided to bypass the previous deadlocked-tender? There were other contenders who met every IAF requirement in the evaluation trials. Why were they not invited to submit a parallel bid for the 36 fighter aircrafts required in flyaway condition? India could have surely obtained such critical hardware at a far cheaper rate and ahead of the timeframe that Dassault has provided for delivering Rafale given the company’s manufacturing constraint. Besides, as is the common norm in any competitive procurement, allowing others to participate would have checkmated the French design of obtaining a revision in the terms and conditions of the contract so that they are absolved of the need to co-produce Rafale in state-owned Indian defense factories. Surely, Modi is shrewd enough to see through such business tricks. Did Modi not realize that his decision would adversely impact servicing, upgradation and future acquisition, with Dassault milking the Indian treasury unethically?
Moreover, if we take into account the very fact that an entire cadre of IAF personnel have been trained to fly and maintain the fleet of 126 Rafale fighter jets, the perils of rewarding the French malfeasance — of violating defense contract clauses deliberately — will continue to haunt India every time the country seek to acquire hardware and technology from foreign sources. Worse still, the contour of the deal was revised without the defense minister Manohar Parrikar’s knowledge. Parrikar was not only not involved in the discussions in Paris with the French hosts, he was not even taken into confidence, thus transgressing the constitutional convention of collective responsibility in a Cabinet system of governance that India has followed all these years. Poor Parrikar was left inaugurating a fish-stall in his home province of Goa even as Modi was busy providing an escape-route to the beleaguered Dassault, which almost decided to down the Rafale-plant-shutters if they lost the initial bid.
Ironic it is that Modi’s decision will neither uphold short nor long-term interest of India or her Air Force. Strangely, Modi refused to use India’s gigantic defense market as a bargaining-instrument to tame Dassault obstinacy. Undoubtedly, he will go down in history as a political executive who astutely used charm offensive to hide his corrupt practices.