The specter of water wars in South Asia

Maj. Gen. Muniruzzaman, a renowned Bangladeshi security expert had predicted sometime ago that “if ever there were a localized conflict in South Asia, it will be over water.” Water indeed is that spark which is expected to provoke clashes in the Indian subcontinent. And the region’s unquenchable thirst for water has reached such a point that even sovereign governments are alarmingly getting dragged into domestic politics of neighbor.
Take for example the readiness of Bangladesh leadership to play ball with the Indian Hindu nationalists, trying to grab power in the sensitive Indian border state of West Bengal by hook or by crook. The reason — Sheikh Hasina and her ruling Awami League believes Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s legitimate objection to 50:50 sharing of Teesta river water was actually a ploy to ensure her defeat in the farcical general elections held earlier this year. Hasina’s popularity dipped noticeably in Bangladesh prior to the polls and a sizeable majority, especially those associated with farming, was getting disillusioned with her for conceding too much to India on the issue of river water sharing.
In this backdrop, a deal with India on Teesta waters just before the elections would have been a major trump card for the Awami League. That she had to organize a virtual coup-in-disguise to come back to power because of the failure to reach an interim Teesta accord did not go down well with Bangladesh’s founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s daughter. Hence, a fiery Mamata has turned into an anathema to Bangladesh’s ruling party and its leadership. The continuous verbal bashing of Mamata by an Awami League politician on Indian television recently is the most glaring example of how Hasina is trying to fish in the troubled — domestic — political waters of India. Yes, Hasina desperately wants to push through the Teesta water accord to counter her formidable opponents back home.
The water issue does have a bearing in Bangladesh’s domestic politics — like in neighboring West Bengal — because of a primarily agrarian economy. Moreover, Begum Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is known for taking a rigid stance in river diplomacy whenever in power. But then, it is being deliberately overlooked that local politicians in north Bengal, cutting across party lines, have diligently opposed the Teesta deal because five districts, namely Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, Cooch Behar, North and South Dinajpur, would have been adversely affected had the agreement been signed in its present form. In fact, Prasanta Majumdar, a parliamentarian representing the main opposition Left Front in Bengal, had walked into the well of the lower law-making house Lok Sabha to register his protest on behalf of the local populace and went to the extent of writing an open letter to the Indian premier.
Majumdar says, the Left parties too oppose this proposed treaty because it would not only hamper livelihood of the people in north Bengal but also affect rural economy and the region’s hydroelectric power generation capacity. Perhaps it is time that the Bangladesh leadership deals with this situation rationally. They need to understand why India could not ink the Teesta pact, which requires no parliamentary approval. For far too long, the central government has been using Mamata as a scapegoat to save its skin. After all, why would New Delhi allow Mamata to hold sway over foreign policy when constitutionally the sovereign power of the union government will prevail in treaty-making exercise even if it encroaches into provincial jurisdiction?
The point is, if the then Indian premier Manmohan Singh put his government’s very survival at stake by ignoring the Left parties’ — who held the key to majority — plea of abandoning the 123 Nuclear Agreement with America, could he not have done the same with Mamata? He could not because of a classified note that apprised him of the security—consequences in the critical chicken’s neck area — the only passage linking the land-locked northeastern theater to the rest of India — if the Teesta accord was operationalized. There was a design to exploit the brewing discontent among Teesta basin stakeholders, who felt their legitimate interests were being undermined. Since, two strains of dormant militancy — ethnic and radical left — lie embedded in north Bengal, the Congress regime decided against throwing caution to the wind.
Now, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) desperately wants to club the so-called “Islamic militants finding safe haven in Bengal” propaganda with that of Teesta water sharing issue to prove that Mamata is acting against national interest. The reality, however, is completely different. An Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA) Task Force report suggests that India will become water-stressed by 2025 and water-scarce by 2050. The team comprising of eminent security and hydrology experts, therefore, wanted New Delhi to deal with Bangladesh’s water issue in the overall political and security context.
Mamata, like her predecessor Buddhadeb Bhattacherjee, is following this line by putting the core strategic interest of Bengal, and consequently India, over anything else. Does, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, having endorsed the IDSA recommendation previously, consider it a crime? On her part, Hasina must realize that she is barking up the wrong tree. Prime Minister Modi’s favorite river-linking project, and not Mamata, is a far bigger threat to Bangladesh, as it will increase flooding and further reduce the availability of water in lean season. Instead, Hasina and Mamata, the two influential Bengali leaders, must jointly act as the catalyst to introduce a holistic basin-based trans-boundary water-governance in South Asia.

Email: sengupta.seema@gmail.com