Saudi Arabia: What comes after the Arab Spring?

The question is no longer the following: Do you have to be with the revolutions of the Arab Spring or against them? Do you have to consider them as revolutions or as something else? Should we fear them and their implications or should they be regarded as trustworthy? What is your position on the political Islam that was brought forth by this spring? Should you be with the Muslim Brotherhood? Or must you be against them? These and other questions are legitimate, but there is a more important question for you: What will you do in the face of this historical trend that pushes and imposes itself? What will you do after the results of this Spring become highlighted and its repercussions take effect and exceed its local framework to prevail throughout the region? Are you ready for what the pot holds for this region and for its Spring? Are you ready for the fact that what happened to the countries of the spring may get to you one way or another or affect you in one way or another? Or do you think you are safe from all the implications of what is happening? In both cases, have you taken precautions to face either? These questions show that it is very important for you to take a stance on the events and contribute to the formulation and the direction of these events as opposed to limiting oneself to a reactionary role of proclaiming positions of support and endorsement or having attitudes of condemnation towards this or that party according to the regional position and the circumstances surrounding such a position.
These are questions concerning Arab countries, especially those that have not been reached by the storm, such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates among others. Morocco, from this perspective, is a distinct case, as it belongs neither to the countries ravaged completely by the winds of Spring nor to those who avoided the storm. This is due to what appears to be clearly intelligent political acceleration by the leadership in Morocco to contain the storm by being proactive through applying a package of constitutional reforms and political concessions where the King gave up some of his powers to Parliament and accepted that the formation of the government be led by a political power that wins the majority of the Parliament through popular elections.
Regardless of what has been said in favor of the Arab Spring or against it, it already has shifted to a new historic line. There is near unanimity that the Arab world will not go back to what it was before this spring. The popular mood in the region is changing in an accelerated pace and the streets in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Kuwait. Indeed, the battlefields that cover Syria’s entire map for about 20 months now disclose that. Perhaps it also hides more than that. Among the most popular indices of change in the Arab mood are the surprises faced by political Islam in Egypt and Tunisia after the revolution. It comes as no surprise that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that enjoys a large base of support faces an enormous crowd of opposition which has rippled across Egyptian cities in recent weeks. Also surprising was the objection of worshipers during a Friday sermon at a mosque in Cairo when he began defending President Muhammad Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood in the presence of the president himself. There are more surprises that are no less important in scale. Whoever follows what is being said on the Arab Twitter, especially Saudi Arabia, can see that the change of the popular mood is not limited to countries which have undergone a Spring storm. What is being said on these sites about the attitudes, opinions and demands on social, political, economic and even religious issues includes aspirations, courage and knowledge far exceeding the boundaries of traditional media. This suggests that there is a gap widening between traditional media and public opinion. The seriousness of this is that traditional media in the Arab world represents governments, while new media represents the people. Therefore the gap that separates the public from the traditional media has also separated them from their governments.
A change in popular mood means that the political culture in the region is rapidly changing and in an apparent way. What points toward this are new terms being used such as ‘rights’, 'constitution' and 'democracy', which have become of the most heavily traded terminology, in addition to the subjects of debate and disagreement in both the traditional and new media, as well as at the conferences and private and public meetings. Some of these terms were previously taboo. Talking about it or around it was a kind of intellectual warfare which had no place nor justification. However, the situation has turned around completely. In Egypt, the constitution and its interpretation have become themes of political and popular clashes where blood was shed. In Jordan and Kuwait, the rights, specifically the right to vote, became the subject of clashes with security forces. In Yemen, the state, with all its constitutional, human rights and democracy accessories became topics for clashes before and after Ali Abdullah Saleh.
What does this mean? It means that the change of the popular mood and the accompanying change in the political map in the countries of the Spring and beyond, as well as the change of the political culture, will result in a change in the concept of the Arab state itself, which is already changing as we speak. We may not know to what end this change will settle. This is precisely the source of concern and should therefore be the focus of attention and care. The state is changing in Syria in a bloody manner caused by the ruling regime. In Tunisia and Egypt so far, the state is changing in a more political and rational way. In Libya, change is occurring in a third way; it began as it is in Syria, but is now trying to go the way of Tunisia and Egypt. In Yemen there is a fourth way while in Kuwait, Morocco, and to some extent in Jordan, there is a fifth way. The best of these methods and the closest to the rational methods are the second and fifth.
What is the position of Saudi Arabia in such scenario? Should it have to worry about the repercussions? Or it can be reassured that it will, in any case, remain free from all or some of the most dangerous aspects of what is going on in the regional scene? I do not think that Saudi Arabia should worry, but it should not be assured as well. Saudi Arabia is not immune to what is happening and cannot afford it. Saudi Arabia is an integral part of the Arab world; it is in the heart of this world, and is considered as one of its large poles. In the eastern Arab region, Saudi Arabia specifically is the only major country that survived every political storm that swept the region since what was known as the Arab cold war in the fifties and sixties of the last century, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iranian revolution, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990, the Sept. 11 attacks, the US invasion of Iraq and now the Arab Spring, which is still ongoing. This is undoubtedly a great achievement, but an achievement that necessarily comes with great responsibilities, first and foremost internally, then toward the regional scene abroad. If the region is going through a pivotal moment, Saudi Arabia is part of this moment. What is the outlook of what is happening? And how should it respond to what is happening? If the popular Arab mood is changing, the popular Saudi mood should not be an exception. If the Arab political culture is changing, the Saudi political culture does not have to isolate itself from this change. If the concept of the Arab state is changing, the Saudi state cannot afford to be separated from it because it is part of the Arab political and cultural fabric itself and is influenced by it and should affect it. Saudi Arabia qualifies to hold the reins of vulnerability and take the initiative to influence. The question is: how should this be?