Lebanon conflict holds echoes of 1982 — and Israeli failure

 

It was Mark Twain who famously said that “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” In other words, events rarely recur in exactly the same way, but the similarities can be striking, and often painfully so. The direction in which the war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon is heading, frighteningly, reminds me of what Israel calls the “First Lebanon War of 1982,” as well as several other Israeli military incursions into its northern neighbor, which ended with significant losses and no lasting political achievements.
Back in 1982, under the guise of pushing Palestinian militants away from the Israeli-Lebanese border, Israel fell into the trap of using the attempted assassination of its ambassador to the UK, Shlomo Argov, as a pretext to launch a preplanned regime-change operation in Lebanon. The plan had been concocted in coordination with right-wing Christian factions in the country. It took Israel 18 years to leave Lebanon, and by then the genie was out of the bottle: Hezbollah, a Shiite movement allied with Iran, had emerged not only as a major political force but also as a formidable military one, and has posed a constant threat to communities in northern Israel ever since.
Forty years ago, the decision to embark on what was initially described as an “operation” and later became a full-scale war was taken by the first Likud Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and his hawkish Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon. Together with Mossad, Sharon was the mastermind behind a wide-ranging plan to destroy the PLO’s infrastructure in Lebanon, force Syria out of the country, and install a friendly Christian-dominated government led by Bashir Gemayel, who would then sign a peace treaty with Israel. At least in theory, it all appeared neat and carefully thought through, a strategy designed to translate military superiority into political triumph.
It did not take long, however, for the rapid military advance to Beirut and the occupation of large parts of Lebanon to collide with the reality of the country’s deeply fragmented political landscape. Although Gemayel was elected president as the sole candidate, his assassination marked the beginning of the end of this grand fantasy and the start of a long nightmare.
To make matters worse, Israel allowed Christian Phalangist forces to enter the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut, where they carried out a horrific massacre. The episode severely tarnished Israel’s international reputation and led to widespread condemnation. What followed were 18 years of the Israeli military struggling in Lebanon’s quagmire. Although Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership were forced into exile, the vacuum they left behind paved the way for Hezbollah, which would prove to be a far more challenging adversary. More than 40 years later, Israel is once again occupying much of the Lebanese territory south of the Litani River and, following the recent capture of Beaufort Castle, has expanded its ground offensive even further. But to what end?

Weakening Hezbollah, particularly as a military force, is as much in Lebanon’s interest as it is in Israel’s. This convergence of interests should encourage Israel to make it easier for its counterpart in Beirut to negotiate a long-term ceasefire agreement. 

Yossi Mekelberg

Israel has legitimate security concerns regarding Hezbollah, which has attacked northern Israel and dug tunnels suggesting an intention to infiltrate the country, potentially enabling elite units to carry out attacks similar to those perpetrated by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023. Hezbollah’s close relationship with Tehran — its principal financial, military, and political backer — makes it a significant threat to Israeli security.
However, Israel’s response carries the unpleasant scent of the 1982 war. It appears to be operating under the same false assumption that military force is the only way to guarantee security and, with it the creation of a permanent security zone, which would require seizing and holding large areas of territory without a clear exit strategy. At the same time, this is also being done by continuing to devastate villages and neighborhoods in southern Lebanon, displacing more than one million people and repeatedly bombing Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut. This has resulted in substantial civilian casualties. According to the Lebanese health minister, almost 3,700 people have been killed during the conflict, reflecting an approach that failed to provide long-term security for northern Israel in the past and is likely to also fail in the future.
What makes the current situation even more dangerous is the presence of the most right-wing government in Israel’s history, some elements within which appear to operate with few moral constraints, and even less strategic understanding, are already contemplating the permanent occupation and settlement of parts of southern Lebanon, in a move that is linked with the inability to reach an agreement with Iran and the fast deteriorating situation there, too. On the Lebanese side, Hezbollah is a different proposition from the PLO. It is fighting not only to survive Israel’s assault but also to maintain its relevance in Lebanese politics by presenting itself as the standard-bearer of resistance to Israel.
There is little doubt that Hezbollah’s close ties to the Iranian regime are complicating efforts to find a solution. Yet they also create a shared interest of both the Israeli and Lebanese governments in reducing the threat posed by Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran. The current Lebanese government, and much of Lebanese society, is exhausted by being caught in the crossfire between these opposing forces and is paying a heavy price for a war in which it has little interest.
Weakening Hezbollah, particularly as a military force, is as much in Lebanon’s interest as it is in Israel’s. This convergence of interests should encourage Israel to make it easier for its counterpart in Beirut to negotiate a long-term ceasefire agreement. Such an agreement could see the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed all the way to the internationally recognized border, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and the strengthening of the UN peacekeeping mission to ensure that Hezbollah does not operate south of the Litani River.
But by relying on overwhelming force, causing significant civilian casualties and inflicting widespread destruction, Israel has adopted a strategy that recalls aspects of its conduct in Gaza. This leaves little political space for Lebanese President Joseph Aoun to negotiate with Israel. Were he to engage directly with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, let alone reach an agreement, he could easily be accused of capitulation or even treason, while Hezbollah portrays itself as the last force to resist occupation and destruction.
With a general election approaching, Netanyahu and his government appear unlikely to prioritize diplomacy, let alone compromise, unless compelled to do so by Washington. Instead, there are growing fears that Israel will entrench its occupation of southern Lebanon while continuing strikes in Beirut. This evokes a chilling sense of a 1982 deja vu. What would begin as a limited and rapid military operation could evolve into a prolonged occupation, accompanied by an enduring resistance movement that would inflict pain on both sides while further weakening the Lebanese state.
The question, for now, is who has both the capability and the will to stop it.

• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg