The significance of Pakistan’s US-Iran mediation

Pakistan has emerged as the most visible and motivated mediator between Iran and the US, a role sharpened by the latest escalation and illustrated by its outreach to regional capitals and calls for de-escalation. This diplomatic posture is calculated, rooted in both strategic positioning and Islamabad’s material interests in the Gulf.

However, Pakistan’s case points to a broader pattern, one in which middle-power mediation in the Middle East rarely operates outside great-power frameworks. Rather, it is embedded within them, with its effectiveness shaped by alignment and tacit acceptance. This is equally evident in the conduct of other countries, such as Turkiye, whose mediation efforts also unfold within the prevailing geopolitical architecture.

The standard account of successful mediation holds that brokers derive their value from impartiality. Pakistan’s role in this conflict challenges that assumption directly. Islamabad facilitated a 15-point US-Iran ceasefire framework and the subsequent ceasefire extension followed the same alignment. Tehran accepted Pakistan at the table because it understood that the proposals it carried had American weight behind them.

Pakistan has maintained direct communication channels between Field Marshal Asim Munir and the Trump administration. US President Donald Trump has publicly described Munir as his “favorite field marshal” on multiple occasions. This unusually warm personal rapport, reinforced by White House visits in June and September last year, is what gives Pakistani diplomacy its operational weight in the region, as all parties recognize that proposals carried by Munir reflect a direct line to the Oval Office.

The standard account of successful mediation holds that brokers derive their value from impartiality

Zaid M. Belbagi

Despite simultaneous courting by China, Pakistan has been keen to double down on its relationship with Washington, to significant material benefit. In 2025, the US approved $397 million in security assistance to Pakistan, despite cutting aid elsewhere, specifically targeting F-16 fleet sustainment and broader military cooperation. Cooperation with US Central Command reinforces Islamabad’s standing with Gulf actors, who themselves operate within the US security umbrella. Pakistan this month hosted the first high-level US-Iran contact since 1979, made possible by the strength of its relationship with Washington.

Pakistan’s pursuit of mediation reflects a clear diplomatic ambition, shaped in part by its economic ties to the Gulf, particularly sizable remittances and a steadily expanding diaspora in the region. Total remittances to Pakistan reached $38.3 billion in 2025, with 60 to 65 percent originating from Gulf countries, primarily Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Approximately 85 percent of Pakistan’s oil imports and virtually all its liquefied natural gas supplies come from the Gulf. Saudi Arabia holds $3 billion in deposits and has extended about $5 billion in rolled-over financial support, a lifeline for an economy under chronic fiscal stress.

For Pakistan, regional escalation is a major concern. Any disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz directly threatens both its energy supply and the remittance flows that sustain millions of households.

Beyond the Gulf, Pakistan shares a 900-km border with Iran. A protracted conflict along that frontier would raise serious risks of refugee flows and compound an already deteriorating security situation in Balochistan. For these reasons, mediation was a structural imperative.

Turkiye’s diplomats have operated differently during this crisis, though within tighter constraints than Pakistan. As a NATO member, Ankara’s room for independent maneuver is structurally limited, since any mediation effort must remain compatible with its alliance commitments and cannot drift into postures that would unsettle Washington or other fellow members.

Within those bounds, Ankara has maintained simultaneous channels with Iran, Gulf capitals and Western governments, positioning itself as a multidirectional interlocutor. It has avoided participation in any escalatory action, while preserving its NATO commitments in full, including continued hosting of US assets at Incirlik Air Base. NATO membership is therefore both a credential that lends Turkish diplomacy weight and a ceiling on how far that diplomacy can independently go.

Turkiye’s calculations are geopolitically discretionary, as its economic exposure to the Gulf does not carry the same structural weight as that of Pakistan. What the two share is the fact that their credibility as mediators derives from perceived alignment with, and access to, the dominant power. Neither can run counter to Washington and remain viable interlocutors in the same conflict. Their room for maneuver is a function of how much room Washington grants.

Aside from the US, China’s posture in this conflict has been consistent with its broader regional approach, being commercially protective, conflict-averse and institutionally passive. Beijing’s priority is the security of energy flows and trade routes, not crisis management.

Pakistan’s credibility as a mediator derives from its perceived alignment with, and access to, the dominant power

Zaid M. Belbagi

Russia, whose ties with Iran might theoretically have positioned it as a relevant mediator, has had little incentive to act. The war in Ukraine has constrained Moscow’s diplomatic bandwidth and the conflict-driven spike in oil prices, combined with the easing of US sanctions pressure, have allowed Russia to expand revenues that directly fuel its war effort. Stability is not in its immediate interest and it has deployed no ceasefire initiative. Neither great power filled the space.

This created the opening Pakistan and Turkiye stepped into. But the critical analytical point is that their effectiveness in filling that space depended on their alignment with the power that was, in fact, managing the broader framework. Pakistan’s access to Washington and Beijing — the latter through its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor integration, in which Saudi Arabia is also an investor — as well as Gulf capitals give it triangulated leverage.

Pakistan’s mediation role during this conflict clarifies a few important points about how middle-power diplomacy actually functions in the contemporary Middle East. First, credibility as a broker is derived from access to the dominating powers. Second, economic fragility can function as a driver of diplomatic activism, as states with the most to lose from instability have the strongest incentive to manage it. Third, the space for middle-power initiative expands precisely when great powers choose not to act, but the effectiveness of that initiative remains bounded by great-power preferences.

The Gulf states illustrate a parallel dynamic. Their dependence on US security in the current environment has entrenched, as years of cautious hedging toward Beijing have offered little during the current conflict. Neither China nor Russia proved willing or able to underwrite regional stability in a moment of genuine crisis, leaving Washington as the indispensable security guarantor and reinforcing why a US-aligned broker such as Pakistan finds ready acceptance in regional diplomacy.

As such, middle powers advance their position by managing multiple alignments simultaneously and converting crisis moments into diplomatic visibility. Their activism speaks to something larger. The Middle East remains so strategically and economically consequential that no state with meaningful exposure to it can afford indifference when it destabilizes. Washington, for its part, has attempted to encourage this arrangement, delegating mediation to aligned middle powers, allowing it to shape outcomes without direct exposure.

The result is a developing regional diplomatic landscape where middle-power engagement is expanding visibly, both with and without the structure of incentives that the US has designed.

• Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

X: @Moulay_Zaid