Climate diplomacy and the need to end the bickering

In the fight against climate change, every month, let alone year, is key. However, 2025 will be more important than most in determining the success or failure of the landmark 2015 Paris climate agreement.

The coming year will shape the all-important context for countries to submit new national targets to cut their emissions of greenhouse gases ahead of the vitally important COP30 summit in Brazil. This process will be critical, since many states will need to show much greater ambition in this round of proposed emission reduction goals if the world is going to get close to meeting the Paris targets.

Indeed, this procedure might be the last best chance to get on a trajectory that is compliant with the ambition set out in 2015. As the UN has concluded, the commitments made by countries in Paris, important as they are, are not remotely sufficient to limit the global average temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius, let alone 1.5 C.

The biggest new political iceberg on the horizon is the upcoming second presidency of Donald Trump. The US, as the world’s largest historical emitter and second-largest current emitter behind China, is crucial to future climate action.

In 2017, Trump set in motion America’s withdrawal from Paris, which has a four-year “sunset” timetable. This was rescinded by President Joe Biden when he took office in 2021. With Trump likely to try to leave the Paris deal again in 2025, there remains a possibility that the treaty will wither.

This is potentially more plausible now, given the growing number of right-wing populists around the world. Take the example of Argentine President Javier Milei, who took the highly unusual step of withdrawing his government’s negotiators from COP29 after their arrival in Baku. It is not yet clear whether this action might presage an exit from the Paris treaty by this key G20 nation. However, Milei has said that the climate crisis is a “socialist lie” and has previously threatened to withdraw from the agreement.

Given the likelihood of Trump withdrawing the US from Paris, the response of other powerful nations and blocs, including Europe and China, will be vital. Firstly, to try to maintain the edifice of Paris until 2029, when Trump’s successor is in place; and, secondly, to continue encouraging change in the American cities and states where positive movement is occurring.

It is not just liberal and centrist politicians who favor remaining in Paris, but also much of the nation’s business community. Many US multinationals believe that it is better for the country to keep a seat at the table and influence an accord that big US-headquartered businesses may ultimately have to abide by anyway.

Given the likelihood of the US withdrawing from Paris, the response of other powerful nations and blocs will be vital.

Andrew Hammond

So, Paris may withstand America’s withdrawal under the second Trump administration. The reason for this is not just that the deal retains significant support across the world, but also because it has a more flexible, bottom-up approach when compared with the preceding Kyoto Protocol and this provides resilience.

This decentralized architecture contrasts with the more rigid, top-down Kyoto framework. While Kyoto worked in 1997 for 37 developed countries and the EU states that agreed to it, a different approach was needed in Paris for the more than 170 diverse developing and developed states.

Nonetheless, even if the Paris treaty can be salvaged in this way, a major reset of the global climate policymaking process is now needed from those states with the largest ambition to tackle climate change. This was clear at COP29 in Azerbaijan — a big disappointment that threatens the legitimacy of future climate summits, including COP30, which will require supreme political skill to be a success.

Several times at COP29, the talks threatened to collapse completely. This included a walkout by dozens of delegates from the Alliance of Small Island States, which represents countries that are the most vulnerable to climate change.

Ultimately, a divisive overall climate finance deal was agreed in Baku that will provide about $1.3 trillion in climate finance for the Global South by 2035.

However, how sustainable those arrangements will prove remains to be seen, given the largely loveless nature of the agreement. India, for instance, was furious at the deal being pushed through so quickly, claiming that Global South nations were not allowed to voice strong dissent.

Even before the new Trump presidency starts, this highlights the divisions plaguing global climate talks. These divisions are sometimes characterized as Global North versus Global South, but the reality is more complex.

What all this bickering points to is a growing need for a new model for world leaders to try to settle the increasingly thorny challenge of global climate diplomacy. COP29 was a step backward, or sideways at best, with the can being kicked down the road on key questions critical to the future of the planet.

Much of this mess may now fall to the Brazilian government to try to tackle at COP30. However, this will be hard to fix in one summit.

Beyond the Global North versus Global South disagreements, the disruptive role of populist politicians is also key. Amid this division, the danger for future COPs is that only a bare minimum will be agreed, even if outright failure is avoided, as in Azerbaijan, when the world now needs much more.

• Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.