The relationships that led to Assad’s downfall

I have previously questioned the depth of Tehran’s relationship with Bashar Assad, as he considered it his pillar of support. It saved him in 2014 but failed 10 years later.
In the final weeks of his life in March 2000, Hafez Assad decided to negotiate with Israel. He was in a hurry, wanting to resolve the outstanding issues before handing power to Bashar. Despite his illness, he flew to Geneva and negotiated with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak through a mediator, US President Bill Clinton. The draft agreement was about regaining the occupied Golan Heights without addressing the issue of a Palestinian state. The Israelis, aware of Bashar’s grooming for the leadership, were not confident he would take power, given the hidden conflicts. Hafez died 10 weeks after the Geneva meeting.
Bashar did not return to negotiations until protests erupted against him in 2011. But Benjamin Netanyahu remained skeptical of Bashar’s ability to sever ties with Tehran and Hezbollah, so he refused.
One of the key reasons for the longevity of Hafez’s regime was his ability to manage relations with his foreign adversaries. He refrained from confronting Israel after the 1973 defeat, whereas Bashar integrated Syria into the Iranian “Revolutionary Guard Empire,” inevitably making it a target for destruction later.
Why did Hafez not sign a peace agreement with Israel, despite having secretly coordinated with it? His closest ally, the late Abdul Halim Khaddam, mentioned that Hafez feared it would be said that the Alawite minority made peace with the enemy.
And what about his confrontations with Israel through Lebanon? In reality, Syria did not launch attacks on Israel during its 30 years in Lebanon. Instead, it acted as a military force to curb the activities of Palestinian factions, and later Hezbollah to a lesser extent, until Bashar expanded the risks. Hafez’s strategy was to take control of Lebanon as long as Israel occupied the Golan Heights. He used it as a bargaining chip with Arab states and played the role of mediator in the abduction of Western hostages.
Using the same policy of getting close to the fire without being burned, he gave Turkish Kurds refuge, but when Ankara threatened him, he stopped and indirectly handed over their leader.

One of the key reasons for Hafez’s longevity was his ability to manage relations with his foreign adversaries.

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

Hafez’s relationship with Iran must be understood as complex. He used it for geopolitical balance against his enemy, Saddam Hussein, to prevent the Damascus regime’s fall. He leveraged Tehran to enhance his significance in Riyadh and repeatedly played roles in easing tensions with Tehran.
After the 1996 Alkhobar bombing, he handed over some Saudi fugitives when it was revealed the cell had hidden in Damascus. On the other hand, he facilitated the escape of its leader to Tehran.
In trying to understand the relationship, Khaddam spoke about Hafez’s policy toward Iran. When Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visited in 1985, seeking Assad’s support in Iran’s war against Iraq, like a skilled Iranian merchant, he tried to convince him that the reward for their alliance upon defeating Saddam would be a stronger Syrian position against Turkiye, Israel and Iraq. Khaddam said Hafez was cautious about overextending the alliance amid the region’s shifting sands.
There is no doubt that one of the reasons for the fall of Bashar’s regime was his failure to manage foreign policy, especially his alliance with Iran. While Hafez built a strong relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime, understanding its importance, he refused to participate in its war. Yet, like Israel and Libya, he secretly sold Scud missiles to Iran.
As for Bashar, at the start of his presidency, he gave the impression to everyone that he had shifted his orientation westward, away from Moscow and Tehran. It was not long before everyone who had initially supported him — Saudi Arabia, Spain, France and the US — realized the truth.
Early in his alliance with Iran, Bashar planned to seize control of Lebanon’s decision-making process by assassinating Rafik Hariri and numerous other leaders, before turning Hezbollah into the sole ruler in Lebanon after the expulsion of his forces.
Bashar then dared to open his southern borders to armed groups to attack the new regime in Baghdad, which was under Washington’s protection. This justified neighboring countries like Jordan and Turkiye opening their borders to Syrian rebels in 2012, ultimately leading to his regime’s downfall.
Alliances can be understood in the context of regional conflict, considering Hafez’s strong relationship with Tehran as a significant player, and similarly Bashar’s. However, the latter became deeply involved in its wars in Lebanon and Iraq.
Khaddam said Bashar made a fateful decision to fully merge with Tehran in 2011. My opinion, as I mentioned earlier, is that his involvement in Tehran’s wars started years earlier. Was Bashar’s rise to power, supported extraordinarily by Tehran, what pushed him to always act as an agent like Hezbollah? Very few know what happened between 2000 and 2024.

• Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a Saudi journalist and intellectual. He is the former general manager of Al-Arabiya news channel and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published. X: @aalrashed