Assad’s self-destructive policies

Syria has witnessed two major events: the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime and the rise of the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham to power.

The fall of Assad is the latest in a series of collapses of the fascist regimes of the 1960s, including Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi.

Similarly, the rise of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham represents the third wave of fundamentalist movements. The first wave was led by Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran in the late 1970s. The second wave emerged during the revolutions of 2011, with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda under Rached Ghannouchi in Tunisia and the Houthis in Yemen. Now it is Syria’s turn, although it is still too early to judge the outcome.

Assad’s fall was expected. But it was delayed from its anticipated timeline in 2014 due to an emergency intervention that granted him an additional 10 years, supported by Iran and Russia.

We saw the Assad regime’s downfall as inevitable due to its transformation into a one-man, minority-led, socialist, Baathist and Iran-aligned system. Additionally, the state itself had aged and the capabilities of its institutions had deteriorated. Since taking power, Assad failed to create a unifying identity for his regime beyond being “a necessity for Iran,” which in itself brought about calamities and led to his downfall. Even his core supporters — Baathists and Alawites — abandoned him.

His intelligence agencies were also ineffective and he ignored the threats he created for himself by making Syria the primary corridor between Tehran and its areas of influence at a time when the confrontation between Iran and Israel was intensifying. He failed to understand the profound implications of the events of Oct. 7, 2023, prior to which Israel’s opposition to any change in Damascus was well established. In Idlib and Ankara, both Turkiye and the Syrian opposition recognized that change had become permissible, prompting them to advance on Damascus.

Assad’s policies reflected his ignorance, allowing crises to pile up on three open fronts against him: with Turkiye, the Syrian armed opposition and an indirect confrontation with Israel. These were challenges far beyond Syria’s capacity to manage, making it unsurprising that they ultimately blew up in his face.

How did Assad manage these crises? For example, in dealing with the refugee issue, he viewed the 3 million Syrians who fled to Turkiye as a problem for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to handle, which resulted in the Turkish leader’s position and war against him. He rejected Erdogan’s request for reconciliation or even a visit to Damascus to negotiate, as well as ignoring demands to facilitate their return.

Assad’s policies reflected his ignorance, allowing crises to pile up on three open fronts against him

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

While refugees have indeed been a problem for the Ankara government, they also posed a threat to Assad’s regime. The 3 million who were displaced became a reservoir for the opposition, which easily recruited thousands from among them. It is difficult to understand how Assad overlooked the danger that these armed groups occupying vast areas of Syria posed, especially when a moment of weakness could prompt them to march on the capital.

The political relationship between Turkiye and Syria has historically been a drama of love and hate. Over the past century, Damascus has remained wary of Ankara’s intentions, though this has not precluded smooth relations along the border. Assad’s approach to managing relations with Turkiye differed to that of his father.

During one of the crises between the two countries in 1989, Turkiye grew frustrated with Hafez Assad’s support for Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the separatist PKK. Turkiye demanded that Syria stop Ocalan’s activities and hand him over. When Hafez Assad refused, Turkiye massed troops at the Bab Al-Hawa border crossing. The Syrian ruler filed a complaint with the administration of US President Bill Clinton, which responded by supporting Turkiye’s demands. Realizing the balance of power favored Turkiye, backed by Israel and the US, he capitulated and expelled Ocalan, leading to his arrest in Nairobi. Hafez Assad understood that the balance of power was not in Syria’s favor.

Today, with Bashar Assad gone, millions of refugees will return to their homes, while Turkiye’s influence in Syria has increased, bolstered by its long-standing support for refugees and the opposition. Turkiye aims for a Syria that is an ally, much like Iran sees Iraq as an extension of its geographical and strategic influence.

• Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a Saudi journalist and intellectual. He is the former general manager of Al-Arabiya news channel and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published. X: @aalrashed