Another October, another mandate: Libya remains adrift

As the UN Security Council once again approached the quagmire that is Libya, the pervasive sense of deja vu is hard to ignore. The impending renewal of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya seems more obligatory than innovative, raising doubts about the council’s readiness to tackle the entrenched political and security issues with any new vigor. This October, as Security Council members gathered to deliver another bimonthly briefing, the stalemate in Libya persists, mired in a profound chasm of divisiveness and dysfunction. The Security Council’s routine, yet essential, proceedings often feel like a haunting refrain, replaying the discord between Libya’s competing mafia-like factions without offering decisive intervention to break the deadlock.
At the heart of Libya’s political standstill is the persistent struggle between the UN-recognized Government of National Unity in Tripoli and the eastern-based Government of National Stability under the control of Khalifa Haftar. This schism has recently been further inflamed by a scramble for control over the Central Bank of Libya, which extends beyond mere governance to a tug-of-war for financial supremacy.
August witnessed the provocative move by the House of Representatives to declare the Government of National Stability as Libya’s legitimate administration, coupled with an audacious decree by Presidential Council head Mohammed Yunus Al-Menfi dismissing long-serving Central Bank of Libya Governor Sadiq Al-Kabir. These unilateral acts have not only deepened the political rift but have also prompted a near collapse of oil exports — Libya’s vital and only economic artery.
Yet, as the Security Council braces to deliberate once more, there is a palpable impatience, questioning — albeit rhetorically — whether these meetings will conjure some “grand strategy” to finally close the “Libya File,” or merely perpetuate an all too familiar cycle of superficial fixes aimed at maintaining the status quo.
Amid this, the wider international community’s bumbling involvement adds another layer of complexity. Behind the facade of concern, major regional powers are less invested in genuine stabilization and more in their own strategic interests. These external actors have successfully carved out spheres of influence within Libya, safeguarding their geopolitical, regional, economic, and military footholds.
For these powers, an unstable yet manageable Libya serves as a buffer against larger regional disruptions, making the longevity of the crisis more palatable. The playbook offers public support for some kind of “peace” and musings of stability, even as Libya’s meddlers remain fairly content with an “invisible occupation and division” that benefits individual geopolitical stakes.
This paradox of intervention — wherein the guise of concern and, occasionally, mild outrage conceals a dogged pursuit of short-term and short-sighted strategic interests dependent on an enduring gridlock in Libya — kills all urgency for real reconciliation and spotlights the international community’s failure to provide coherent, effective solutions. Even a serious commitment to forensically studying just why the goal of a stable, unified, secure, and sovereign Libya remains ever elusive for the UN.
In October, as the Security Council gathered for the ritual renewal of yet another mandate for the UN Support Mission in Libya, the veneer of international diplomacy seemed increasingly hollow. The UN’s once robust role as a convener, arbiter, and legitimizer has been reduced to a mere rubber-stamper, caught in a morass of inefficiency, inertia, and dysfunction. For instance, despite many rounds of UN mission-facilitated talks culminating in the appointment of Naji Mohammed Issa Belqasem as governor of the Central Bank of Libya, the reality is that such agreements often disintegrate under the weight of Libya’s deeply entrenched power struggles.

Libyans seem detached and unenthusiastic by the nation’s gridlocked and highly dangerous political scene.

Hafed Al-Ghwell

Meanwhile, Libyans themselves seem detached and unenthusiastic by the nation’s gridlocked and highly dangerous political arena, an echo of the deep scars left in the wake of the 2011 civil war. The promises of a pluralistic democracy and personal liberties have become distant memories as ongoing humanitarian crises demonstrate systemic failures.
One such crisis, the catastrophic flooding in Derna last September, which displaced over 44,000 people and left around 250,000 in dire need of aid, is the biggest example yet that illustrates these shortcomings. Political corruption and competition over reconstruction funds have only deepened the discord, intensifying the public’s already palpable apathy.
However, even as political elites bicker and an ineffectual UN fails repeatedly to broker a lasting peace, the specter of another round of the continued civil war from 2011 looms large. Compounding these woes is the prospect of Libya becoming a permanent playground for middle powers and criminal organizations seeking to exert their own influence, further destabilizing a nation still grappling with its own unmet aspirations post-2011 as minimal as they have become.
The international community’s unsettling model-setting acquiescence to the status quo in Libya is already feeding a narrative of a heightened tolerance for failings — provided they do not lead to all-out war. However, while avoiding an outright relapse into conflict might elicit a collective sigh of relief, this “faux stability” hides far deeper issues. After all, the current peace is illusory, masking a consolidation of power by various actors who use this period to enrich themselves via corruption and unchecked state capture.
Libya’s divided governments and mafia-like factions, meanwhile, have made an art out of manipulating public institutions like the Central Bank and the National Oil Co. as well as key assets such as oilfields to line their pockets, sowing bitter seeds among a public that can only look on as prospects diminish with each new headline or crisis. This dynamic illustrates a peculiar form of helplessness that not only blesses the cannibalization of Libya but also amplifies the disenfranchisement of its citizens, setting an example the world over of the failures of the international community and its endless verbal diarrhea of statements, press releases, declarations, and resolutions.
After all, as political actors deepen their grip, ordinary Libyans find themselves with ever less to lose, heightening the risk of popular backlash despite the prevalence of arms across Libya’s sprawling black markets. Recent clashes between rival militias in Tripoli and UNSMIL’s concerns over threats of force tease how quickly the veneer of stability can easily and so swiftly shatter. The longer this state of inertia persists, the more likely Libyans are to take matters into their own hands. This is not a sustainable model, nor should it be the legacy of international intervention in Libya.
The UN Security Council must confront a sobering truth if genuine progress is to be made: The cyclical renewal of mandates and surface-level agreements do little to address the root causes of Libya’s woes and only chip away at what is left of UN credibility elsewhere. Without a decisive, coordinated, and genuine effort to implement lasting solutions, the cycle of dysfunction will continue — much to the detriment of Libyans and, ultimately, driving another nail in the already precarious state of global stability.

• Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. X: @HafedAlGhwell