New NATO chief Rutte must hit the ground running

For the first time in more than a decade, NATO has a new secretary-general. Jens Stoltenberg from Norway this week stepped down and was replaced by Mark Rutte, the former prime minister of the Netherlands.

Rutte is an experienced statesman and has been a staunch defender of Ukraine. His home country, the Netherlands, also understands the consequences of Russian aggression. In July 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, departing from Amsterdam, was shot down over eastern Ukraine by a Russian air defense system. Of the 298 people killed, 193 were Dutch citizens. This tragedy has had a profound impact on the Netherlands.

However, despite Rutte’s credentials, his selection as secretary-general sparked some debate within NATO. Many in the alliance had hoped that the next secretary-general would be selected from one of NATO’s newer member states, particularly from Central or Eastern Europe. These regions are seen as more directly affected by recent geopolitical challenges and their inclusion in the leadership might have symbolized NATO’s new focus.

Moreover, at a time when burden-sharing and defense spending are pressing topics within the alliance, some critics found it unusual that the new secretary-general comes from a country that, until this year, failed to meet NATO’s minimum defense spending requirement of 2 percent of gross domestic product. This point of contention reflects the growing impatience within NATO regarding equitable contributions to collective defense.

Rutte certainly has big shoes to fill. During his decade-long tenure, Stoltenberg skillfully guided NATO through some of the most turbulent times in its history. When he assumed office in 2014, Russia had just invaded Ukraine for the first time, NATO had recently ended its combat operations in Afghanistan and only three of its member states were meeting the 2 percent of GDP defense spending requirement.

Many in the alliance had hoped the next secretary-general would be selected from one of NATO’s newer member states. 

Luke Coffey

Under Stoltenberg’s leadership, NATO expanded by adding four new members and significantly increased its presence in Central and Eastern Europe, a move many thought impossible just a few years earlier. Defense spending within the alliance also grew consistently. Perhaps Stoltenberg’s most defining legacy is NATO’s response to Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which saw the alliance rally in support of Kyiv, mobilizing military and humanitarian aid on an unprecedented scale.

Looking ahead, Rutte’s in-tray is already filled with pressing issues, with Ukraine at the very top. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has fundamentally altered the security landscape in Europe, marking the most significant shift in the continent’s security dynamics in more than 80 years. It has been a stark wake-up call for many across Europe, highlighting the need to take defense and security much more seriously. For NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia’s aggression represents an existential threat. Rutte himself has acknowledged that providing sustained support to Ukraine will likely be the most critical challenge of his tenure as secretary-general.

Another significant issue on Rutte’s plate is the question of burden-sharing in defense spending within NATO. This summer, 23 of NATO’s 32 members met the 2 percent of GDP target, a notable achievement compared to just a decade ago. Much of the increased spending comes from countries in Central and Eastern Europe that border Russia or feel most threatened by Moscow. However, more work remains to be done.

Large European economies such as Spain and Italy continue to maintain low levels of defense expenditure, well below the 2 percent benchmark. The same is true of Canada. If former President Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025, there will likely be renewed and intensified pressure on European countries to further boost their defense budgets. During Trump’s first term, Stoltenberg was lauded for his ability to engage with the US president while simultaneously encouraging European allies to increase their military spending. It remains to be seen if Rutte will possess the same diplomatic skills and success in navigating this complex issue.

In addition to addressing defense spending, Rutte will need to expand NATO’s network of global relationships. The alliance has struggled to adapt to the newly emerging multipolar world that has replaced the bipolarity of the Cold War era. The deepening ties of Iran and North Korea with Russia, particularly in the context of the Ukraine war, exemplify how countries far from Europe can still significantly impact the security of the transatlantic community.

Rutte has acknowledged that providing sustained support to Ukraine will likely be the most critical challenge of his tenure. 

Luke Coffey

China’s growing influence poses another challenge. Last year, NATO leaders declared China a “strategic enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine. As concerns over Beijing’s activities in Europe and the Indo-Pacific rise, NATO has stepped up its engagement with countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. It is likely that, under Rutte’s leadership, NATO will seek to further deepen its involvement in the Indo-Pacific.

Additionally, Rutte must focus on strengthening NATO’s relationships with the Middle East and North Africa. Iran’s increasingly aggressive behavior, combined with its provision of weapons to Moscow for use in Ukraine, highlights the importance of closer engagement between NATO and the MENA region. Enhanced cooperation with key regional actors should be a priority for Rutte.

All of this must be achieved against a complex political backdrop in the transatlantic community. Far-right parties, often sympathetic to or supportive of Russia’s worldview, have been gaining ground in countries such as Hungary and Slovakia. In Germany, far-right parties have seen success in recent local elections and there are growing concerns about the potential rise of far-right nationalist politicians in France. This trend presents a challenge for NATO.

Firstly, many of these far-right parties do not share the same commitment to NATO or to strong transatlantic relations as mainstream political groups. Secondly, NATO’s decision-making process requires unanimity, meaning any member state can block or stall important decisions. This has already created obstacles, particularly regarding NATO’s relationship with Ukraine.

As NATO celebrates its 75th anniversary, the alliance, which started with 12 members in 1949, has grown to 32 countries. Europe is facing its largest conflict since the Second World War and, with growing geopolitical uncertainty in both the Middle East and East Asia, the new secretary-general has no choice but to hit the ground running.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. X: @LukeDCoffey