Internally divided Iran sees return of factional politics

New Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s attempts to promote national unity seem to have been short-lived.

Even though he is associated with the reformist camp, he chose to appoint all his ministers with the approval of the head of state, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This tactical move aimed to force Iranian deputies and conservative politicians, who are all loyal to the supreme leader, to approve Pezeshkian’s appointments. Nevertheless, his involvement in appointing ministers or influencing government positions might be perceived as tilting the government toward a more moderate or reformist approach to governance. This puts him at odds with the hard-liners who perceive his influence as a deviation from the original principles of the Iranian Revolution, especially if his appointees or allies are perceived as too lenient or inclined toward reforms.

Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor of Kayhan newspaper (which is often viewed as the mouthpiece of Iran’s supreme leader), is known for attacking figures or policies he deems counter-revolutionary or too reformist. His criticisms are reflective of the larger conservative establishment that is closely aligned with Khamenei. When Shariatmadari accuses certain members of the government or ministers of being “anti-revolutionary,” this is reflective of their stance on policies such as engagement with the West.

Indeed, if any minister favors more diplomatic or economic engagement with Western countries, particularly the US or Europe, this is often seen as breaching revolutionary ideals. Another point of contention between the moderate and conservative factions is related to economic and social reforms. Policies that prioritize economic pragmatism or social reforms are viewed as weakening the revolutionary identity of the regime.

Unsurprisingly, Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister, is at the center of the conservative criticism

Kayhan is now focusing on the appointments in the new government, accusing members of gaining roles without providing a certificate proving they have no past “security convictions.” This criticism likely aims to mobilize hard-liners against any shift toward more moderate policies, reflecting fears that the government might be drifting away from the revolutionary values espoused by Khamenei.

Mehdi Fazali, a member of the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution’s Works, explained that an elected member of the Iranian leadership must also respect the principles and ideals of the revolution. The reappearance of the conservative factions’ critics in the official media sphere is a message to the newly elected president that other centers of power in the regime are closely following and monitoring his policy choices and orientations.

Unsurprisingly, Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister, is at the center of the conservative criticism. Tehran’s representative in the parliament, Hamid Rasaei, explained that “Zarif resigned because his son had dual citizenship, but he announced again that ‘I am back’ and now he is working as the strategic deputy of the president.” His criticism was based on a law approved by the Iranian parliament that is perceived to be against members of the political elite. This law prohibits the children of senior officials from having foreign citizenship. However, Zarif’s children hold US citizenship, as they were born in America while Zarif was studying there. This is why he was first pushed to resign, only 11 days after his initial appointment on Aug. 1.

The factional struggles in Iran are deep-rooted. On one side, the conservative camp, which is loyal to the supreme leader, fears that allowing any form of reform (political, social or economic) could erode the regime’s ideological purity. On the other side, the reformist or pragmatic camp, to which Pezeshkian is aligned, argues that some degree of modernization is necessary for the country to survive its domestic and international challenges.

The hard-liners will likely continue to resist any form of reform or deviation from the revolutionary principles

The hard-line reaction — especially the accusation of being “anti-revolutionary” — is often a tactic used to delegitimize political opponents or discredit policies that do not align with this group’s strict vision of the Islamic Republic. The new concerns expressed in the official media from figures close to Khamenei are a signal to the newly elected president. This means that the supreme leader is cautious regarding reengagement with Western powers or renegotiating the nuclear deal.

Also, he may not be in favor of economic policies proposed by the new president that possibly prioritize short-term solutions. Indeed, the hard-liners view any economic compromises as delaying the long-term revolutionary goals of self-sufficiency and resistance against global (especially Western) powers. These accusations from the hard-line camp are often designed to consolidate power, ensuring that any potential for significant reform is quickly quashed.

The ongoing power struggle is likely to intensify as Iran faces increasing economic hardship due to sanctions, internal unrest and international isolation. The hard-liners will likely continue to resist any form of reform or deviation from the revolutionary principles, framing it as a betrayal. Pezeshkian and his allies, along with other pragmatists or reformists in the government, will have to navigate these accusations carefully. While they may want to push for change, they are constrained by the hard-line dominance of key institutions, particularly those aligned with the supreme leader.

In essence, the accusation of being “anti-revolutionary” is a powerful political weapon in Iran, used by conservatives like Shariatmadari, his Kayhan newspaper and the factions around Khamenei to maintain ideological control and suppress any tendencies toward reform or moderation. The presence of ministers associated with Pezeshkian may have triggered this hard-line response due to their perceived pragmatic stances, leading to inevitable and significant friction within the political establishment of the Iranian state.

- Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is the founder and president of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah). X: @mohalsulami