Retaliation in the Middle East: After Hezbollah, will Iran be next?

There is no denying that Hezbollah’s attack on Sunday in response to Israel’s assassination of its senior commander, Fouad Shukr, fell short of the expectations of its supporters and certainly the level of threats made by the leaders of the pro-Iranian party, including Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who had sworn to punish Israel for its assassination of the highest-ranking member of the militia.

The attack seemed laughable compared to the propaganda that Hezbollah had launched on a massive scale, in Lebanon and the region, through the media and social networks. In the end, the promised response did not materialize and, in return, Israel did not start a bigger war against Hezbollah, since the confrontation caused virtually no casualties on either side.

Therefore, the page has been turned. The revenge promised by Hezbollah’s chief of staff in the heart of Beirut’s southern suburb is now a thing of the past. Both parties have almost come out of this on the same level.

This reminds us of the previous Iranian response, on the night of April 13-14, to the massacre at the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which claimed the lives of seven senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force. About 350 missiles were launched in both acts of retaliation and, in both cases, damage was limited to equipment. No sensitive economic or military facilities were seriously damaged. According to descriptions of the scenes by some observers, Iran in April and Hezbollah on Sunday launched two attacks aimed at being a display of force, not the use thereof.

Certainly, both sides would not have refrained from causing further harm to Israel had they not realized that seriously responding to the two deadly Israeli attacks could provide Tel Aviv with the excuse it has been waiting for to launch a major attack on Iran, which would be likely to affect sensitive facilities related to its nuclear program, and also to launch a full-scale war against Hezbollah in an attempt to reverse the current equation on the Lebanese side of the border.

Iran in April and Hezbollah on Sunday launched two attacks aimed at being a display of force, not the use thereof

Ali Hamade

In both cases, there were behind-the-scenes “deals” between Israel on the one hand and Iran and Hezbollah on the other to keep the confrontation to a minimum, in order to save face for the parties involved.

Some described Iran’s response in April as spectacular, while others described Hezbollah’s response as disciplined and spectacular. Neither party claimed that their retaliation had changed anything in the equation. Iran’s retaliation in April did not prevent the assassination three months later of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh in the heart of Tehran. Nor will Hezbollah’s acknowledged military capabilities, or its retaliation last Sunday, prevent Israel from carrying out further assassinations.

It is therefore estimated that Iran’s retaliation for the assassination of Haniyeh, if any, will be like the two previous retaliations. In other words, it will be more for the sake of image, TV channels and social media than for serious revenge.

Above all, we must remember that the current Israeli government is desperate to launch a larger-scale war with Iran and Hezbollah. In return, taking advantage of the massive deployment of American and NATO military assets in the region, Washington and its allies aim to demonstrate a gigantic military force that would be sufficient to help Iran escape the trap of propaganda and threats into which it has fallen.

This may even be what helped Hezbollah put an end to the propaganda it was feeding for 25 days following the assassination of Shukr.

While we wait for the “Iranian revenge” that may or may not come, it is safe to say that careful calculations and cool heads will prevail. As for the hotheads and the rampaging masses, they can wait a long time.

• Ali Hamade is an editorial journalist at the Annahar newspaper in Lebanon. X: @AliNahar