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In Lebanon, as well as in Syria and the Occupied Territories, we find many different assumptions and even more predictions. The facts are strange, but developments on the ground are even stranger.
The Lebanese are languishing under their economic and cost-of-living crises. Amid a vacuum at the upper echelons of their government — albeit nominally — their eyes and hearts are on the southern front and what Hezbollah’s diplomatic arsenal has in store for them.
With a new Western envoy arriving as soon as another packs his bags in frustration because of the failure to find solutions, things keep getting worse in what has practically become an occupied country. Its politicians are unwelcome guests and decisions are made outside its borders.
Hezbollah’s pretext for instigating a conflict with Israel from Lebanon’s southern border is that it is on a “support mission” — coordinating and showing solidarity with the Gaza Strip. Yes, in Lebanon, which has been denied proper governance in line with the constitution due to its occupation by Hezbollah, the support for Gaza, which is governed by Hamas (not the legitimate Palestinian Authority), continues ... but it is incapacitated and incapacitating.
Against the backdrop of Israel’s aggression, its occupation of Gaza and its displacement of its people, and amid battles on two Arab territories effectively run by forces that have imposed themselves on the legitimate authorities, Iran has emerged as a regional power. In its own way, it is a partner in the negotiations to manage this region along with the US and Israel. Indeed, the Iranian leadership has mastered this approach of field negotiations since the 1980s.
On the other hand, despite fiery rhetoric and direct threats, the Tehran camp and the Washington-Tel Aviv camp agreed to an “implicit understanding” and “shared priorities” after the Iraq-Iran War.
In fact, the more heated the rhetorical threats from both sides became, the more Tehran expanded its sphere of influence — or rather, its practical occupation — within the Arab world. Some of its security officials eventually felt confident enough to declare that their country runs four Arab capitals ... and they are certainly right.
Iran’s expansion in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, as we remember, did not emerge suddenly or without American and Israeli political and war planners knowing about it. On the contrary, it could not have happened without American-Israeli “facilitation” at every juncture.
In its own way, Iran is a partner in the negotiations to manage this region along with the US and Israel.
Eyad Abu Shakra
Under the pretext that armed Palestinian groups had been present in the country, Israel was allowed to occupy Beirut and half of Lebanon in 1982. This occupation did not end until 2000 and the emergence of Hezbollah. Then, after February 2005, Hezbollah was handed control of Lebanon.
Meanwhile, under the pretext of Saddam Hussein’s nonexistent weapons of mass destruction, the US occupied Iraq. Before the smoke had cleared from occupied Baghdad, the allies of the mullahs had returned from their exile in Iran to take power and hand Mesopotamia to Velayat-e Faqih.
Claiming to be pushing back against Daesh, the Syrian regime, an ally in Tehran’s so-called resistance axis, was rehabilitated. Washington and other Western capitals turned a blind eye to what had happened in Syria. The “red lines” drawn by Barack Obama miraculously vanished. Not long after that, Donald Trump assured the top brass of the Damascus regime that the only goal of the US forces on Syrian soil was to fight Daesh.
Last but not least, international authorities did not see a threat to the Yemeni social fabric in the Houthis’ takeover of the country, nor did they see the threat this development posed to neighboring countries or trade on international waters.
Everyone following the political and military developments in the region is familiar with this record. It also highlights the complexities of US-Russian relations on the one hand and Russian-Iranian relations on the other.
There is no doubt that the Ukraine war has created a new global reality, with repercussions for the Middle East. The growing roles of China and India and their ambitions for the region have also been consequential, as has Israel’s accelerating retreat from its commitments to peace, despite some Arab states seeking normalization with it in the hope of weakening the Likud and ensuring that it loses its bet on extremism.
In this climate, Tehran seized the moment to reassert its role as a regional player, doubling down on its refusal to allow its interests to be bypassed or its status as an influential political, military and oil market player.
Thus, through “strategic allies,” as it calls them, or “Tehran’s proxies,” as the West views them, it made its move on Oct. 7. Unfortunately, the operation served the objectives of Benjamin Netanyahu. He is Israel’s worst-ever leader and the most hostile to peace. The operation also caused tremendous humanitarian suffering in the Occupied Territories. And it coincided with the presidential election campaign in Washington, the rise of far-right populism in Europe and India and an aggravating crisis with Russia over Ukraine.
Some now say that the era of implicit understandings and shared priorities between Tehran and the Washington-Tel Aviv camp has come to an end, meaning that Iran’s field negotiations have become a risky venture.
On the other hand, others believe that Washington and Tel Aviv have become convinced that the Iranian leadership still believes it has enough cards to negotiate greater influence in the region from a position of strength. These observers also note that the Gaza war has demonstrated Israel’s total reliance on Western logistical support and that Tehran’s proxies can obstruct and confuse, as well as create regional tension. In this, they have benefited from the diminishing faith in peace with the current right-wing government in Israel.
- Eyad Abu Shakra is managing editor of Asharq Al-Awsat. X: @eyad1949
- This article first appeared in Asharq Al-Awsat.