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The accident that led to the death of former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and his accompanying delegation in May increased the mystery surrounding the identity of the potential successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who is 85 years old. Khamenei, despite his remarkable activity and many public appearances, has dealt with several health issues in recent years.
Raisi was one of the names widely proposed as his successor and he was described as the “next leader” prior to his death. However, I believe that these predictions were not realistic, as Raisi lacked the charisma needed for leadership, in addition to his limited administrative experience and popularity among Iranians.
For many years, Raisi occupied the position of custodian of the Imam Reza shrine in the city of Mashhad. This position has significant spiritual and economic influence, with the custodian supervising the management of a shrine that is visited by millions of pilgrims from inside and outside Iran annually.
Despite that, when Raisi ran in the 2017 presidential election, he lost to Hassan Rouhani, which made him accuse Rouhani’s government of “engineering the elections.” He added that “Iranians are witnesses of what happened in the ballot boxes.” Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli responded, affirming that the elections “were fair and legal,” as reported by the IRNA news agency.
Despite this, Raisi ran again in the 2021 presidential election and won, after a strong competitor — former parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani — was disqualified and prohibited from running.
The election won by Raisi, who received 72.38 percent of the votes, saw a turnout of just 48.78 percent, which at the time was the lowest in the history of the Islamic Republic, indicating a widespread public reluctance. That record low turnout was surpassed by last Friday’s vote, when participation amounted to only about 40 percent.
So, the late Raisi did not have the popularity that would have allowed him to be the strongest candidate to succeed Khamenei. However, he would have perhaps played an important role in the transition process during the post-Khamenei phase.
After excluding Raisi due to his death, the name of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the current leader, was widely circulated in the media. In a previous article for Arab News, I explained the factors that will prevent Mojtaba from succeeding his father and occupying a position of leadership and authority.
There are two other possible names remaining: the former head of Iran’s judiciary, Sadeq Larijani, and former President Rouhani. What are the odds of these two men becoming supreme leader?
Larijani is a religious scholar and jurist — able to deliver formal religious decrees — who belongs to a noble family, as his father was the late senior jurist Ayatollah Hassanzadeh Amoli. Larijani, who also holds the title of ayatollah, is married to the daughter of a very well-known religious authority in Qom, Sheikh Hossein Wahid Khorasani. However, Khorasani is not involved in politics and does not believe in the guardianship of the Islamic jurist.
Larijani has also assumed several positions in the institutions of the Iranian regime, including being head of the judiciary and a member of the Assembly of Experts, Guardian Council and Expediency Discernment Council. But this accumulated experience and his family status did not enable Larijani to continue in the Assembly of Experts, as he came last among five candidates who ran for the position in Mazandaran Province this year.
The late Raisi did not have the popularity that would have allowed him to be the strongest candidate to succeed Khamenei.
Hassan Al-Mustafa
This decline in Larijani’s role was expected, especially after he publicly expressed his dissatisfaction when the Guardian Council in 2021 disqualified his brother Ali Larijani from presidential elections. He also protested against “increased interventions in the decisions of the Guardian Council through false reports.”
This was followed by another development. In August 2021, Guardian Council spokesperson Hadi Tahan Nazif announced that Sadeq Larijani did not sign Raisi’s credentials. He said that “the credentials were signed during a meeting of the Guardian Council before the inauguration ceremony,” adding that “Sadeq Larijani wasn’t present,” prior to Larijani’s resignation from the council.
Following the death of Raisi, Ali Larijani tried to run for the presidency again. However, the Guardian Council disqualified him for a second time.
All these facts indicate that the influence of the Larijani family is declining and that the hard core of the radical movement does not want them. This makes Sadeq Larijani’s chances of being the next “leader of the revolution” very low, following the disputes that became public and are increasing day by day.
What about Rouhani?
A day before Friday’s Iranian presidential election first round, fundamentalist candidate Alireza Zakani announced his withdrawal. However, what was interesting was that he called on “candidates Saeed Jalili and Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf to unite,” so they could “prevent the formation of a third Rouhani government.”
There is an obvious front that has already formed, the members of which are demanding further cooperation to limit Rouhani’s influence, especially after Rouhani declared that he supports the reformist candidate in the presidential election, Masoud Pezeshkian. Rouhani called on “those who want constructive relations with the world to vote for Masoud Pezeshkian on Friday.”
Rouhani’s invitation came following a message from the head of the reformist movement, Mohammed Khatami, in which he also supported Pezeshkian’s candidacy.
This alliance between “moderate conservatives,” as represented by Rouhani, and the “reformists,” as represented by Khatami, has not been well received by members of the fundamentalist movement, as they consider it to be a threat to the revolution and its values.
In January, the Guardian Council rejected Rouhani’s candidacy for membership of the Assembly of Experts. This move aimed to prevent Rouhani from forming a large block of candidates from Tehran and that would have significant influence inside the body, which is about to assume the important role of preparing the post-Khamenei phase.
Therefore, Rouhani will also not be Khamenei’s successor. This is because radical religious scholars, fundamentalist politicians and prominent officials in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps perceive him as someone who cannot be trusted to preserve the values of the revolution and who would seek to make a deal with European governments and the US.
Neither Larijani nor Rouhani will assume the position of leader of the revolution in the post-Khamenei phase, despite having significant educational and administrative qualifications, especially Rouhani, who is also a jurist.
Most probably, the alternative will be a leadership council instead of just one person.
A name from the background, supported by radical jurists and the IRGC, could also be suggested. This might already be in the preparation phase, behind the scenes and away from the spotlight, so as not to ruin his chances of assuming an important position in the regime.
• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher interested in Islamic movements, the development of religious discourse and the relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran.
X: @Halmustafa