Middle East’s new phase creates opportunities and challenges

There is a new structure in the Middle Eastern order in general, and the Arab order in particular, in light of the strategic vacuum, shedding light on two important stages. The first relates to the traditional regional structure, while the latter pertains to the new regional structure.

The first stage lasted from the early 2000s to the early 2020s. During this period, the regional structure underwent significant shifts, in which Arab influence either fell or vanished — both regionally and internationally. This resulted in a strategic vacuum as a result of the collapse of the Arab regional order.

The regional security system deteriorated as a result of transformations such as the US invasion of Iraq, Israel’s aggression against Lebanon in 2006 and the impacts of popular demonstrations on Arab stability. This is in addition to the rise of nonstate actors, the shift in America’s strategic position toward the region by refraining from backing historical allies, the gradual US withdrawal from the region and the signing of a nuclear deal that did not take into account the interests of Arab and Gulf states, as well as abandoning the principle of limiting expansionist regional powers.

Attempts to fill the strategic void have created an appropriate environment for regional powers to also try and fill this void. In the meantime, China and Russia have been progressing to compete head to head with the Western powers on regional issues.

Meanwhile, the influential regional powers, particularly the Gulf states, have turned to new alternatives in light of the ineffectiveness of the old structures in the face of challenges. They have proposed, as a test, the expansion of the Gulf Cooperation Council, established an international coalition to combat terrorism, formed a coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen, sought to set up an Arab NATO and attempted to reshape relations with the US under the Trump administration. Despite the convergence of viewpoints, US behavior reiterated Washington’s withdrawal in light of China’s rise and the shift in its own priorities. The Biden administration has clearly adopted this orientation.

Here, we can conclude that the traditional regional structure has been devoid of any influential Arab powerhouses, except for Saudi Arabia’s attempts to mitigate the impacts of the popular uprisings in the Arab world and counter regional geopolitical projects.

The second stage, that of the new regional structure, was triggered by the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. It has a similarity with the previous stage: the continued strategic vacuum. The differences are related to the features of this continued strategic vacuum, the level of Arab influence in curbing the regional powers’ expansionist projects and maximizing Arab tools of influence throughout the region.

The state of the strategic vacuum has persisted as a result of regional shifts. However, this time there have been Arab attempts to vie with regional powers to fill the void created by the total US military withdrawal. This has, in turn, paved the way for regional disputants to entrench their strategic foothold. In addition, the Middle East is no longer a priority for US strategy, which has instead pivoted eastward to encircle China. Thus, the pressures exerted by the monopolar world order on the regional expansionist powers have diminished, which has caused the Arab nations to feel the need to have a bigger share of influence to fill this strategic void.

There have been Arab attempts to vie with regional powers to fill the void created by the total US military withdrawal

Yet, Russia displayed defiance to the international rules — well established since the end of the Cold War — when it announced the start of its invasion of Ukraine, an ally of the West. It was a message to the Arab nations that Washington and its historic allies are no longer the only influential actors on the global arena. There are other rising poles that could cause transformations that shake the global order to the core, turning it into a multipolar world order.

Arab influence at this stage appeared in Saudi efforts to reduce reliance on the US and expand the international relations network, especially with alternatives such as China. But Egypt’s rejection of the eviction of Palestinians and the total liquidation of the Palestinian cause cannot be overlooked. In addition, laying out the initiatives of mediation and the settlement of regional crises — through influential Arab actors such as Saudi Arabia — are two of the signs of the new Arab influence.

Accordingly, the settlement of Saudi-Iranian differences have impacted Yemen, Syria and Iraq, thereby creating a wave of regional reconciliations, in addition to imposing an acceptable formula of settling the Palestinian cause based on the two-state solution. The US has also coordinated with Saudi Arabia to attempt to settle the Sudanese crisis. And Riyadh has deployed the lever of oil, working to stabilize global prices.

Saudi Arabia has also taken advantage of its geopolitical location, turning it into an advantage that places the Kingdom at the heart of global trade projects. The Kingdom’s steps are enhanced by the confidence of major global partners, the ambitious Vision 2030 and the awareness of the Saudi leadership of the necessity to transform its competitive advantages into sources of external influence that maximize its regional and global standing.

Thus, Arab nations have a considerable share in the new regional structure, resulting in the creation of a new system that restructures the hierarchical order and causes the major actors to reconsider their positions toward Arab issues. This has been clear in the Arab position toward allowing aid into Gaza, refusing to pulverize the Palestinian issue and clinging to the two-state solution.

The Middle Eastern reality is already being restructured away from the old structures. The region is no longer a space for US influence and hegemony, as China has entered it through strategic cooperation agreements. Additionally, Russia has entered under a global umbrella that is contributing to changing the current regional landscape. Security initiatives are no longer the only catalysts for regional policies; the economy has also become part of these interactions. Here, we should not be heedless of the Saudi initiative that laid out the new Middle East project, which expands the region to encompass areas from Central Asia to West Asia. It is a security-economic project that does not place a veto on including Iran — on condition that it abandons its ideological orientations.

In light of the new reality, Israel could be integrated with the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia has been a stone’s throw away from normalizing relations with Israel on the condition of reaching an equitable settlement to the Palestinian issue. Operation Al-Aqsa Flood came to reiterate the Kingdom’s position that Israel will not enjoy peace or security without resolving the Palestinian issue. The ball is now in Israel and the US’ court. In case Israel recognizes Palestinian rights, the Abraham Accords could be expanded, thus creating a new regional landscape marked by an Arab-Israeli partnership.

The current regional landscape is fraught with challenges. The regional powers continue to aspire to enhance their clout in the absence of arrangements or structures that would manage the ongoing competition. However, it is clear that the region is entering a new phase whose trajectories are hard to predict. At the same time, we have an opportunity to bypass the traditional concepts, shifting instead to new formulae, chiefly driven by the need for security, stability and deepening economic cooperation.

– Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is the founder and president of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah). X: @mohalsulami