The lessons of Fouad Chehab’s Lebanon rescue mission

Amid the presidential vacuum in Lebanon and against the backdrop of armies’ experiences of power in the Arab world and even across the Third World, some Lebanese recall a phenomenon called Fouad Chehab.
This man, who passed away 50 years ago — on April 25, 1973 — at the age of 71, embodied numerous qualities and contradicting dimensions. He was the descendant of an Arab family of Banu Makhzum of Quraysh, the leadership of which was located in the region of Wadi Al-Taym in southeast Lebanon, with the towns of Hasbaya and Rashaya constituting its stronghold. The Chehab family, which was originally Sunni Muslim, was later entrusted with the Emirate of Mount Lebanon following marriages that tied them to the Ma’n family, who were the Druze “emirs of Mount Lebanon” and the descendants of Rabi’a, one of the mother tribes of the Arab Adnanites.
However, during the reign of Emir Youssef Chehab (1770 to 1789), some emirs of the Chehab family, especially in Mount Lebanon, converted to Christianity, while others kept their Sunni Muslim faith. Several of the latter became prominent politicians and personalities, such as the former Lebanese Prime Minister Khaled Chehab, the martyr Aref Al-Chehabi and the head of the Arab Academy of Damascus, Mustafa Al-Chehabi.
This background, enriched by its diversity and culture, contributed to Fouad (bin Abdullah bin Hassan) Chehab — a Maronite Christian — rising above the sick sectarianism and partisanship. Similarly, his military experience as an officer, then as army commander, contributed to shaping his institutional convictions, as well as his strong belief in the constitution and his insistence on adhering to laws and holding himself accountable before others. Indeed, Chehab lived a modest and ascetic life and died as a modest and ascetic person, despite being significantly influential and respected, especially after he was elected president of the republic.
Both times that Chehab attained power, it was the power that technically sought him. He did not ask for it. As army commander, he was appointed interim prime minister for a few days in 1952 following the resignation of President Bechara El-Khoury and Prime Minister Saeb Salam. He was then elected president in the wake of the 1958 “revolution” against President Camille Chamoun. Chehab’s decision to refuse the army’s intervention in the civil conflict was the main factor that qualified him to be the “rescue president,” who would mend the souls of the people, rebuild the country and relaunch the journey of development and institution-building. This is exactly what Chehab did throughout his six years in office. Thus, he was deservedly dubbed the architect of the modern state in Lebanon.
Chehab, who had no children, refused to establish a political party of his own. He did not cause confrontations with his opponents and did not seek to dominate a sect under any pretext. On the contrary, amid the emergence of the Nasserist movement and after Syria joined Egypt in what was known as the United Arab Republic, his deep awareness of how sensitive the equilibriums were and the fear of emotional outbursts in Lebanon, which had just emerged from an armed civil conflict, led him to meet with President Gamal Abdel Nasser inside a tent that was set up on the Syrian-Lebanese border.
However, the zeal of some army officers marred the memory of that honorable man, as the Second Bureau — the army intelligence service that Chehab had established — infiltrated the political game and its practices falsely gave the Lebanese public the impression that it was speaking and acting on behalf of the president.

He did not cause confrontations with his opponents and did not seek to dominate a sect under any pretext.

Eyad Abu Shakra

The direct result of that was Chehab rejecting the calls for him to seek reelection for a second term. Charles Helou was therefore elected in 1964. Helou’s mandate was considered a continuation of Chehab’s until the elections of 1968, when the largest Christian parties rallied together — a move that was backed by the patriarch — and defeated the Chehabist candidates in most of the Christian constituencies.
These developments also negatively affected the chances of Elias Sarkis for some time, as he was Chehab’s closest aide (and was elected president years later). As a result, Suleiman Frangieh was elected president in 1970 with one vote more than Sarkis. It is worth noting that the Lebanese civil war broke out before the end of Frangieh’s mandate and lasted until 1990.
When revisiting Chehab’s political legacy and the developments in Lebanon both before and after his presidency, we notice the following.
Firstly, pluralistic societies, especially in the Third World, often live while waiting for a so-called hero to save them from their contradictions and to end their divisions. In many cases, these societies find charismatic leaders who might temporarily succeed under exceptional circumstances that match or go in line with their appeal. However, long-term success is not guaranteed. They might even undermine the existing institutions that the “hero” has inherited, established or promoted.
Secondly, given the structure of armies, the command structure prevails, as there is no room for debates, interpretations or clashing ideas within an apparatus whose primary mission is a nation’s security and the protection of its borders. This structure and system contradicts parliaments and their political parties. Additionally, in the absence of a genuine intention — between the military and political institutions — to coexist based on a culture of integration and recognizing that the common interest lies in a unified purpose, contradictions will occur sooner or later.
Thirdly, the role of the hero in all of the countries that have experienced this phenomenon was short-lived. For example, in Pakistan, which was established after a divisive civil war, Mohammed Ali Jinnah played this role. However, following his death, the country entered an unending tunnel of military coups and divisive turmoil, the biggest of which succeeded in granting Bangladesh its independence. Things are not too different in Nigeria, where the situation is made worse by corruption infiltrating the successive military and civilian administrations and by the spread of extremist religious groups.
Finally, categorical divisions and economic crises, overlapping with the political-military system’s inability to undertake a rescue mission, could lead us from a divisive state to the blight of fragmentation. For example, what we have seen in Libya and Syria and what we are currently seeing in Sudan is testament to this.
In Sudan, the military has intervened in politics several times. It did so on the pretext of “saving” the country from the parties’ disputes. So, how are things in Sudan today? The disputes between the parties have not ended and they are showing no signs of ending soon. However, South Sudan seceded and the Darfur war in the west resulted in the establishment of a militia that is today showcasing its power on the streets of Sudanese cities. The situation is escalating and separatist voices are emerging from the Beja to the east, while there is nothing that can prevent additional divisions and confusion in other places.

• Eyad Abu Shakra is managing editor of Asharq Al-Awsat. This column first appeared in Asharq Al-Awsat.
Twitter: @eyad1949