How the EU arrived at its new Iran policy

During 2022, the EU has gradually but considerably shifted its position on Iran, from rapprochement to a more realistic position that is closer to that of the US and the GCC. The EU’s push for the resumption of Tehran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal was a main factor in the earlier detente. There was also a desire by some EU member states, including Germany, to engage with Iran politically and economically in the hope such engagement would moderate its behavior.
Last week, the European Council announced its strongest “conclusions” or resolutions on Iran, confirming a decisive shift, which started earlier this year, in the group’s Iran policy. The council cited the human rights situation in the country, the repression of the ongoing protests, its military cooperation with Russia — including the delivery of drones deployed by Russia in the Ukraine war — the failure of the JCPOA talks, and Iran’s destabilizing regional conduct. The European Council is the EU’s highest body, consisting of the heads of state or government of the EU’s member states, together with its president and the European Commission president. It defines the EU's general political direction and priorities.
In its newest measure, the council added 20 individuals and one entity to the list of those subject to restrictive measures, “in view of their role in the violent response to the recent demonstrations in Iran following the death of Mahsa Amini.” It also added four individuals and four entities to the list for “undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,” in a reference to their role in the development and delivery of drones used by Russia in the Ukraine war. “Restrictive measures” include asset freezes, travel bans to the EU and prohibition to make funds or economic resources available to those listed.
At the start of the protests in Iran, the approach the EU took was low-key, perhaps out of fear that any measures it took could jeopardize hopes for the JCPOA or backfire on the protesters, especially if the unrest turned out to be temporary.
On Sep. 25, the EU issued a statement saying that “the widespread and disproportionate use of force against nonviolent protesters is unjustifiable and unacceptable. People in Iran, as anywhere else, have the right to peaceful protest. That right must be ensured in all circumstances.” The statement was adopted by the 27 member states, joined by 10 others (North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, Moldova, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland).
On Oct. 17, the EU issued a stronger statement condemning the “widespread and disproportionate use of force,” which is “unjustifiable and unacceptable.” It also announced that it had sanctioned 11 individuals and four entities, “in view of their role in the death of Mahsa Amini and the violent response to the recent demonstrations in Iran.” By then, the list of those sanctioned in Iran comprised a total of 97 individuals and eight entities. The EU’s Iran sanctions regime was extended to include a ban on exports to Iran of equipment that might be used for internal repression and of equipment for monitoring telecommunications.
Three days later, the EU sanctioned three Iranian individuals and one entity for “undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,” in view of their role in the development and delivery of drones used in the Ukraine war. It promised to “respond swiftly and decisively” to further Iran’s actions in the war.
On Nov. 14, the EU sanctioned 29 individuals and three entities “in view of their role in the death of Mahsa Amini and the violent response to the recent demonstrations in Iran,” bringing the list up to a total of 126 individuals and 11 entities.
And then last week, the EU finally announced its new approach to Iran — direct, comprehensive and forceful, and not only about human rights violations but also about Tehran’s malign behavior in the region and beyond.
Starting with the protests in Iran, the EU “strongly” condemned “the widespread, brutal and disproportionate use of force by the Iranian authorities against peaceful protesters, including women and children, leading to the loss of hundreds of lives, in clear breach of the fundamental principles enshrined in international law.” It also condemned “restrictions on communications, including internet shutdowns,” and “persistent impunity for grave human rights violations.”
The EU strongly condemned “any type of Iran’s military support,” including drones, for use in the Ukraine war, a violation of international law, the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

Last week, the EU finally announced its new approach to Iran — direct, comprehensive and forceful.

Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg

It reiterated its “determination that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon,” expressing deep concern about successive International Atomic Energy Agency reports “documenting the alarming acceleration of Iran’s nuclear” program, which “gravely” departs from its JCPOA and Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments.
The EU then condemned “Iran’s continued destabilizing activities in and around the Middle East,” including its activities with ballistic and cruise missiles, drones and the transfer of such advanced weaponry to state and nonstate actors. It urged Iran to cease destabilizing activities in the form of “political, military or financial support, including to nonstate actors, in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon,” and called on Tehran to respect the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors,” citing several UNSC resolutions violated by Iran. It also urged Tehran to “stop all actions or attempts that disrupt or threaten the safety and freedom of navigation in and around maritime routes in the wider Gulf region.”
This new approach adopted by the European Council was anticipated by a statement made last month in Bahrain by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. She said that Gulf security matters to Europe and stressed the need for a stronger security architecture in the region “against the spread of chaos,” asserting that “Europe is willing to do its part,” including closer cooperation and a coordinated approach to Iran, “with a broader focus than nuclear.”
These robustly worded statements and the tough conclusions adopted last week by the EU provided the background to high-level visits by members of the European Parliament to Riyadh this week. There, it became clear that they are also in sync with the European Council and other European institutions in pushing through with the new, realistic Gulf policy that has been articulated in the EU’s Joint Communication on Strategic Partnership with the Gulf of May 2022. The most important step would be to cement further the EU-GCC strategic partnership, announced earlier this year, as a basis for confronting the regional challenges behind the recent shift in the EU’s Iran policy.

• Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the GCC assistant secretary-general for political affairs and negotiation, and a columnist for Arab News. The views expressed in this piece are personal and do not necessarily represent GCC views. Twitter: @abuhamad1