Elections are not the panacea for Libya’s ills

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Despite the aspirations of a traumatized, war-weary Libyan populace, and well-intentioned posturing by the international community, promoting the December elections as a foregone conclusion was the height of credulity.

This is not the first time that one development or other has been touted as the panacea for Libya's post-2011 ills. Too often there has been a misreading of Libya's constantly evolving dynamics, and influential actors frequently dismiss profound complexities in favor of simplistic patchwork solutions that end up doing more harm than good.

After a decade of civil war and political upheaval, Libya was in no way ready for elections pivotal to accelerating democratic aspirations and establishing a peaceful, stable, and fully sovereign state. This is not a dismissal of some of the remarkable efforts by the UN, Arab world countries, and the wider global community. The right tools are still available in the form of tireless UN mediation, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, multitrack dialogues, and even the interim Government of National Unity itself.

However, the rush by an increasingly impatient international community to achieve any semblance of progress has resulted in a fundamentally flawed process. Chasing after symbolic elections while ignoring the problems has created yet another reason for violent clashes to return as armed actors flex their muscles ahead of yet another round of negotiations.

With a formal postponement now looming, numerous actors are seeking to absolve themselves in the inevitable blame game, but the writing was on the wall all along. In a country without proper enforcement mechanisms, there are few guarantees that any judge’s determinations will be respected, especially if rulings are not in favor of known spoilers. In fact, the roughshod enactment of the electoral law itself created an exploitable vulnerability. Without consultation, consent and proper coordination between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, any candidate could easily challenge the results, pointing to their controversial enactment alone as a ground for their illegitimacy. Such engineered vulnerabilities go beyond simply preventing Libyans heading to the polls; the objective was always to ensure that whatever happen on Dec. 24 would be irrelevant.

There is no way a deeply fragmented Libya, with emaciated institutions, collapsed judiciary, and non-existent rule of law was ever going to stage free, fair, credible, transparent, and inclusive elections. The focus of the international community should never have been the insistence on an arbitrary date to hold elections when the environment was always going to be hostile to both the process and the result.

Missing from the year-long rush to get things underway was an acknowledgement that the December vote, while aspirational, was never going to solve everything. For it to be truly transformational, and the results enduring, robust structures, laws, and policies need to be in place, functioning seamlessly. Otherwise, the entire endeavor will fall victim to the same weaknesses that have crippled security sector reform, the unification of state institutions, and transitional justice, and also Libya’s progress in emerging from this ambiguous quagmire of neither war nor peace.

To some known spoilers, however, the delays, confusion and eventual postponement of the elections are not disadvantageous. Despite all its faults, a divided state of Libya is far more tolerable for certain factions whose grip on power is threatened by the decisive mandates delivered via free and fair elections.

There is no way a deeply fragmented Libya, with emaciated institutions, collapsed judiciary, and non-existent rule of law was ever going to stage free, fair, credible, transparent, and inclusive elections.

Hafed Al-Ghwell

Over the years, spoilers such as warlord Khalifa Haftar and his chief political ally, Aguila Saleh, the head of the eastern House of Representatives, have perfected their disruptive politicking, while weaving themselves deep into Libya’s political fabric, making their excision practically impossible. The Haftar-Saleh coalition benefits from postponed elections by remaining on the ballot so as to spoil outcomes later should results not go their way. Alternatively, should the focus turn to creating a successor to the GNU after its mandate expires, they remain well positioned as the second half of a tenuous power-sharing deal between east and west. Either way, they are not going anywhere.

That these two political figures find themselves in such an enviable position, whether elections proceed or not, is a byproduct of the UN’s “big tent” approach to conflict resolution, and the Haftar-Saleh determination to foist their authoritarian vision on post-civil war Libya. The UN sought to bring as many diverse voices to the table as possible in search of an inclusive settlement. However, noble as its aim is, it works only when warring factions have shared interests and similar political visions for the postwar landscape.

Unfortunately, a decade of upheaval has polarized Libya, worsened by the preponderance of armed groups with their own mercenary ideals, hostile to the formation of a truly democratic and stable state. Insisting on processes that require the consent of such diametrically opposed interests to be fully functional inevitably painted the global community into a corner.

Growing impatience eventually led to political expediency overriding necessity. Thus, when an election “law” that was essentially a diktat from a known spoiler emerged, several actors and the UN hastily accepted it, ignoring the obvious ploy to prolong the east’s influence on an inevitably chaotic post-elections landscape. Tragically, the determination to hold the elections at any cost meshed well with plans by malign actors to preserve the status quo by any means possible, even if it meant projecting false cohesion around elections. Where the international community saw a window of opportunity to hold elections, spoilers saw a chance to feign cooperation while corrupting or disrupting the run up to December to further entrench themselves.

Surprisingly, most Libyans appear unperturbed by the prospect of delayed elections, and remain eager to cast their ballots even if it means doing so after Dec. 24. A record number of candidates in both the legislative and presidential elections underscores the importance of these elections, and presents an opportunity for Libyans to clear the slate after a decade of woes.

Most of the alarm surrounding the delay is from an international community that had bet on the election taking place without interruption. It can only be hoped that by postponing the elections, more time will be afforded for a recalibration of global efforts in Libya. This time, however, focus should be on creating a conducive environment for elections, and committing to a credible roadmap that also outlines expectations for the morning after.

  • Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Institute at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Twitter: @HafedAlGhwell