Iran’s target: An Israeli ship or the nuclear deal?

The relative lull in the volatile relationship between Iran and Israel leaves a deceptive sense that both sides are comfortable with the current state of affairs.

The latest instalment was the explosion on the MV Helios Ray, a cargo ship owned by an Israeli company, which Israel has categorically attributed to Tehran, and probably the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran was quick to deny, but for a change there was a consensus in the Israeli government between Benjamin Netanyahu and his “alternate” prime minister, Benny Gantz, who is also the defense minister, that responsibility lay with Iran.

Gantz based his claim on “the location and context” — and context is the key factor here, as this incident adds to the wider geography and circumstances of a hostile relationship that stretches from the Strait of Hormuz to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and clandestine operations elsewhere. However, much of the diplomatic and military commotion currently taking place has to do with the change of administration in Washington, and the posturing over a possible revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of sanctions, which effectively collapsed when Donald Trump pulled out in 2018. Neither the US nor Iran would like to be seen as either coerced into negotiations or coming to the table from a position of weakness. And Israel, though not directly involved, is making sure its voice and concerns are heard.

A blunt contextualisation of the attack on the Helios Ray came from Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, the Israeli military chief of staff, asserting that this was “a reminder that Iran is spreading terrorism and is acting against civilian targets.” Kochavi added that Iran’s threat was not limited to its efforts to develop nuclear capability, but equally in unsettling the region by acts of terrorism, including those against civilian targets. Kochavi has already departed from the convention for those still in uniform, of refraining from expressing political views in public, arguing recently in a major speech outlining Israel’s strategy in the region that it would be a mistake for the US to return to the nuclear deal, and that neither Israel nor the US should rule out military operations against Iran, speculating that without America’s withdrawal from the 2015 agreement Iran would have developed a nuclear bomb by now.

Kochavi’s views widely represent those of most of Israel’s political and security establishment, and their fear of the Biden administration being too soft on Tehran rushing back into the JCPOA without essential adjustments to reflect on the enhancement of Iran’s missile capabilities and Tehran’s continuing regional adventurism, let alone the progress that has been made in its nuclear program.

Iran is still licking its wounds from a difficult 2020, a year that exposed its vulnerabilities, beginning with the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the elite Quds Force, followed by the tragic fiasco of the shooting down of Ukraine Airlines flight 752, and later in the year the assassination of the head of the nuclear weapons programme Mohsen Fakhrizadeh on Iranian soil. Iran has also been hit worse than any other country in the region by the COVID-19 pandemic, exacerbating an already dire economic situation and leading to increased social malaise. And it didn’t help Tehran’s increasing sense of isolation to witness Israel’s 2020 normalization agreements with the UAE and Bahrain, and improved relations with other countries in the region.

Such worsening international conditions for Iran suggest that it should have shown more flexibility, at least on some of the fronts where it clashes with its regional rivals, but this hasn’t been the case so far. It has continued to play hardball, even employing threatening language toward Washington suggesting that it won’t give the US much time to ponder whether it intends to rejoin the JCPOA. Biden’s response of ordering a US airstrike on Iranian-backed militia in Syria might be the first sign that the new administration is embarking on a two-headed policy, one that wishes to return to the negotiating table while at the same time demonstrating that it won’t refrain from tightening the screw on Iran, including by the use of military force.

Iran’s intransigence — for instance, ruling out an informal meeting with the US and European powers on how to revive the nuclear deal until America repeals all its unilateral sanctions — may resonate with the more hawkish elements in the country, and may avoid antagonism with the Revolutionary Guards. Nevertheless, the possible trade-off is one of friction with the international community and further economic hardships that will increase unrest at home.

Imminent elections both in Israel and Iran have also become a major obstacle to addressing the fraught relations between the two powers. The vicious cycle of retribution, especially when the stakes are so high, and given the number of potential theaters of confrontation, is creating an extremely unpredictable situation. The attack on the Helios Ray was not the first incident at sea between the two countries, and as with previous flashpoints both sides are at least for now adhering to a limited use of force, leaving enough room for plausible deniability that won’t force the other side to overreact. However, ensuring the safety of maritime routes is essential for both countries’ trade, and putting them at risk will have a severe impact on both economies. And these types of incident have a cumulative effect.

With more frequent clashes in Syria and even in Iraq, and heightened diplomatic confrontation around the nuclear issue handled by two political systems that suffer from inherent instability, any future incident could be the trigger to a wider and more dangerous confrontation that might further destabilise the region.

• Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations at Regent’s University London, where he is head of the International Relations and Social Sciences Program. He is also an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. He is a regular contributor to the international written and electronic media.

Twitter: @YMekelberg