In Syria, ‘if you are not at the table, then you are on the menu’

In the early years of the Syrian civil war, several peace conferences took place in an attempt to find a solution that could end the crisis. During one of those conferences, a senior diplomat told me, in reference to the relative positions of the countries involved: “If you are not at the table, then you are on the menu.”
I recalled these words when Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that his country would suffer if it failed to maintain a strong presence in Syria, militarily and diplomatically.
“If we weren’t that strong, both at the negotiation table and on the field in Syria today, the front line would be our country itself,” he said on Monday during the 12th Ambassadors’ Conference in Ankara. He added that Turkey’s policies prevent others from acting in ways that are hostile to the country.
Since 2016 Turkey has prioritized the use of hard power to neutralize threats resulting from the Syrian civil war. In contrast to its previous approach, which used soft power and respected humanitarian norms, in the past four years Turkey has relied more on its military.
It conducted three cross-border operations in northern Syria: Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018) and Peace Spring (2019). During the latest of those, the Trump administration ordered US troops to withdraw from Syria, which strengthened Turkey’s position in the country, but also exacerbated the differences between Ankara and Moscow.
Although these Turkish operations had aspects to them that related to management of the humanitarian crisis, aiding opposition forces and eliminating the Daesh threat, they were predominantly designed to prevent the Kurdish PYD/YPG from establishing dominance in parts of northern Syria.
It would not be wrong to say Turkish policy in Syria in the past few years has been closely linked to the Kurdish threat, and is part of Turkey’s 30-year terror campaign against the PKK and its Syrian offshoot, the YPG.
Ankara’s adoption of an assertive military approach in Syria coincided with the election of Donald Trump as US president. Now that Joe Biden is headed for the White House, a new balance in Syria is expected — certainly, it seems, by Syrian Kurds.

It remains to be seen how the new table in Syria will be set — and who will be seated at it and who will be on the menu — given the changing conditions in the region and internationally.

Sinem Cengiz

In an interview with news website Al-Monitor, the commander of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces, Ferhat Abdi Sahin, who goes by the name Mazloum Kobani Abdi, said Biden’s victory in the presidential election might force a change in Turkish behavior. He expects Ankara to reset relations with Syrian Kurds as a result of the financial crisis it is facing, and pressure from the US over its purchase of Russian S-400 missiles.
Turkey has in the past engaged in peace talks with Kurds. PYD leader Salih Muslim even visited Ankara several times for discussions with Turkish officials about the peace process. The PYD promised to not fight against Turkish forces, and not to help the PKK. The Turkish government recognized this and in return accepted PYD control over most of the Syrian border zone.
Talks with the PYD fell apart when the peace process collapsed in July 2015. The situations on the ground and in politics have changed so much since then that a resurrection of the peace process appears unlikely. Therefore, what Abdi means when he talks about a change of heart by Ankara is not, it seems, a change in Turkey’s security-oriented policy on northern Syria. Just a few weeks ago, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan raised the possibility of another offensive against the US-backed PYD/YPG forces in the war-torn country.
Some analysts read Trump’s announcement this week that Defense Secretary Mark Esper has been replaced by Christopher Miller as a change in US foreign policy, especially in Syria. This argument was strengthened when US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that James Jeffrey was stepping down from his posts as US special representative for Syria engagement, and as special envoy to the global coalition to defeat Daesh.
Not so long ago, Biden was vice president when US President Barack Obama decided to support the YPG in Syria. Ankara therefore has plenty of information on which to base a profile of the president-elect, but the Syrian war has proven many times that shifts in the balances on the ground can cause changes in discussions and policies.
Biden is due to take office in January, a few months before the 10th anniversary of the start of the Syrian civil war, to which there is no end in sight. For Ankara, the most crucial aspect of its relationship with the new administration in Washington will be how Biden handles Syria, and whether he supports Syrian-Kurdish militias.
Although relations between Turkey and the US have been strained as a result of a number of crises caused by problematic issues they disagree on, their cooperation in Syria — or lack thereof — will have a significant effect on their overall relationship in the months and years ahead.
It remains to be seen how the new table in Syria will be set — and who will be seated at it and who will be on the menu — given the changing conditions in the region and internationally.

• Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. Twitter: @SinemCngz