https://arab.news/cp4ee
Pakistan is abuzz these days with a proposed change in the official status of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), a stupendously beautiful mountainous region that is legally a part of the country, though with special status and limited rights, and whose ultimate future is tied to a resolution of the seemingly unending Kashmir dispute between Islamabad and New Delhi.
What is so significant about the proposed “GB reforms,” what is likely to change if these come about, and how will they impact not just the people of the region but also Pakistan and India politically? A lot, and fundamentally too, if political pundits on all sides are to be believed.
GB boasts of the world’s highest mountain ranges, tallest peaks and longest glaciers. It is the area of choice for Pakistan’s affluent honeymooners, though underneath this beauty lies uneasy facts that now demand political changes that may be difficult to enact and may deeply impact regional geopolitics.
Both Pakistan and India agree the political future of GB lies with the ultimate fate of Kashmir, itself divided between the two countries with an intractable disputed status that was supposed to be decided by the United Nations but hasn’t been for seven decades, making it the longest running dispute in the UN Security Council. The two South Asian rivals have gone to war twice without resolving the quarrel that is rooted in the bloody Partition of India in 1947.
But a new political buzz on the fate of GB erupted in Pakistan last week that may change all this when it emerged that the security establishment, which de facto runs Pakistan’s India and Kashmir policies, and hence also has a formidable say in how GB is managed by Islamabad, tried recently to take into confidence the country’s opposition parties over GB reforms.
If the process starting with India’s de jure annexation of Kashmir leads to completion of Pakistan’s de jure co-option of Gilgit-Baltistan, the de facto settlement of Kashmir will have occurred, freeing Islamabad and New Delhi of the never ending kinetic political confrontation that is robbing one-fifth of humanity the fruits of human development and socio-economic progress.
Adnan Rehmat
These include a provisional “provincial status” to GB that will allow it to send representatives to Pakistan’s parliament and contribute to making laws that govern the country, including their own region. Hitherto GB is allowed limited autonomy by way of a regional assembly that cannot legislate.
Also proposed is self-rule through an elevated status for GB assembly — on a par with other four Pakistani provincial legislatures — that can make its own laws. The reforms would also allow GB a seat at the powerful National Finance Commission, which meets every five years to manage a policy on guaranteed division of national revenues for the provinces.
If agreed to, this set of reforms will all but make the region a formal part of Pakistan constitutionally. To prevent this far-reaching political reform from running afoul of the current national policy of linking GB’s fate with Kashmir, the proposal is to add in the necessary constitutional amendment providing a legal cover to the reforms a caveat that allows for a reversal of the new policy “if and when the fate of Kashmir is decided.”
And therein lies the catch. The fate of Kashmir seemingly is already being decided de jure with the annexation of New Delhi-administered part of Kashmir by India through a constitutional amendment by the Modi government a year ago that made it a “union territory” (part of India), thereby “removing Pakistan from the Kashmir dispute.”
Now Pakistani seems to be doing likewise. Many in Pakistan and India — including in the divided Kashmir regions and GB — believe that the Kashmir dispute is being “resolved” de facto — without declaration — with constitutional and other political changes by both New Delhi and Islamabad. And that the new GB reforms are part of this undeclared policy to formalize the status quo. Officially both Islamabad and New Delhi reject this assertion.
Nevertheless, in Pakistan things are moving fast. While the military’s attempt to co-opt the opposition for the GB reforms came to nothing due to a current wrangling with the Imran Khan government, the parties said they would engage on the proposals once local elections for GB assembly are over in November and only if they are held fairly and without rigging.
The GB reforms themselves are not opposed by any Pakistani political party per se — except by some Kashmiri groups — but the best place to decide this is inside the national parliament to add transparency to the process and to lend it de jure legitimacy. And the proposed reforms must get assent of the residents of GB. Their fate should only be decided by them and making them the key part of the parliamentary engagement should be the best way to do it to make any reforms representative, beneficial and lasting.
If the process starting with India’s de jure annexation of Kashmir leads to completion of Pakistan’s de jure co-option of GB, the de facto settlement of Kashmir will have occurred, freeing Islamabad and New Delhi of the never ending kinetic political confrontation that is robbing one-fifth of humanity the fruits of human development and socio-economic progress.
- Adnan Rehmat is a Pakistan-based journalist, researcher and analyst with interests in politics, media, development and science.
Twitter: @adnanrehmat1