Erdogan torn between two camps on Syria

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu last Tuesday announced that Turkey’s position on the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system it has bought has not changed, and that it will be activated as planned. Meanwhile, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pleaded for the West’s help in Idlib as he faces the Assad regime, which is supported by Russia and Iran.

For a while, Erdogan managed to maintain relations, however strained, with both the US and Europe on the one hand and Russia on the other. However, now is the time for Erdogan to choose a camp, otherwise he will lose on all fronts. If he does not downgrade relations with Russia, he will not get the support he wants from the West. If he keeps his relations with NATO without getting the required support, Russia will view him not as an ally but as an adversary in a weak position, and it will not give him a favorable deal on Syria.

Erdogan has an uncomfortable relationship, to say the least, with the West. His mounting frustration with his Western partners led him to diversify his alliances and cozy up to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Erdogan’s tensions with Europe and the US came at a time when Moscow rushed to support the faltering Bashar Assad and change the balance of power in favor of the Syrian dictator. Hence, Erdogan wanted to hedge his bets and garner a better bargaining position with the US and the West.

The refugee situation put a lot of pressure on Erdogan domestically, especially with the worsening economic situation. He has always accused the Europeans of not doing enough. He said that refugees from Syria have cost his country $40 billion and Europe has not fulfilled its commitments to Turkey; namely granting Turkish citizens visa-free travel to Europe and an enhanced EU-Turkish customs union. On the other hand, the Europeans accused Erdogan of blackmailing them and using vulnerable refugees as a negotiating card instead of forging a partnership with Europe in order to see how to accommodate them. One of his alleged reasons for last October’s incursion in northeastern Syria, to the east of the Euphrates, was to relocate the refugees back to their own country, though in other people’s homes.

In the fight against Daesh, the US relied heavily on the Kurds, which led to their empowerment. This was an alarming sign for Erdogan, who saw in that a factor that could help mobilize the Kurds at home, especially with the People’s Protection Units’ (YPG) connections to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). He wanted to create some balance and not be too dependent on the US.

As he saw the Americans getting too close to the Kurds, Erdogan went ahead and bought the S-400 system from the Russians. Though his argument was that American missiles came with too many conditions, no proper financing facilities and no technology transfer, the Russian missiles were off the shelf and also included no technology transfer. The transaction also led the US Congress to block Turkey’s involvement in the F-35 fighter jet project.

However, the purchase of the S-400 had a more strategic value than a technical one. To add to it, Erdogan joined Russia in the Astana process, which is a parallel and competing track to the Geneva process aimed at negotiating a peace settlement in Syria. From Erdogan’s perspective (not being sure of his Western allies’ commitment to his project in Syria), he preferred to hedge his bets and open a channel with Moscow. The shooting down of a Russian jet in 2015 after it entered Turkish airspace was expected to trigger a clash, but Erdogan used it for a rapprochement with Putin.

Erdogan’s behavior angered the US, especially his incursion into northeast Syria. Though the operation was conducted with the tacit blessing of the Trump administration and after the withdrawal of American troops, it led to an angry wave against Turkey in the US. Recognition of the Armenian genocide — a resolution that had been adjourned for a long time — received the backing of both chambers of Congress. Sen. Lindsey Graham called for Turkey to be sanctioned and suspended from NATO if it attacked the Kurds. 

Too close a relationship with Putin might mean accepting Assad as the leader of Syria indefinitely.

Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib

However, too close a relationship with Putin might mean accepting Assad as the leader of Syria indefinitely. This would greatly alter the image of Erdogan in the Arab world. He has tried to portray himself as a leader of the Sunni Muslim world by advocating issues such as Syria and Palestine. On the other hand, if he retreats from facing Assad, he will look like a loser and will be opening the door for a wave of attacks from his domestic opponents, especially given that Turkish intervention in Syria has been framed as an integral part of national security.

In a March congressional hearing, “limited” US assistance to Turkey was advised, including the deployment of Patriot missile batteries to enable its NATO ally to create a no-fly zone. However, Turkey will not be able to face Assad, Russia and Iran alone. Erdogan will need NATO’s help to push back against the Syrian regime’s forces. If he does not get that kind of support, he will have to compromise and accommodate Assad and Russia.

Though Turkey cannot decide the fate of Syria, it can decide which camp will decide the country’s fate. The question remains which side Erdogan will choose. Most likely it will be whoever gives him a better deal.

• Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She holds a PhD in politics from the University of Exeter and is an affiliated scholar with the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut.