Many people are aware of the unwarranted and overly sensitive attitude of the Qatari leadership toward Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is due to a “smaller state” complex, in the case of Saudi Arabia, and to a “success and international presence” complex, in the case of the UAE.
Even before the dispute that led to relations with Doha being severed by several of its neighboring countries on June 5, 2017, Qatar viewed the UAE as a rival in relations with Riyadh, the capital of its big neighbor. Doha wanted to be the closest regional friend of Saudi Arabia, which it viewed as a “sleeping elephant.” The Qataris tried to clamber onto the back of this regionally and internationally important ‘elephant’, but failed to do so.
Doha continued to play the role of a rival in its dealings, and by trying to impose its will through plans and projects that were greater than its capabilities such as the attempt to change the regime in Egypt. As a result, tension and friction dominated relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia over the reigns of three Saudi kings.
As for Abu Dhabi, the opposite was true as it followed the path of partnership in almost all areas, and avoided differences in the interests of rapprochement with Riyadh. The relationship between the two countries has remained smooth, even when their viewpoints did not concur, as when Saudi Arabia desired to convert the GCC into a union council. Abu Dhabi was not convinced about this, but did not fight it.
In the year of major regional unrest, namely, the Arab Spring of 2011, high-level coordination helped spare Bahrain the threat of the pro-Iranian movement that called for the overthrow of the government. While Qatar played a disruptive and negative role, Saudi Arabia considered the security of Bahrain to be part of its own national security, and the UAE supported this. The two countries cooperated in an attempt to save Bahrain — and succeeded.
In the Yemen crisis, Qatar initially played a positive political and military role, just like the UAE did, but the Qataris soon found their role limited, reflecting their limited participation. And in Syria, the UAE withdrew its military support from the crisis, leaving Riyadh and Doha to work together. However, Qatar insisted on imposing its own chosen groups - most of which were terrorist or extremist groups - on the rest of Syria’s national forces. Riyadh stood against that move and; in the end, the world witnessed how these extremist forces damaged the Syrian revolution.
Doha has repeatedly questioned Abu Dhabi’s motives in the hopes of sabotaging its close relationship with Riyadh.
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
The UAE was never an opponent in any crisis; and on the Saudi home front, Abu Dhabi never played a role in supporting any group with controversial tendencies. Qatar, on the other hand, never ceased to support groups even when they were openly hostile to the Saudi state or had conflicting ideals, both inside and outside the Kingdom.
This is why the relationship between Riyadh and Doha has been strained for many years. It was only natural for Qatar, with such ethics and practices, to lose the competition for Riyadh’s friendship, and for relations to ultimately reach breaking point.
Qatar did not understand, or rather did not want to understand, that the breakdown had nothing to do with the arrival of Abu Dhabi, but with the rise of a new leadership in Riyadh that handles crises in a different way.
Former Saudi leaders treated Qatari interventions in a traditional way, i.e. by ignoring the problems and tolerating Qatar until the crisis grew. That approach has since changed, strategically and tactically, including the building of effective alliances.
As a result, Doha became hysterical and launched various campaigns, thinking it would succeed in achieving one of three objectives: Separating Riyadh from the Pact comprising Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain, or weakening Riyadh and its allies in major battles such as in Yemen, or introducing external forces, specifically the US to deter the Riyadh alliance.
In an attempt to dismantle the coalition, the Qatari media machine became busy questioning, in Yemen, America and the UAE itself, Abu Dhabi’s intentions toward Riyadh. However, all that was said and written was just the work of a provocative press. Qatar has repeatedly questioned Abu Dhabi’s motivations in the hope of sabotaging the close relationship with Riyadh, including their media cooperation, but has failed to find any hostile UAE activity against Saudi Arabia. The reality is that, contrary to Doha’s claims, the UAE had entrusted qualified Saudi journalists to manage its media facilities, not vice versa.
Doha did not, and will not, succeed in sabotaging the relationship between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi because it is based on genuine respect between the two sides, and truly makes a big difference. They complement each other as the two largest powers in the GCC.
Qatar does not only suffer from a bad reputation, but it also has a really bad record in all areas and interactions with Saudi Arabia. I sincerely pity our brothers in Qatar because they are fighting pointless battles that neither increase the value of Doha nor secure it any political gains.
Sooner or later, Qatar will realize that things across the border have changed, and that going back to the same old games is a dangerous adventure for Qatar itself.
— Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a veteran columnist. He is the former general manager of Al Arabiya news channel, and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat.
Twitter: @aalrashed