“Peace for our time,” declared British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain following the Munich Agreement of September 1938. Subsequent to successive acts of aggression by Germany with the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Spanish civil war and the annexation of Austria, world powers met Hitler’s visions on Czechoslovakia with appeasement.
What had begun as demands to grant autonomy to the German-speaking peoples of Czechoslovakia led to the absorption of the entire territory by Germany. Within a year the world was at war, as once again the patience of the international community was tested with the invasion of Poland. Appeasement had failed.
These events are well documented, but what is absent is a realization of their importance in managing the major geostrategic challenges of today. From the perspective of power politics, the two most significant threats to international peace are the rapid militarization of China and Russia’s aim to achieve global hegemony. These trends are set against a backdrop of perceived US decline, and the international community having resigned itself to the gray area between appeasement and containment.
As the new US defense secretary visits East Asia, the rise of China will be the topic of conversation in each capital. China has pledged $260 billion to shore up its navy and military by 2020. This figure does not compare to US military spending, but it illustrates an ambition to build its hard power. When matched with Beijing’s naval intrigues to extend its influence in the South China Sea, it is evident that it seeks to project power.
This is compounded by the recent revelation by Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies that China has placed anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems on all seven of its occupied islands. Chinese claims to “traditional waters” delimit virtually all of the South China Sea, posing a direct threat to the six other nations involved.
Beijing believes it has rights over land features inside the zone, and their territorial seas and exclusive economic zones, but also over all the water itself — a concept alien to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which China is party.
Given the presence of US naval bases in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines, as well as military ones in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikstan, it is well placed to militarily contain Chinese expansion.
However, it is increasingly clear that a more sophisticated application of power is required to seek a peaceful resolution to China’s growing appetite for its neighbors’ territory. Through its allies, the US has clearly increased its military presence in the region.
Nevertheless, China’s view is that the US has militarized the situation by provocatively “projecting power.” The US is engaged in gunboat diplomacy, China’s deputy foreign minister said in 2015. “This has gone beyond the scope of freedom of navigation. It is a political provocation.”
To calm the waters, the US should engage its allies in showing a united front to counter China’s claims. The US must work with India, Australia and Japan to develop a long-term strategy to contain China or risk seeing its aggressive expansion unchecked.
This strategy is not without its pitfalls. The US needs to realize the growing linkages between Beijing and regional powers: China has replaced the US as Japan’s largest trading partner, China is India’s largest trading partner, and the recent boom in Australia’s mining industry is due to insatiable Chinese demand for minerals.
Within such an interconnected arrangement, the US cannot guarantee its partnerships through military superiority alone; it must position itself as a partner to its allies, reinforcing its place as a global leader through its values and culture.
In the words of American political scientist Joseph Nye, this soft power will allow the US to achieve its ambitions “through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies.”
The last week has seen an escalation of tensions in eastern Ukraine, with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) “seriously concerned about the increasing violence in eastern Ukraine and its impact on the civilian population.” In what has been interpreted as a challenge to the new US administration, it is understood that Russian-backed rebels have continually sought to project power so as to draw out the conflict.
In a similar vein as China’s ambitions, Russian excesses must be checked. A precedent for disrespect of the territorial integrity of its neighbors cannot be allowed to take hold. In this context, it is imperative for the US to act with its allies as primus inter pares so as to avoid direct confrontation with Russia, and to seek its acquiescence to join what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton labelled the “multi-partner world.”
The situation calls for the US to show willingness to defend freedom and project both military and cultural power to better engage with Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe. Using Russian policies as an example, the US must seek to achieve its strategic objectives through multi-pronged strategies.
When Russia had disputes with Ukraine over gas prices, it did not hesitate to cut off supplies as a form of economic punishment. Thereafter, as a more friendly government came to power in Ukraine, Russia used the lure of discounted gas prices to extend its lease of a naval base there. As Russia has reverted to using the stick with Ukraine, the opportunity arises for the US to demonstrate leadership and show itself to be the more benign power and mainstay ally.
There have always been varying degrees of influence and leadership during what historians call “the American century.” The US has never fully been in control, but the periods in which it has been at its strongest are when it has acted alongside its allies to be a powerful force for international peace, as opposed to simply being in possession of the world’s largest arsenal.
• Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator, and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).