Hassan Rowhani: A ‘moderate’ face

Hassan Rowhani: A ‘moderate’ face

Hassan Rowhani: A ‘moderate’ face

I once met him in Tehran when he was in charge of the Iranian national security. He was previously director of the Center for Strategic Studies in Tehran. Of course, these bodies in revolutionary countries mean nothing other than diplomatic cover for security institutions. Rowhani was a calm and indeed polite person. Also he was very balanced.
Rowhani is close to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and not to Hashemi Rafsanjani as it is commonly believed.
However, being close to the supreme leader or not is a smokescreen that conceals a deeper game. In fact it is a part of the game played by the regime to reproduce new tools to rule and deal with the Iranian street. The regime always needs new tools to respond to the new challenges thrown up by the emerging regional and international conditions.
Therefore, branding the president-elect as liberal or reformist does not resonate well as he will not have enough power and prerogatives to carry out reforms without getting a nod from Ali Khamenei.
Of course, Iran suffers from an internal crisis and the Western media onslaught, especially when it comes to its record on human rights. Additionally, Tehran views the regional transformation with fear. The Turkish Spring is becoming reality and many experts expect that Iran is all set to witness its own spring in the near future. For this reason, Iran is trying to pre-empt this possibility by electing a president who can carry forward a reformist discourse to calm the masses and build the external relationship with the world and the region.
The regime is paving the way for an active political role for the Iranian president. This can be done by helping destabilize the security and stability in the region in the coming three months. This may happen despite the cautious Gulf states’ welcome of Rowhani.
The goal behind such escalation is to make the president influential in regional policies and to postpone the onset of the Iranian spring.
The Iranian presidential election is still not — as described by Rafsanjani — the fairest in Iran. The supreme leader decides who will be or who will not be the president of Iran. A gesture from the supreme leader is enough to disqualify any candidate. Also the supreme leader still enjoys the backing of the presidential assembly. Therefore, he is the winner of any elections. If anything, the exclusion of Rafsanjani and the victory of Rowhani is part of the regime’s long-term reading of the future of the Iranian political system. In other worlds, it is not an expression of the will of voters.
It is expected that the supreme leader would offer the new president some support such as releasing the prisoners and rejuvenating the Iranian economy, which is the wining card for Rowhani. He also can help the new president open up to the Gulf countries for Iranian ends.
Simultaneously, he insists on supporting Assad and instigating sedition in Bahrain, Yemen and Al-Qatif. These interventionist actions are not the real task of the president as much as they are tasks for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and its leadership, which is linked to the supreme leader directly.
Despite the new presidential change in Iran and all of its diplomatic and political manifestations, it would be a mistake to pin hope on Rowhani to do things different from his predecessors.
Ahmadinejad just admitted that the nuclear program was not part of the prerogatives of the president but the supreme leader. In fact, Rowhani’s government will be more representative of the supreme leader. The pledges to release prisoners and to restore the dignity and esteem of the country were electoral pledges that were designed to gain popular sympathy.
On the whole, Hassan Rowhani is an exceptional Iranian talent. In addition to his good command of English, German, French, Russian, and Arabic, the man has good knowledge of law. But his personal qualifications are not important in such a political system which is based on internal and external calculations.
These calculations will ultimately supersede the agenda of the government.
Rowhani appears to be the only one who is in a position to come up with cosmetic reforms to contain the popular anger.
Rowhani’s slogans can give him the ability to affect big changes and address some complicated issues. Iran cannot do all of that if it fails to learn the lesson. Alternatively, the country is on the collision course with the region and the world. Additionally, it is subject to internal problem. Rowhani is therefore expected to try to restore the esteem of the state, recover the economy, deal with the popular anger against the authority of the religious men and their political and ideological discourse. High on his agenda are a number of issues: The nuclear program, withdrawal from Iraq and Syria, and the cessation of inciting and instigating sectarian sedition in the region.

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point of view