The plethora of books published about India and China in the last decade has highlighted the dearth of information concerning Pakistan. Even though Pakistan is an important country with more than 180 million people. Pakistan has about six times the population of Afghanistan or even Iraq, twice the population of Iran, and nearly two-thirds the population of the entire Arab world put together. It also possesses nuclear weapons and is one of the most powerful armies in Asia.
The recent publication of Anatol Lieven’s latest book, “Pakistan a Hard Country,” fills a crucial gap. It has received excellent reviews, which are entirely justified. The author has a deep level of understanding about the country, since he reported from South Asia as a journalist for The Times and other prominent publications. Moreover, he has also lived in Pakistan and has conducted extensive research in all the country’s four provinces in recent years. Lieven has gone to great lengths to understand Pakistan and to prove that it is not the failed state too often portrayed in the Western media.
“Pakistan, a Hard Country” is not a study of Pakistan’s international relations, although it does offer some recommendations for Western policymakers. The book describes and analyzes the problems as well as the sources of Pakistan’s internal resilience. In addition, it dwells on the threat from the Pakistani Taleban and their allies, the roots of their support, and the relationship of this support to the war in Afghanistan. The book also studies the policies of the Pakistani security establishment toward Afghanistan and India since these have a crucial effect on domestic developments within the country.
The author depicts Pakistan as a surprisingly tough and resilient state and society, not as an unequal as seen by the outside.
“Pakistan contains islands of successful modernity and of excellent administration, not that many, but enough to help keep the country trundling along: A few impressive modern industries; some fine motorways; a university in Lahore, parts of which are the best of their kind in South Asia; a powerful, well-trained and well-disciplined army; and in every generation, a number of efficient, honest and devoted public servants,” writes Lieven.
We are also reminded that the National Finance Commission Award of 2010, which rebalanced state revenues in favor of the poorer provinces showed that Pakistan’s democracy and federalism possess a “measure of vitality, flexibility and the ability to compromise. None of these things is characteristic of truly failed or failing states like Somalia, Afghanistan or the Congo.”
Lieven underlines throughout the book that in Pakistan the state is weak and society is strong. Any individual or group with power in society will use it to plunder the state for patronage and favors. As little as 1 percent of the population pay income tax and the wealthiest landowners in the country pay no direct taxes at all.
A former Finance Minister Mehboob-ul-Haq explained to the author in 1988 the reasons behind the slow economic development, saying:
“Growth in Pakistan has never translated into budgetary security because of the way our political system works. We could be collecting twice as much in revenue, even India collects 50 percent more than we do and spending the money on infrastructure and education. But agriculture in Pakistan pays virtually no tax because the landed gentry controls politics and therefore has a grip on every government. Businessmen are given state loans and then allowed to default on them in return for favors to politicians and parties. Politicians protect corrupt officials so that they can both share the proceeds. That is why only technocratic, non-political governments in Pakistan have ever been able to increase revenues. But they cannot stay in power long because they have no political support.”
Twenty-five years later these words are strikingly true. The political system is still the same today. The succession of government, whether civilian or military, has not affected the deeper layers of Pakistani politics embedded in groups and allegiances which are changing “with glacial slowness.”
The title of this book was given to the author by a landowner-politician in Sindh explaining the political power of the kinship group in Pakistan.
“This is a hard country. You need family or tribal links to protect you, so that there are people who will stick with you and sacrifice for you whatever happens. That way, you will not be abandoned even when out of government. The tribal people give even ordinary tribesmen some strength and protection against attacks, whether by dacoits, the police, the courts, your tribesmen will get you out of jail, lie for you to the court, avenge you if necessary.”
One of the greatest problems facing Pakistan is the lack of water resources. Pakistan is one of the most arid of the world’s heavily populated countries. According to a 2009 study by the Woodrow Wilson Center, by 2025, Pakistan’s annual water demand will reach 338 billion cubic meters while, if nothing is done to improve the efficiency of water use, the water availability will be the same as present, at 236 billion cubic meters. The resulting shortfall of 100 billion cubic meters would account for two-thirds of the entire flow of the Indus. The access to the shrinking Indus combined with the negative effects of climate change and the tensions between the country’s provinces will threaten the country’s survival. Improving Pakistan’s water infrastructure should become one of the country’s top priorities, as it would also provide massive jobs for unskilled workers and engineers.
Yet Pakistani politics are still dominated by foreign issues. Afghanistan is one of them; it has a strategic importance for Pakistan, which is not always taken into consideration by Western powers. Pakistani establishment fears that under the rule of the non-Pashtun nationalities, Afghanistan will become an Indian client state, leading to India’s encirclement of Pakistan.
Many readers will be surprised to read that contrary to what is said in the Western media, Pakistan was not responsible for the creation of the Taleban in Afghanistan and that the US-led campaign in Afghanistan has triggered an increase in Islamist insurgency and terrorism in Pakistan since 2001.
India in general and Kashmir in particular are still the military’s main concern. America’s growing alliance with India since 2001 and its abandonment of the need for a plebiscite on Kashmir’s fate has caused a deep dissatisfaction with the army institution. In his conclusion the author underlines the importance for the US and EU to reconcile legitimate Pakistani goals in Afghanistan and continue to limit Indian involvement in Afghanistan. The West should also pursue its efforts for a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute.
“Only Pakistanis can control Pakistan and the behavior of the Pakistani security establishment will always be determined by what they see as the vital needs of Pakistan and the Pakistan army.
A new approach to Pakistan over the future of Afghanistan should therefore be part of a much deeper long-term engagement with Pakistan by the West in general and one tied not to the temporary war in Afghanistan but to the permanent importance of Pakistan as a state,” concludes Lieven.
This book gives an insight into the soul of Pakistan, a country often misunderstood and wrongly portrayed in the media. Besides a brilliant introduction, the author gives an in-depth portrayal of the military establishment and tackles key subjects namely, justice, religion and politics. The reader will also find relevant information concerning the country’s provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the Pathans. The fourth and last part of the book deals with the Pakistani Taleban.
One can only hope that this remarkable book will trigger an interest to know more about a country whose legitimate needs have often been ignored. The time has come to understand and acknowledge why Pakistan is so important internationally.
Pakistan: A Hard Country
Pakistan: A Hard Country
