As the European Council prepares to decide on Turkey’s membership of the European Union, the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan is also trying to heighten his country’s Islamic profile.
It looks almost certain that EU heads of state, meeting on Dec. 17, will give the go-ahead for opening membership talks with Turkey. This has already been recommended by a special mission that the EU sent to Ankara last month. What was described as “the last hurdle” was removed in September when the Turkish Parliament approved a new civil code modelled on those in force in all EU member states.
But, even if the EU leaders approve the start of formal membership talks with Turkey, the process could take up to 20 years to complete. Turkey would be asked to implement massive economic, trade, legal, social and cultural reforms in the context of a program known as “mise-a-niveau”, which means bringing it up to the current EU levels. At every stage of this long and fraught process any of the EU member states could delay Turkish membership by raising objections about this or that aspect of the “mise-a-niveau” program.
Although the strongest opposition to Turkish membership comes from Germany, Greece and France, it is not at all certain that those EU members, like Great Britain, that want Turkey to join, will be prepared to force a showdown on the subject.
To make matters more complicated, France’s new Foreign Minister Michel Barnier has dropped hints that Paris may propose that Turkey’s membership be put to a referendum in all of the EU’s 25 nations. With anti-Muslim sentiments in Europe at their highest level ever, and rising, such a referendum could only mean certain defeat for Turkey’s European ambition.
Ironically, Turkey was the first country, outside the original six that created the European Common Market (EEC) to apply for membership in 1960. Once it became clear that the EEC would not even consider the Turkish demand, Ankara scaled down its ambitions and negotiated an associate status which was approved in 1963. Thus Turkey became the second country, after Israel, to become an EU partner without achieving full membership.
“We have been trying to join Europe for the past four decades, “says Turkish State Minister Ali Babacan. “ We have crossed every hurdle put on our way and still pursue our goal with great determination.”
One direct consequence of Turkey’s European strategy has been Ankara’s ambivalent attitude toward relations with the Muslim world. Turkish Euro-enthusiasts have always argued that any sign that Ankara might be highlighting Turkey’s Islamic identity could harm its European ambitions.
Now, however, there are signs that the “moderate-Islamist” government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan intends to build up an Islamic policy in parallel with the pursuit of EU membership.
Last June Turkey hosted a meeting of foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), signalling its intention to play a more active role in shaping pan-Islamic policies
The new two-track policy was further highlighted this week when Turkey hosted the second Joint Forum of the European Union and the OIC.
Turkey has also initiated diplomatic moves to gain control of the so-called Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Committee of the OIC which plays a key role in shaping the policies of Muslim nations toward Israel.
The Turkish leadership, however, is clearly divided on how far should Turkey go in search of an Islamic leadership role.
Some Cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, argue that a Turkish leadership role in the Muslim world would enhance its chances of joining the EU.
“At a time that people are talking of a clash of civilizations, Turkey is a natural bridge of civilizations,” Gul says. “All we are trying to do is to use our position to bring Islam and the West closer together.”
Other Cabinet members, notably Deputy Premier Mehmet Ali Shahin, however, appear to be less than enthusiastic about an Islamic tilt in Turkish foreign policy. They believe that heightening Turkey’s Islamic profile could strengthen those within the EU who oppose Turkish membership precisely on the grounds of its Islamic identity. The powerful army chiefs and leaders of the secularist political parties have indicated similar concern.
It was such a concern that initially prevented Turkey from becoming a full member of the OIC. When the first Islamic summit was held in Rabat, Morocco, on Sept. 25, 1969, Turkey refused to send its president or prime minister. Instead it was represented by Orhan Eralp, a civil servant at the foreign ministry in Ankara. The Turkish delegation also refused to endorse key passages of the final communiqué. It was not until 1995 that Turkish membership of the OIC was accepted by virtually all political parties as a matter of course.
Last June’s ministerial meeting in Istanbul gave Turkey an opportunity to launch two ideas.
The first was that Islam needs to promote currents of “enlightened moderation” against obscurantist movements that have led parts of the Muslim world into violence and terror. To coordinate efforts in that direction a Commission of Eminent Persons will be set up to recommend ways in which Muslims could meet the challenges of the 21st century. The second idea launched by Turkey concerns relations with Israel.
At present only 11 of the 57 members of the OIC have diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. Turkey was the first Muslim nation to recognize Israel in 1948 and to establish relations at ambassadorial level. At the time Israel’s recognition was popular in Turkey where many believed that the Arabs had stabbed the Turks in the back by joining a British-led revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. Turkey also regarded Israel as a potential ally against Arab states which pursued territorial claims against the newly created Turkish republic.
From the 1970s onward, however, Turkey began to develop important commercial interests in the Arab world. At one point almost a million Turks worked in Arab countries, principally Libya, while Turkey’s dependence on Arab oil and transit trade continued to grow. Although trade with the Middle East represents no more than 15 percent of the Turkish foreign trade, it is growing faster than trade with the European Union.
The Turkish argument is that relations between the Muslim world and Israel must be handled by a country that has normal relations, and no history of enmity, with the Jewish state. In that context Turkey is the ideal go-between.
The principal task of the Al-Quds Committee, chaired by Morocco, is to prevent measures that could alter the character of the disputed city or do damage to Islamic edifices there. This necessitates a permanent dialogue with Israel which occupies the Arab part of the city. It also means visits to the city and, if and when necessary, initiating repair projects there. All of that requires Israeli consent, which only Turkey is in a position to obtain without compromising the broader interests of the Muslim world in the city.
Although it has always maintained informal relations with Israel, Morocco still refuses to recognize the Jewish state and establish diplomatic ties with it. Ankara sees this as a handicap for Morocco in the performance of its responsibilities in the Al-Quds Committee.
Ankara sources deny reports that Turkey is, in fact, after the position of the OIC secretary-general which is currently held by Abdelouahed Belkeziz, a Moroccan lawyer and diplomat. Belkeziz’s term will not end until 2005, and he could seek a second term. But since his predecessor, who served for two terms, was also a Moroccan, Ankara believes that other nations should have a chance to nominate the next secretary-general.
Between Europe and Islam, Turkey hopes to forge a synthesis but runs the risk of becoming an outsider to both.
