India sleepwalking into an unbalanced relationship with US
India last week hosted a historic 2+2 summit, which saw the US Secretaries of State and Defense meet with their Indian counterparts for two days in an attempt to advance the Indo-US relationship, which has remained at a standstill ever since the meeting between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in mid-2017.
However, a number of stumbling blocks, all originating in Washington, had prevented this meeting from taking place for many months, as it was initially scheduled for January. So there was relief on both sides when it finally took place last week. But the relief may prove to be short-lived, at least for India, as the meeting’s agenda seemed lopsided, with defense issues dominating the talks overwhelmingly, while several other subjects that are central to India’s economic and geostrategic objectives were skirted.
The biggest takeaway of the 2+2 was a communication and security agreement called Comcasa, under which the US would provide India with its latest and top-secret communications gadgetry and hence allow the armed forces of both nations to communicate with each other through secure channels. This could also enhance India’s capabilities for mounting secret and secure reconnaissance missions across the borders in Pakistan and China.
Comcasa also provides for greater cooperation between the militaries of the two nations, including the further purchase of US defense equipment by India, which has already bought $15 billion of weapons from the US.
Closer cooperation between India and the US in defense is certainly welcome, but it comes with its own challenges, especially for India. Historically, New Delhi has been reluctant to be seen as an extremely close ally of the US, unlike Japan, South Korea or the EU nations. Nonetheless, over the past few years, India seems to be getting drawn into an ever-tighter embrace with Washington — an extremely uncomfortable situation for India, whose geostrategic objectives and ambitions do not totally match those of the US.
In the 2+2 meeting, India not only failed to resolve the issues of importance to its interests, but also seemed to readily place all its eggs in the US basket, gravitating toward an unbalanced relationship with Washington.
Ranvir Nayar
Take Russia, for instance. India has decided to purchase the S-400 Triumf air defense missile system from Moscow, despite the sanctions imposed by the US on Russia that would prohibit any such purchases. Even though the two sides had talked of exempting the Triumf deal from the scope of the sanctions, with Defense Secretary James Mattis saying the US was aware of and sensitive to the historical military ties between India and Russia, there was no clear agreement on this during the New Delhi meeting.
The Russia deal is important for India’s defense capabilities and hence a quick resolution to the issue is important. But the elephant in the room is China. The entire US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region (rebranded by the Trump administration as Indo-Pacific) is aimed at limiting Chinese ambitions and capacities in the region. Thus, China is unlikely to silently watch India and the US develop ties that would curtail its influence.
Relations between the two Asian giants have been rather tense over the last two years; the same time as India cozied up to the US. The two armies have just ended a prolonged stand-off on the border in the Doklam region and a thaw in relations seemed to be setting in after two rushed visits by Modi to China to meet with President Xi Jinping. This is hardly the time for India to again upset its delicately balanced relationship with China.
Another topic where India finds itself in a spot is its relations with Iran, its third largest supplier of crude oil. Tehran was in Trump’s cross hairs even before he took office and the imposition of economic sanctions means India must end all its business dealings with Iran by the end of next month. However, with sharply higher crude prices, India’s options are limited, especially because of extremely favorable terms on oil imports from Iran.
India is also engaged in building a port in the Arabian Gulf, which would allow Indian companies and products access to markets in Central Asia and Afghanistan without having to pass through Pakistan. Iran is unlikely to look on idly if India does not keep its end of the bargain.
The 2+2 meeting also failed to address India’s other concerns, notably the ongoing trade disputes with the US, as well as the decision to curtail H-1B work visas, which are crucial to the Indian IT industry.
In the New Delhi meeting, India not only failed to resolve the issues of importance to its interests, but also seemed to readily place all its eggs in the US basket, gravitating toward an unbalanced relationship with Washington. India must keep its options open and rebalance its key relationships in a way that reflects its own priorities and requirements.
- Ranvir S. Nayar is managing editor of Media India Group, a global platform based in Europe and India, which encompasses publishing, communication, and consultation services.
