Today’s leaders should learn lessons of Camp David Accords

Given the non-existent state of peace processes in the Middle East today — at a time when the processes of war are dominant — it is perhaps salutary to remember one of the few Middle East peace agreements to have lasted. 

 

Monday is the 40^th anniversary of the Camp David Accords of Sept. 17, 1978, signed by Israel and Egypt. For sure a chilly peace has reigned for much of the ensuing four decades, and relations are now at best lukewarm, yet it is a deal that few see disappearing and is central to the region’s politics. Back then, Anwar Sadat’s Egypt was ostracized for years, whereas today most regional powers are inching toward some form of relationship with Israel. 

 

What can we learn from the negotiations? Many might not realize it but these talks looked completely and utterly doomed to failure. After day three of 12, US President Jimmy Carter was begging both sides to give him one more day. 

 

Sadat’s dramatic flight to Jerusalem in 1977 had opened up this opportunity. His visit was so unexpected that the Israeli army orchestra had to hastily learn the Egyptian national anthem from a radio recording. Sadat loved bold, ambitious gestures; his Israeli counterpart Menachem Begin was secretive and preferred detail — but both had fought the British and hated colonialism. Both had been in prison. Ezer Weizman, then Israel’s defense minister, summed it up: “Both desired peace. But whereas Sadat wanted to take it by storm… Begin preferred to creep forward inch by inch.”

 

Begin had recently been elected as Israel’s first Likud leader, a revisionist and believer in Greater Israel. David Ben Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, was scathing: “Begin is a distinctly Hitlerite type. He is a racist who is willing to kill all the Arabs in order to gain control of the entire land of Israel.” Begin was determined not to give up Israeli settlements in Egypt — there were 2,000 settlers in 13 settlements — and also keep Israel’s 10 airfields there. His delegation did not all share the same view. 

 

Sadat, who had made the bold move the year before, had expected a much warmer response to his overture. In his bitterness, he condemned Israel for pumping Egyptian oil from Sinai and for being hell-bent on occupation and conquest. Egypt wanted reparations, something that made Israeli leaders wonder if Sadat had forgotten who had won the wars. If anything, Sadat had far less backing from his delegation then Begin had from his. 

 

 

Carter was not an experienced Middle East hand. The Georgia peanut farmer had barely any Arab or Jewish contacts and little experience of the region. Many advised him not to get embroiled in any process whose outcome was not known. His re-election chances were already looking gloomy. 

 

So the three leading characters in the drama were far from perfect, all suffering from significant domestic opposition. The question is why did it actually achieve an agreement? 

 

Firstly, Carter was hugely dedicated to the task. He could have ended the talks early but he and his experienced team never gave up, even organizing an outing to Gettysburg. In all, the Americans put forward 23 draft proposals. Persistence was key. 

 

Secondly, the US was a pretty impartial mediator during the summit, not something that Carter’s successors — with the possible exception of George Bush Sr. — could be accused of. The 39^th US president cajoled but did not bully, making it clear to both sides that, if they acted in bad faith, it would have implications for their relations with the US. 

 

Thirdly, both the Israeli and Egyptian leaders were determined not to upset Carter and wanted to retain American support: Neither wanted to shoulder the blame for the talks collapsing. 

 

Fourthly, even players with a terrorist past like Begin, who had overseen numerous attacks on the British, could be part of the solution in the end. It reinforces the view that far-right governments in Israel might be more capable of making a deal. Most conflict studies gurus will argue today that successful peace processes must be inclusive and often have to involve those with a bloody past. 

 

The Camp David agreement had plenty of flaws, not least when it came to the fate of the Palestinians: Pledges that Begin had no intention of honoring and Sadat made little attempt to challenge. Who knows, if Sadat had held out, better terms for the Palestinians could have been achieved. Carter certainly tried. Recently released documents show how much pressure he exerted on Israel for this. But Begin never had any intention of implementing the five-year transitional deal that would have seen a withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Imagine if that had happened. One can always argue the deal could have been stronger, fairer and clearer, but at least the bilateral core of the agreement has lasted. 

 

Perhaps most remarkable is the bitterness with which the Israeli right still views Carter. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saw fit to damn Barack Obama by comparing him to Carter: “A president who was hostile to Israel.” Netanyahu shows contempt for any peace process with the Palestinians, as well as a deep resentment at the costs of the one with Egypt. It is the attitude of a man who has no intention of making any sacrifice for peace for his country — something even an extreme hard-liner such as Begin grudgingly understood. 

 

Great leadership is about tough and brave choices; something current leaderships have rarely demonstrated. The three principals in 1978 were far from perfect, but their successors could still learn much from them.