Beijing and its soft power deficit

The $50 billion of US tariffs on Chinese goods announced last week could be “shock therapy,” America’s new National Security Adviser John Bolton said on Sunday. His controversial comments will feed into Beijing’s consideration of reciprocal sanctions on about $3 billion-worth of US goods in what could turn into a trade war.

US President Donald Trump’s rationale for his move in imposing the tariffs, the first time he has specifically targeted China on the trade sanctions front, is his belief that Beijing is employing a range of unfair practices, including stealing US intellectual property. And he has repeatedly criticized China’s large surplus in trade in goods with the US, which was about $375 billion last year.

The White House’s targeting of China in this specific way reflects not just the personal animus that some administration officials appear to have toward that country, but also wider shifts in the global economic and political landscape, with China’s rise to greater prominence one of the defining features of this period.

On the financial front, for instance, IMF data since 2014 has asserted that the Chinese economy is now larger than its US counterpart on a purchasing power parity basis, which makes adjustments for the fact that goods are cheaper in China and other countries than in the US. However, the consequences of the country’s generally strong growth since 2001 have been more than economic and financial.

In terms of perceptions, many believe the global economic and political balance of power has swung significantly. And this is having important, real-world implications, including feeding into the political postures of some US politicians.

During the 2016 US presidential campaign, for instance, Trump promised: “We’re going to turn it around. And we have the cards, don’t forget it. We’re like the piggy bank that’s being robbed. We have the cards. We have a lot of power over China.” One of his threats has long been to impose punitive tariffs on goods made in China; a move that Beijing has always said it would oppose given that its WTO membership prohibits other members from unilaterally raising such tariffs above levels that they have committed to maintain.

The stark change in some international perceptions toward China is underlined by Pew Global Research. In 2017, the public in seven of the 10 EU nations surveyed asserted that China is the world’s “leading economic power” (and, in one further EU nation, Italy, China was tied with the US for the top spot). Moreover, the population in Australia — a long-time US ally in the Asia-Pacific — puts China ahead on this question by a two-to-one margin.
 

China’s explosive economic growth since 2001 has exposed its foreign policy, political values and culture to international scrutiny; increasingly, the rest of the world, led by a newly assertive America, does not like what it sees.  

Andrew Hammond

Thus 58 percent of Australians last year believed Beijing to be the “world’s leading economic power,” a rise of 18 percentage points since 2008. Comparable data for other countries includes the United Kingdom, which has seen a rise from 29 to 46 percent over the same period.

Many of the reasons for these changed perceptions of China’s strength stem from the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis. While much of the developed world subsequently recovered, at a sometimes slow pace, from the worst economic downturn for a generation, China enjoyed mostly strong growth.

While welcomed by many in China, who understandably like recognition of the country’s growing might, this opinion shift is not without headaches for Beijing. For, as Trump’s rhetoric shows, it has exposed the country to greater foreign scrutiny and fed into perceptions, seized upon by politicians like the US president, of angst about China’s rise.

What this underlines is that China’s growing prominence is not without its challenges. The country’s grand strategy has long been premised on a gradual, peaceful transition to power, during which it will grow stronger while keeping a low profile.

The significantly brighter spotlight on the country, especially since 2008, has exposed a “soft power deficit,” which is complicating its rise to power. Soft power, which rests upon the international attractiveness of a country’s foreign policy, political values and culture, is recognized by Beijing as a key political commodity, but one it has had limited success in cultivating to date.

As international perceptions of the country’s power have changed, its global favorability has shown weakness in some key countries and continents, as underlined in Pew’s data in 2017. For instance, across the populaces surveyed in the EU (10 nations) and Asia-Pacific (seven countries), there was overall net negative opinions about China — 44 percent unfavorable to 43 percent favorable in the EU, versus 41 percent unfavorable and 34 percent favorable in Asia-Pacific. 

Moreover, in the United States, China also had a net unfavorability rating in 2017, according to Pew. Trump is well aware of this sentiment, and also the fact that US Republican voters tend to have lower overall favorability than Democrat counterparts toward the country.

Especially if critical scrutiny intensifies, Beijing must find better ways to tackle this soft power deficit, including enhanced international public diplomacy to win more foreign “hearts and minds.” At a symbolic level, example measures might include utilizing the country’s growing capabilities in space travel for high-profile international cooperation projects. Surveys underline that many around the world admire China’s strength in science and technology.

Beijing should also restart a process of addressing foreign concern about its intentions as a rising power. It could intensify efforts to be seen as a responsible and peaceful global stakeholder; and match this rhetoric with actions.

This agenda may pose significant challenges for Beijing. However, unless it is tackled, China’s soft power deficit could only grow bigger in 2018 and beyond.
 
Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.