Measuring the success of NAP

In the aftermath of last year’s Peshawar school tragedy, Pakistan’s political leadership demonstrated great maturity and wisdom to formulate a consensus based 20-point National Action Plan (NAP).
The NAP stressed the need to root out extremism and terrorism from the society as a national priority. Soon after, the setup of controversial military courts was expedited in these extraordinary times with the passage of 21st constitutional amendment. The NAP bucket list also included capital punishment for convicted terrorists, ban on armed militias and preaching sectarian hatred, regulating madrasas and NGO’s, curbing financing of terror groups, framing a policy on Afghan refugees, action against militant wings of political parties and promoting Balochistan reconciliation process. Official figures show that terrorism is down by about 70 percent in Pakistan this year owing to actions against militancy and military operation in the restive north-western region. Despite this phenomenal success, the recent attack on a Peshawar military base by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants provides a grim reminder of the complex terrorism challenge confronted by Pakistan.
Such brazen attacks, even after nine months of NAP implementation, call for a serious review of the government’s capacity to effectively execute the multi-dimensional program. Is the government capable to implement the NAP in its true spirit or will it suffer the same fate as other ambitious plans chalked out in Pakistan? One possible reason for slow progress on goals of NAP can be low political ownership as the parties fear that new anti-terror laws may be used against them as well. It is no secret that major political parties use their armed groups to achieve political objectives. The sweeping powers assigned to security authorities and lack of clear definition of terrorism raise the possibility that NAP may be used as a tool to victimize certain political groups. Therefore, NAP seems to be more a product of political compulsion rather than a determination to weed out terrorism.
Weak prosecution rate by Pakistan’s legal system has also impeded the success of NAP. The much debated military courts have been given a go-ahead by Supreme Court only last month, while special courts formed under the Pakistan Protection Act 2014 (PPA) are still not functioning. There is an urgent need to bring the terrorists to justice otherwise the sacrifices of law-enforcement agencies may go in vain. Other areas of dismal performance include madrasa reforms and efforts to curb financing of terror groups in a largely undocumented economy. The registration and regulation of religious seminaries remains an extremely sensitive, political issue as previous such efforts have been branded as part of an anti-Islamic agenda. It is hoped that the seminary reform proposals are agreed upon by all stakeholders and seen in positive light to promote a better image of these religious institutions.
Effective implementation of a broad program like NAP is greatly dependent on coordination of activities across different provinces and committees. To ensure smooth progress in all areas, it is imperative that the federal government devises a mechanism to centrally monitor, coordinate and share NAP results with all stakeholders.
All provincial governments should recognize that it is their collective responsibility to make NAP a success. The relative lull in violence should not be mistaken for success of NAP – pace of this plan’s progress has been undeniably disappointing so far and the nation hopes for more action on ground in the long battle against scourge of terrorism.