It appears that at least, for now, Lebanon and Beirut in particular have weathered the latest crisis. Sporadic fighting might still be taking place in and outside Beirut but by and large, relative calm has been restored. But the four days of bloody street battles which killed more than 40 people should not pass without lessons having been learned to avoid a similar deadly repeat.

The Hezbollah-government showdown proved first that the Lebanese Army cannot really be called an army, for it did not defend the people of its country as any army is expected to, but shied away from its duty, standing idly by as Hezbollah briefly took over vital institutions and streets in the capital. It had to. Because it is as fragmented as the country, the fear that if it took sides in the battle it would break up, paralyzed it when it needed most to do its job: protect the country and its people from clear and present danger. True, Hezbollah is not an outside foe but the very real danger that Lebanon was and remains perilously close to another civil war should have galvanized the army into unequivocally securing Beirut and saving lives. The army’s weakness in the crisis grinds in sharp contrast to the power and influence exhibited by Hezbollah. The current escalation followed a decision by the Siniora Cabinet to take a more assertive stance toward Hezbollah, but look what followed. The army was forced to repeal the decisions to sack the Hezbollah-supported head of security at Beirut Airport and place Hezbollah telecommunications system under state control for there to be peace. The past week has proved Hezbollah’s ability to cause major damage, even to the country it is supposed to be guarding, when it perceives its strength jeopardized. Hezbollah was chiefly responsible for ridding Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in 2000 and was portrayed as the Arab world’s hero. It has also, at times, shown a certain degree of recklessness. This week’s muscle-flexing was such an instance. It was an abandonment of responsible behavior.

The past few days have shown more than anything else the high price Lebanon is paying for making its government, stripped of a president, so impotent. How is it possible that a government behave like a government when it has not had a head of state for over six months? Nobody is asking Lebanon to change its age-old constitution that dispenses the highest government posts along confessional lines. But the understanding that Hezbollah and the army have reached does not address the fundamental political deadlock underlying the eruption of violence. While all parties agree that the army commander, Gen. Michel Suleiman, should be Lebanon’s next president, they cannot agree on the composition of a new government. Thus the prolonged political paralysis.

The relative calm after the clashes has put at least a temporary hold on the worst sectarian violence since the end of the country’s civil war in 1990. However, as long as the political vacuum is not filled, Lebanon will remain hostage to forces who, at times, work in Lebanon’s best interests and at other times do not.